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The uncertain Arab-Israeli peace process has scarcely put an end to the threat of war in the Middle East. Israel's relations with its Arab neighbors remain tense, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a problem for the entire region, and the Israeli-Palestinian fighting that began in September 2000 shows that the peace process can suddenly become a war process. Renowned Middle East military expert Anthony Cordesman provides up-to-the-minute analysis in this richly detailed guide to one of the most complicated, and dangerous, regions in the world. Cordesman covers every…mehr
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The uncertain Arab-Israeli peace process has scarcely put an end to the threat of war in the Middle East. Israel's relations with its Arab neighbors remain tense, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a problem for the entire region, and the Israeli-Palestinian fighting that began in September 2000 shows that the peace process can suddenly become a war process. Renowned Middle East military expert Anthony Cordesman provides up-to-the-minute analysis in this richly detailed guide to one of the most complicated, and dangerous, regions in the world. Cordesman covers every significant aspect of military and strategic issues in the region, including conventional forces, arms transfers, force quality and morale, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, the dynamics of specific ongoing conflicts, and the outcome of possible future conflicts. He carefully weighs the political factors against what is known about actual military capabilities to shed light on the range of strategic options likely to be considered by each of the major regional actors, including Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and the Palestinian Authority. He finds no easy answers, concluding that while the balance of conventional forces has stabilized significantly in recent years, the risks from unconventional warfare have escalated considerably and that any major new peace agreement is likely to unleash a whole new set of military concerns that have the potential to disrupt diplomatic agreements. Always mindful of the complexities of the region, Peace and War is the definitive guide to strategic developments in this vital part of the world.
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Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Praeger
- Seitenzahl: 722
- Erscheinungstermin: 30. November 2001
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 240mm x 161mm x 43mm
- Gewicht: 1236g
- ISBN-13: 9780275969394
- ISBN-10: 0275969398
- Artikelnr.: 21190701
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
- Verlag: Praeger
- Seitenzahl: 722
- Erscheinungstermin: 30. November 2001
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 240mm x 161mm x 43mm
- Gewicht: 1236g
- ISBN-13: 9780275969394
- ISBN-10: 0275969398
- Artikelnr.: 21190701
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
Anthony H. Cordesman
Contents1Assessing the Conventional Balance1The Conventional
Balance3Counting Total Forces5Deciding What to Count5The Strengths and
Weaknesses of Manpower Numbers7The Strengths and Weaknesses of Equipment
Numbers8Dealing with Force Quantity and Force Quality82Arab-Israeli
Military Efforts and Arms Transfers11Differences in the Size of National
Economies and in the Level of Military Effort12Problems in Dollar
Comparisons of Military Expenditures and Arms Sales16What Can Be Learned
from Comparisons of Military Expenditures19Syrian Military
Expenditures20Jordanian Military Expenditures21Egyptian Military
Expenditures22Lebanese Military Expenditures24Israeli Military
Expenditures25###8220;Haves###8221; versus ###8220;Have
Nots###8221;29Relative Efficiency in Using Military
Expenditures29Comparisons of Arms Sales and Imports32The Impact of US
Military Assistance443Comparing Arab-Israeli Forces by Service and
Country55Understanding the Details Behind Quantitative Comparisons of Total
Forces59Total Force Strength and Differences in National Force
Structure59Israeli Command Structure and Land Forces Major Combat Unit
Strength59Syrian Command Structure and Land Forces Major Combat Unit
Strength61Jordanian Command Structure and Land Forces Major Combat Unit
Strength62Lebanese Command Structure and Land Forces Major Combat Unit
Strength64Egyptian Command Structure and Land Forces Major Combat Unit
Strength65The Importance of Reserve Forces and Strategic
Warning67viiiContentsHigh-Quality Weapons versus Total Weapons71Main Battle
Tanks73Other Armored Fighting Vehicles81Anti-Tank Weapons87Artillery
Forces90Multiple Rocket Launchers98Mortars99Advanced Artillery Warfare
Capability100Combat Aircraft101Qualitative Factors Shaping the
Effectiveness of the IAF107Qualitative Factors Shaping the Effectiveness of
