This book examines expectations that elections will lead to counterinsurgency success through close analysis of four cases where governments were supported by the United States: Vietnam, El Salvador, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Such expectations are unfounded, and contributed to a flawed counterinsurgency strategy by the United States.
This book examines expectations that elections will lead to counterinsurgency success through close analysis of four cases where governments were supported by the United States: Vietnam, El Salvador, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Such expectations are unfounded, and contributed to a flawed counterinsurgency strategy by the United States.
Acknowledgments Introduction: Understanding Pathological Counterinsurgency Chapter 1: Legitimacy and Democratization in Counterinsurgency Chapter 2: Building Legitimacy: Theory vs. Practice Chapter 3: Democratization, Elections and Counterinsurgency in Theory and Policy Chapter 4: Vietnam Chapter 5: El Salvador Chapter 6: Iraq Chapter 7: Afghanistan Chapter 8: Malaya, Colombia, and the Limits of Third Party Campaigns Conclusion: The Limits of Elections in Counterinsurgency Bibliography About the Author
Acknowledgments Introduction: Understanding Pathological Counterinsurgency Chapter 1: Legitimacy and Democratization in Counterinsurgency Chapter 2: Building Legitimacy: Theory vs. Practice Chapter 3: Democratization, Elections and Counterinsurgency in Theory and Policy Chapter 4: Vietnam Chapter 5: El Salvador Chapter 6: Iraq Chapter 7: Afghanistan Chapter 8: Malaya, Colombia, and the Limits of Third Party Campaigns Conclusion: The Limits of Elections in Counterinsurgency Bibliography About the Author
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