Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Volume 3
Herausgeber: Kriegel, Uriah
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Volume 3
Herausgeber: Kriegel, Uriah
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Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind presents cutting-edge work in the philosophy of mind, combining invited articles and articles selected from submissions.
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Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind presents cutting-edge work in the philosophy of mind, combining invited articles and articles selected from submissions.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Hurst & Co.
- Seitenzahl: 480
- Erscheinungstermin: 7. Oktober 2023
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 220mm x 139mm x 35mm
- Gewicht: 696g
- ISBN-13: 9780198879466
- ISBN-10: 0198879466
- Artikelnr.: 67732888
- Verlag: Hurst & Co.
- Seitenzahl: 480
- Erscheinungstermin: 7. Oktober 2023
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 220mm x 139mm x 35mm
- Gewicht: 696g
- ISBN-13: 9780198879466
- ISBN-10: 0198879466
- Artikelnr.: 67732888
Uriah Kriegel is Professor of Philosophy at Rice University. He is the author of Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory (OUP, 2009), The Sources of Intentionality (OUP, 2011), The Varieties of Consciousness (OUP, 2015), and Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value (OUP, 2018).
* I. Mind and Science
* 1: Sara Aronowitz: The Parts of an Imperfect Agent
* 2: Henry Cowles and Joshua Knobe: The Average isn't Normal
* 3: Gabriel Dupre: Correspondence and Construction: The
Representational Theory of Mind and Internally-Driven Classificatory
Schemes
* 4: Gabbrielle Johnson: Bias and the Domain of Consciousness
* 5: Preston Lennon: Aphantasia and Conscious Thought
* 6: Maja Spener: The Introspective Method
* II. Sensory Experience: Perception, Imagination, Pleasure
* 7: Dorothea Debus: Right Here, Right Now: On the Eudaimonic Value of
Perceptual Awareness
* 8: Justin D'Amrbosio and Daniel Stoljar: Imagination, Fiction, and
Perspectival Displacement
* 9: Daniel Pallies and Alexander Dietz: The Dilemma for Attitude
Theories of Pleasure
* 10: Davide Bordini: Seeing through Transparency
* III. Book Symposium on David Papineau s The Metaphysics of Sensory
Experience
* 11: David Papineau: Précis of The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience
* 12: Alex Byrne: Papineau on Sensory Experience
* 13: Angela Mendelovici: Truth and Content in Sensory Experience
* 14: Adam Pautz: An Argument Against Papineau s Qualitative View of
Sensory Experience
* 15: David Papineau: Responses to Mendelovici, Pautz and Byrne
* IV. History of Philosophy of Mind: Cavendish and Strong
* 16: David Cunning: Cavendish and Strawson on Emergence, Mind, and
Self
* 17: Alison Peterman: 'Actions of a Body Sentient': Cavendish on the
Mind (and against Panpsychism)
* 18: Galen Strawson: C. A. Strong: Real Materialism, Evolutionary
Naturalism, Panpsychism
* 1: Sara Aronowitz: The Parts of an Imperfect Agent
* 2: Henry Cowles and Joshua Knobe: The Average isn't Normal
* 3: Gabriel Dupre: Correspondence and Construction: The
Representational Theory of Mind and Internally-Driven Classificatory
Schemes
* 4: Gabbrielle Johnson: Bias and the Domain of Consciousness
* 5: Preston Lennon: Aphantasia and Conscious Thought
* 6: Maja Spener: The Introspective Method
* II. Sensory Experience: Perception, Imagination, Pleasure
* 7: Dorothea Debus: Right Here, Right Now: On the Eudaimonic Value of
Perceptual Awareness
* 8: Justin D'Amrbosio and Daniel Stoljar: Imagination, Fiction, and
Perspectival Displacement
* 9: Daniel Pallies and Alexander Dietz: The Dilemma for Attitude
Theories of Pleasure
* 10: Davide Bordini: Seeing through Transparency