the Syrian Air Force117Qualitative Factors Shaping the Effectiveness of the
Jordanian Air Force120Qualitative Factors Shaping the Effectiveness of the
Egyptian Air Force121Attack and Armed Helicopters123Israeli Combat
Helicopter Forces124Arab Combat Helicopter Forces126Major Surface-to-Air
Missile Defenses127Israeli Land-Based Air Defenses128Syrian Land-Based Air
Defenses129Jordanian Land-Based Air Defenses130Egyptian Land-Based Air
Defenses131Short-Range Air Defenses132Israeli Short-Range Air
Defenses132Syrian Short-Range Air Defenses133Jordanian Short-Range Air
Defenses133Egyptian Short-Range Air Defenses133The Size and Role of Naval
Forces134Israeli Naval Forces136Syrian Naval Forces139Jordanian Naval
Forces140Lebanese Naval Forces140Egyptian Naval Forces141The Inevitable
Limits of Quantitative Comparisons1444###8220;Intangibles###8221;:
Arab-Israeli Force Quality147The Israeli ###8220;Edge###8221;147Arab
Organizational, Resource, Political, and ###8220;Cultural###8221;
Problems150The Qualitative Weaknesses in Most Middle Eastern Military
Forces153The Qualitative Advantages of Israeli Forces157The Limits of
Israel###8217;s Qualitative ###8220;Edge###8221;1635Comparing Arab-Israeli
War Fighting Capability1676The Israeli ###8220;Edge###8221;: Strengths and
Weaknesses173ContentsixKeeping the ###8220;Edge###8221;?177Israeli Military
Technology, Equipment Buys, and Arms Transfers178Israeli Force
Trends179Israeli Military Manpower182The Problem of Peace and
Bureaucratization184The Problem of Conscription185The Uncertain Role of
Women186The Changing Role of Reserves187Morale, Motivation, and
Money188Willingness to Serve and Willingness to Take Casualties188Numbers
versus Quality versus Money189Israeli Land Forces190Israeli Air
Forces191Israeli Naval Forces195Israeli Long-Range Missiles and Weapons of
Mass Destruction195Israeli Criticisms of the IDF and Fears That Israel Is
Losing Its ###8220;Edge###8221;197The Wald Report198The Barak
Reforms199Reforms Since Barak200Israel###8217;s Continuing Strategic
Debate201The Creation of a National Security Council, ###8220;Zahal
2000,###8221; ###8220;Idan 2003,###8221; and ###8220;Idan
2010###8221;207The Barak Government and Idan 20102117Israeli-Palestinian
Conflicts215Peace with Violence versus a Second Intifada: The Nature of
Asymmetric Warfare226The ###8220;Military Balance###8221;: The Actors That
Would Challenge the IDF in a Second Intifada234Palestinian Paramilitary
Groups235The Role of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad239Hamas243Islamic
Jihad251Outside Actors: Palestinians in Lebanon, the Hizbollah, and
Iran254Palestinian Hard-Line Movements in Syria and Jordan257Israeli
Hard-Line Movements and Extremists260The History and Effectiveness of the
Palestinian Authority Security Forces260The Palestinian Authority versus
Hamas and the PIJ261The Effectiveness of the Palestinian Authority Security
Forces262The Organization of the Palestinian Security Forces in Gaza and
the West Bank264Conflict in Gaza270Fighting in an Economic and Demographic
Time Bomb271The Forms the Fighting Might Take in the
Gaza275xContentsConflict on the West Bank280The West Bank Version of the
Economic and Demographic Time Bomb283Major Security Issues on the West
Bank285The Problem of Palestinian Sovereignty and the Final Settlement
Issues287The Problem of Demographics and the Right of Return288The Problem
of Economics290The Problem of Jerusalem290The Problem of West Bank
Security293The Problem of Water295The Impact of the Security Arrangements
on the West Bank296The Israeli-Palestinian Accords296Possible Wars on the
West Bank300Israeli Tactics in a West Bank Conflict300The Palestinian
Response302The Costs of Fighting and Possible Aftermaths306Cyber-Conflict
on the Web307If Peace Should Fail for Years: ###8220;Violence without
Peace###8221;308A Possible Drift Towards Military and Political
Extremism308Possible Israeli Tactics in a Prolonged Conflict310Prolonged
Conflict, ###8220;Separation,###8221; and Evacuation313The Role of Egypt,
Syria, Jordan, Iran, and Hizbollah in a Longer Conflict in Gaza or the West
Bank314If Peace Does Ever Come: The Cost of Living with ###8220;Peace with
Violence###8221;315Palestinian Authority Security Operations and
###8220;Mission Impossible###8221;316Israeli Criticisms and the Art of the
Possible318###8220;Peace With Abuses###8221; versus ###8220;Peace With
Violence###8221;319The Palestinian Authority Response319The Israeli
Security Response324The Cost-Effectiveness of Security Measures328A Cold
Peace and the Possible Role of Neutral Observers3308Israeli-Syrian
Conflicts333Syrian Capabilities in War Fighting339Syrian Modernization,
Military Spending, and Arms Imports340Syrian Land Forces349Syrian Air and
Air Defense Forces350The Strategic and Tactical Impact of the Golan351The
