Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind
Volume 4
Herausgeber: Kriegel, Uriah
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind
Volume 4
Herausgeber: Kriegel, Uriah
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Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind presents cutting-edge work in the philosophy of mind, combining invited articles and articles selected from submissions.
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Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind presents cutting-edge work in the philosophy of mind, combining invited articles and articles selected from submissions.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Oxford University Press
- Seitenzahl: 560
- Erscheinungstermin: 17. Dezember 2024
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 218mm x 145mm x 38mm
- Gewicht: 844g
- ISBN-13: 9780198924128
- ISBN-10: 0198924127
- Artikelnr.: 72541727
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Produktsicherheitsverantwortliche/r
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
- Verlag: Oxford University Press
- Seitenzahl: 560
- Erscheinungstermin: 17. Dezember 2024
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 218mm x 145mm x 38mm
- Gewicht: 844g
- ISBN-13: 9780198924128
- ISBN-10: 0198924127
- Artikelnr.: 72541727
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Produktsicherheitsverantwortliche/r
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
Uriah Kriegel is Professor of Philosophy at Rice University. He is the author of Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory (OUP, 2009), The Sources of Intentionality (OUP, 2011), The Varieties of Consciousness (OUP, 2015), and Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value (OUP, 2018).
* Part I Twenty-First-Century Idealism
* 1: Miri Albahari: Is Universal Consciousness Fit for Ground?
* 2: David Builes: Modal Idealism
* 3: Geoffrey Lee: Idealism and the Interface Theory
* 4: Helen Yetter-Chappell: Idealism and the Best of All (Subjectively
Indistinguishable) Possible Worlds
* Part II Acquaintance and Perception
* 5: Jared Warren: The Sense-Data Language and External World
Skepticism
* 6: William Fish: Naïve Realism, Incorporeal Objects, and the Time-lag
Argument
* 7: Dorothea Debus: Relationalism, Acquaintance, and Subjectivity:
Some Metaphysical Implications
* 8: Emad Atiq and Matt Duncan: I Feel Your Pain: Acquaintance and
the Limits of Empathy
* Part III Acquaintance and Consciousness
* 9: Elijah Chudnoff: Inferential Seemings
* 10: Anna Giustina: Inner Acquaintance Theories of Consciousness
* 11: Michelle Liu: Revelation and the Appearance/Reality Distinction
* 12: Nicholas Silins: The Conscious Theory of Higher-Orderness
* Part IV Book Symposium on David Chalmers' Reality+
* 13: David J. Chalmers: Précis of Reality+
* 14: Grace Helton: The Simulation Hypothesis, Social Knowledge, and a
Meaningful Life
* 15: Terry Horgan: Why Virtual Worlds Aren't Real: How Phenomenal
Intentionality Constrains Mental Reference
* 16: Christopher Peacocke: Simulation: Its Metaphysics and
Epistemology
* 17: David J. Chalmers: The Simulation Hypothesis: Metaphysics,
Epistemology, Value
* Part V History of Philosophy of Mind: Aristotle
* 18: Patricia Marechal: Aristotle on Thumos
* 1: Miri Albahari: Is Universal Consciousness Fit for Ground?
* 2: David Builes: Modal Idealism
* 3: Geoffrey Lee: Idealism and the Interface Theory
* 4: Helen Yetter-Chappell: Idealism and the Best of All (Subjectively
Indistinguishable) Possible Worlds
* Part II Acquaintance and Perception
* 5: Jared Warren: The Sense-Data Language and External World
Skepticism
* 6: William Fish: Naïve Realism, Incorporeal Objects, and the Time-lag
Argument
* 7: Dorothea Debus: Relationalism, Acquaintance, and Subjectivity:
Some Metaphysical Implications
* 8: Emad Atiq and Matt Duncan: I Feel Your Pain: Acquaintance and
the Limits of Empathy
* Part III Acquaintance and Consciousness
* 9: Elijah Chudnoff: Inferential Seemings
* 10: Anna Giustina: Inner Acquaintance Theories of Consciousness
* 11: Michelle Liu: Revelation and the Appearance/Reality Distinction
* 12: Nicholas Silins: The Conscious Theory of Higher-Orderness
* Part IV Book Symposium on David Chalmers' Reality+
* 13: David J. Chalmers: Précis of Reality+
* 14: Grace Helton: The Simulation Hypothesis, Social Knowledge, and a
Meaningful Life
* 15: Terry Horgan: Why Virtual Worlds Aren't Real: How Phenomenal
Intentionality Constrains Mental Reference
* 16: Christopher Peacocke: Simulation: Its Metaphysics and
Epistemology
* 17: David J. Chalmers: The Simulation Hypothesis: Metaphysics,
Epistemology, Value
* Part V History of Philosophy of Mind: Aristotle
* 18: Patricia Marechal: Aristotle on Thumos
* Part I Twenty-First-Century Idealism
* 1: Miri Albahari: Is Universal Consciousness Fit for Ground?