* III. Book Symposium on David Papineau s The Metaphysics of Sensory
Experience
* 11: David Papineau: Précis of The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience
* 12: Alex Byrne: Papineau on Sensory Experience
* 13: Angela Mendelovici: Truth and Content in Sensory Experience
* 14: Adam Pautz: An Argument Against Papineau s Qualitative View of
Sensory Experience
* 15: David Papineau: Responses to Mendelovici, Pautz and Byrne
* IV. History of Philosophy of Mind: Cavendish and Strong
* 16: David Cunning: Cavendish and Strawson on Emergence, Mind, and
Self
* 17: Alison Peterman: 'Actions of a Body Sentient': Cavendish on the
Mind (and against Panpsychism)
* 18: Galen Strawson: C. A. Strong: Real Materialism, Evolutionary
Naturalism, Panpsychism
* I. Mind and Science
* 1: Sara Aronowitz: The Parts of an Imperfect Agent
* 2: Henry Cowles and Joshua Knobe: The Average isn't Normal
* 3: Gabriel Dupre: Correspondence and Construction: The
Representational Theory of Mind and Internally-Driven Classificatory
Schemes
* 4: Gabbrielle Johnson: Bias and the Domain of Consciousness
* 5: Preston Lennon: Aphantasia and Conscious Thought
* 6: Maja Spener: The Introspective Method
* II. Sensory Experience: Perception, Imagination, Pleasure
* 7: Dorothea Debus: Right Here, Right Now: On the Eudaimonic Value of
Perceptual Awareness
* 8: Justin D'Amrbosio and Daniel Stoljar: Imagination, Fiction, and
Perspectival Displacement
* 9: Daniel Pallies and Alexander Dietz: The Dilemma for Attitude
Theories of Pleasure
* 10: Davide Bordini: Seeing through Transparency
* III. Book Symposium on David Papineau s The Metaphysics of Sensory
Experience
* 11: David Papineau: Précis of The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience
* 12: Alex Byrne: Papineau on Sensory Experience
* 13: Angela Mendelovici: Truth and Content in Sensory Experience
* 14: Adam Pautz: An Argument Against Papineau s Qualitative View of
Sensory Experience
* 15: David Papineau: Responses to Mendelovici, Pautz and Byrne
* IV. History of Philosophy of Mind: Cavendish and Strong
* 16: David Cunning: Cavendish and Strawson on Emergence, Mind, and
Self
* 17: Alison Peterman: 'Actions of a Body Sentient': Cavendish on the
Mind (and against Panpsychism)
* 18: Galen Strawson: C. A. Strong: Real Materialism, Evolutionary
Naturalism, Panpsychism
* 1: Sara Aronowitz: The Parts of an Imperfect Agent
* 2: Henry Cowles and Joshua Knobe: The Average isn't Normal
* 3: Gabriel Dupre: Correspondence and Construction: The
Representational Theory of Mind and Internally-Driven Classificatory
Schemes
* 4: Gabbrielle Johnson: Bias and the Domain of Consciousness
* 5: Preston Lennon: Aphantasia and Conscious Thought
* 6: Maja Spener: The Introspective Method
* II. Sensory Experience: Perception, Imagination, Pleasure
* 7: Dorothea Debus: Right Here, Right Now: On the Eudaimonic Value of
Perceptual Awareness
* 8: Justin D'Amrbosio and Daniel Stoljar: Imagination, Fiction, and
Perspectival Displacement
* 9: Daniel Pallies and Alexander Dietz: The Dilemma for Attitude
Theories of Pleasure
* 10: Davide Bordini: Seeing through Transparency
* III. Book Symposium on David Papineau s The Metaphysics of Sensory
Experience
* 11: David Papineau: Précis of The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience
* 12: Alex Byrne: Papineau on Sensory Experience
* 13: Angela Mendelovici: Truth and Content in Sensory Experience
* 14: Adam Pautz: An Argument Against Papineau s Qualitative View of
Sensory Experience
* 15: David Papineau: Responses to Mendelovici, Pautz and Byrne
* IV. History of Philosophy of Mind: Cavendish and Strong
* 16: David Cunning: Cavendish and Strawson on Emergence, Mind, and
Self
* 17: Alison Peterman: 'Actions of a Body Sentient': Cavendish on the
Mind (and against Panpsychism)
* 18: Galen Strawson: C. A. Strong: Real Materialism, Evolutionary
Naturalism, Panpsychism