Alison L Young (UK University of Cambridge)
Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act
Alison L Young (UK University of Cambridge)
Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act
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This book argues that the principle of parliamentary legislative supremacy is sufficiently flexible to enable a stronger protection of human rights.
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This book argues that the principle of parliamentary legislative supremacy is sufficiently flexible to enable a stronger protection of human rights.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Bloomsbury Publishing PLC
- Seitenzahl: 198
- Erscheinungstermin: 5. Dezember 2008
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 240mm x 161mm x 15mm
- Gewicht: 454g
- ISBN-13: 9781841138305
- ISBN-10: 1841138304
- Artikelnr.: 24998347
- Verlag: Bloomsbury Publishing PLC
- Seitenzahl: 198
- Erscheinungstermin: 5. Dezember 2008
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 240mm x 161mm x 15mm
- Gewicht: 454g
- ISBN-13: 9781841138305
- ISBN-10: 1841138304
- Artikelnr.: 24998347
Alison Young is a Fellow and Tutor in Law at Hertford College, Oxford.
1 INTRODUCTION I. Defining Parliamentary Sovereignty: Dicey's Conception
II. The Compatibility of the Human Rights Act 1998 with Dicey's Theory of
Parliamentary Sovereignty III. Sovereignty Explored IV. In Defence of the
Human Rights Act 1998 V. In Defence of Dicey 2 INTERPRETATION AND IMPLIED
REPEAL I. Continuing Parliamentary Legislative Supremacy and the Doctrine
of Implied Repeal: the Orthodox Account II. The Narrow Scope of Implied
Repeal III. How to give Human Rights an 'Entrenchment Effect' IV.
Conclusion 3 REDEFINITION AND THE RULE OF RECOGNITION I. Continuing and
Self-embracing Parliamentary Legislative Supremacy II. Manner and Form and
Redefinition III. Methods of Entrenchment IV. Conclusion 4 DEMOCRACY AND
RIGHTS I. Dicey and Democracy II. Constitutional Rights III. Democratic
Dialogue IV. Conclusion 5 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998
I. Models of Dialogue II. Justification of Democratic Dialogue III.
Justifications of the Human Rights Act 1998 IV. Dialogue and Institutional
Competences V. Towards a Theory of Adjudication VI. Conclusion 6 A THEORY
OF ADJUDICATION I. The Current Legal Test II. A New Theory of Adjudication
III. Conclusion 7 CONCLUSION I. A Modest Defence of Continuing
Parliamentary Legislative Supremacy II. Conclusion
II. The Compatibility of the Human Rights Act 1998 with Dicey's Theory of
Parliamentary Sovereignty III. Sovereignty Explored IV. In Defence of the
Human Rights Act 1998 V. In Defence of Dicey 2 INTERPRETATION AND IMPLIED
REPEAL I. Continuing Parliamentary Legislative Supremacy and the Doctrine
of Implied Repeal: the Orthodox Account II. The Narrow Scope of Implied
Repeal III. How to give Human Rights an 'Entrenchment Effect' IV.
Conclusion 3 REDEFINITION AND THE RULE OF RECOGNITION I. Continuing and
Self-embracing Parliamentary Legislative Supremacy II. Manner and Form and
Redefinition III. Methods of Entrenchment IV. Conclusion 4 DEMOCRACY AND
RIGHTS I. Dicey and Democracy II. Constitutional Rights III. Democratic
Dialogue IV. Conclusion 5 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998
I. Models of Dialogue II. Justification of Democratic Dialogue III.
Justifications of the Human Rights Act 1998 IV. Dialogue and Institutional
Competences V. Towards a Theory of Adjudication VI. Conclusion 6 A THEORY
OF ADJUDICATION I. The Current Legal Test II. A New Theory of Adjudication
III. Conclusion 7 CONCLUSION I. A Modest Defence of Continuing
Parliamentary Legislative Supremacy II. Conclusion
1 INTRODUCTION I. Defining Parliamentary Sovereignty: Dicey's Conception
II. The Compatibility of the Human Rights Act 1998 with Dicey's Theory of
Parliamentary Sovereignty III. Sovereignty Explored IV. In Defence of the
Human Rights Act 1998 V. In Defence of Dicey 2 INTERPRETATION AND IMPLIED
REPEAL I. Continuing Parliamentary Legislative Supremacy and the Doctrine
of Implied Repeal: the Orthodox Account II. The Narrow Scope of Implied
Repeal III. How to give Human Rights an 'Entrenchment Effect' IV.
Conclusion 3 REDEFINITION AND THE RULE OF RECOGNITION I. Continuing and
Self-embracing Parliamentary Legislative Supremacy II. Manner and Form and
Redefinition III. Methods of Entrenchment IV. Conclusion 4 DEMOCRACY AND
RIGHTS I. Dicey and Democracy II. Constitutional Rights III. Democratic
Dialogue IV. Conclusion 5 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998
I. Models of Dialogue II. Justification of Democratic Dialogue III.
Justifications of the Human Rights Act 1998 IV. Dialogue and Institutional
Competences V. Towards a Theory of Adjudication VI. Conclusion 6 A THEORY
OF ADJUDICATION I. The Current Legal Test II. A New Theory of Adjudication
III. Conclusion 7 CONCLUSION I. A Modest Defence of Continuing
Parliamentary Legislative Supremacy II. Conclusion
II. The Compatibility of the Human Rights Act 1998 with Dicey's Theory of
Parliamentary Sovereignty III. Sovereignty Explored IV. In Defence of the
Human Rights Act 1998 V. In Defence of Dicey 2 INTERPRETATION AND IMPLIED
REPEAL I. Continuing Parliamentary Legislative Supremacy and the Doctrine
of Implied Repeal: the Orthodox Account II. The Narrow Scope of Implied
Repeal III. How to give Human Rights an 'Entrenchment Effect' IV.
Conclusion 3 REDEFINITION AND THE RULE OF RECOGNITION I. Continuing and
Self-embracing Parliamentary Legislative Supremacy II. Manner and Form and
Redefinition III. Methods of Entrenchment IV. Conclusion 4 DEMOCRACY AND
RIGHTS I. Dicey and Democracy II. Constitutional Rights III. Democratic
Dialogue IV. Conclusion 5 DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998
I. Models of Dialogue II. Justification of Democratic Dialogue III.
Justifications of the Human Rights Act 1998 IV. Dialogue and Institutional
Competences V. Towards a Theory of Adjudication VI. Conclusion 6 A THEORY
OF ADJUDICATION I. The Current Legal Test II. A New Theory of Adjudication
III. Conclusion 7 CONCLUSION I. A Modest Defence of Continuing
Parliamentary Legislative Supremacy II. Conclusion