* 2: David Builes: Modal Idealism
* 3: Geoffrey Lee: Idealism and the Interface Theory
* 4: Helen Yetter-Chappell: Idealism and the Best of All (Subjectively
Indistinguishable) Possible Worlds
* Part II Acquaintance and Perception
* 5: Jared Warren: The Sense-Data Language and External World
Skepticism
* 6: William Fish: Naïve Realism, Incorporeal Objects, and the Time-lag
Argument
* 7: Dorothea Debus: Relationalism, Acquaintance, and Subjectivity:
Some Metaphysical Implications
* 8: Emad Atiq and Matt Duncan: I Feel Your Pain: Acquaintance and
the Limits of Empathy
* Part III Acquaintance and Consciousness
* 9: Elijah Chudnoff: Inferential Seemings
* 10: Anna Giustina: Inner Acquaintance Theories of Consciousness
* 11: Michelle Liu: Revelation and the Appearance/Reality Distinction
* 12: Nicholas Silins: The Conscious Theory of Higher-Orderness
* Part IV Book Symposium on David Chalmers' Reality+
* 13: David J. Chalmers: Précis of Reality+
* 14: Grace Helton: The Simulation Hypothesis, Social Knowledge, and a
Meaningful Life
* 15: Terry Horgan: Why Virtual Worlds Aren't Real: How Phenomenal
Intentionality Constrains Mental Reference
* 16: Christopher Peacocke: Simulation: Its Metaphysics and
Epistemology
* 17: David J. Chalmers: The Simulation Hypothesis: Metaphysics,
Epistemology, Value
* Part V History of Philosophy of Mind: Aristotle
* 18: Patricia Marechal: Aristotle on Thumos
* 1: Miri Albahari: Is Universal Consciousness Fit for Ground?
* 2: David Builes: Modal Idealism
* 3: Geoffrey Lee: Idealism and the Interface Theory
* 4: Helen Yetter-Chappell: Idealism and the Best of All (Subjectively
Indistinguishable) Possible Worlds
* Part II Acquaintance and Perception
* 5: Jared Warren: The Sense-Data Language and External World
Skepticism
* 6: William Fish: Naïve Realism, Incorporeal Objects, and the Time-lag
Argument
* 7: Dorothea Debus: Relationalism, Acquaintance, and Subjectivity:
Some Metaphysical Implications
* 8: Emad Atiq and Matt Duncan: I Feel Your Pain: Acquaintance and
the Limits of Empathy
* Part III Acquaintance and Consciousness
* 9: Elijah Chudnoff: Inferential Seemings
* 10: Anna Giustina: Inner Acquaintance Theories of Consciousness
* 11: Michelle Liu: Revelation and the Appearance/Reality Distinction
* 12: Nicholas Silins: The Conscious Theory of Higher-Orderness
* Part IV Book Symposium on David Chalmers' Reality+
* 13: David J. Chalmers: Précis of Reality+
* 14: Grace Helton: The Simulation Hypothesis, Social Knowledge, and a
Meaningful Life
* 15: Terry Horgan: Why Virtual Worlds Aren't Real: How Phenomenal
Intentionality Constrains Mental Reference
* 16: Christopher Peacocke: Simulation: Its Metaphysics and
Epistemology
* 17: David J. Chalmers: The Simulation Hypothesis: Metaphysics,
Epistemology, Value
* Part V History of Philosophy of Mind: Aristotle
* 18: Patricia Marechal: Aristotle on Thumos