Golan and Israel###8217;s Overall Supply of Water354The Impact of Giving up
the Golan357War Fighting on the Golan358Mobilization, Surprise, and
Mass359Expanding the Depth of the Golan Battlefield360Israeli ###8220;Soft
Strike###8221; Capabilities in Strategic Bombing362A New Type of
War?363ContentsxiSyrian Risk Taking363An Attack Through the Golan After a
Syrian-Israeli Peace Settlement364The Value of the Golan to Syria in an
Attack on Israel364Can the Golan Stay Partially Divided?366Creating a
Secure Peace on the Golan369The Military Aspects of the Israeli and Syrian
Positions370Force Limitation Measures and Confidence-Building
Measures371Observation Points, Sensors, and Transparency372The Role of a
Peacekeeping or Observer Force and the Role of the US373US Presence in a
Peacekeeping Force374A US-Israeli Strategic Alliance375US ###8220;Extended
Deterrence###8221;378Including Arab States3789Wars Involving Lebanon381A
History of Civil War381The Lebanese Military Forces385The Lebanese
Army386The Lebanese Air Force and Navy392The Syrian Military Presence in
Lebanon393Syrian Forces in Lebanon and Possible Creation of a Second Front
against Israel395The Hizbollah and the Proxy War in Lebanon397The Evolution
of the Hizbollah398Foreign Support for the Hizbollah400The Size and
Armament of Hizbollah404The Role of the Hizbollah in Military and Terrorist
Actions405Amal in Military and Terrorist Actions407The South Lebanon
Army407Israel###8217;s Defeat in Lebanon: An Israeli Vietnam?410The Basic
Military Situation411The Fighting Through 1995412The Disaster of Operation
Grapes of Wrath413Trying to Fight Guerrillas on Their Own
Terms414Blundering Towards Withdrawal417Sensors and Electronic Fences420Air
Raids, ###8220;Massive Retaliation,###8221; and Collapse421Syria, Israel,
and Lebanon With or Without the Peace Process423Israeli Defense
Options423Peace as a Defense426The UNIFIL Option427The Future Threat to
Israel Proper###8212;With and Without a Peace43210Jordanian-Israeli
Conflicts437Jordan###8217;s Military Forces438xiiContentsJordanian Support
of Palestinian Forces in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Israel444Jordanian
###8220;Rescue###8221; of Palestinians in the West Bank: Jordanian
Re-Occupation of the West Bank451Arms Control and Security
Implications45211A Jordanian-Syrian Alliance, Turkey, and Wars on the
Eastern Front455If Jordan Should Join Syria455A Jordanian Role in a Broader
Alliance Against Israel459The Israeli (Jordanian) Alliance with
Turkey46012Egyptian-Israeli Conflicts463Egyptian War Fighting
Capabilities470Egyptian Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers475Egyptian
Land Forces475Egyptian Air Forces478Egyptian Naval Forces479An
Egyptian-Israeli Conflict in the Sinai480Egyptian Defensive
Capabilities481Egyptian Offensive Capabilities481Arms Control in the
Sinai484Egypt###8217;s Impact on Peace Negotiations and Arms
Control48613###8220;Worst Case###8221; Conventional Wars: Israel Fights
Egypt, Jordan, and Syria with Support from Other Arab States48714Wars
Involving Libyan, Iranian, Iraqi, and Other Arab Conventional
Forces497Libyan Capabilities502Iranian Capabilities503Iraqi
Capabilities505The Impact of Libyan, Iranian, Iraqi, and Other Arab
Conventional Capabilities50615Wars Using Weapons of Mass
Destruction509Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction509Israeli Nuclear
Weapons512Israeli Nuclear Delivery Systems519Israeli Chemical and
Biological Weapons526Israeli Deterrent and Strategic Doctrine and
Planning527Israeli Missile Defenses529Israeli National Programs530The
Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) or Nautilus530ContentsxiiiThe Patriot and
PAC-3531The Arrow532The Integrated Boost-Phase Intercept System and
Moab534Warning and Command and Control535The Interoperable Defense Effort:
Israeli and US Cooperation536The Complex Structure of the Full Israeli
Missile Defense Program537Israeli Civil Defense538Syrian Weapons of Mass
Destruction539Syrian Missile Programs539Syrian and Other Regional Use of
Commercial Satellite Imagery542Syrian Missile Conversions and Cruise
Missiles543Syrian Aircraft Delivery Systems544Syrian Chemical
Weapons544Syrian Biological Weapons546Syrian Strategy, Doctrine, and
Plans548Egyptian Weapons of Mass Destruction549Egyptian Missile
Programs549Egyptian Chemical Weapons551Egyptian Biological and Nuclear
Weapons552Algerian, Libyan, Iranian, and Iraqi Weapons of Mass
Destruction553Algeria553Libya555Libyan Delivery Systems555Libyan Chemical
Warfare Programs556Libyan Biological Programs558Libyan Nuclear
Programs558Libyan War Fighting Capability559Iran560Iranian Delivery
Systems560Iranian Chemical Warfare Capabilities572Iranian Biological
Warfare Capabilities578Iranian Nuclear Warfare Capabilities579Iranian War
Fighting Options588Iraq588Iraq###8217;s Current Delivery
Capabilities589Iraqi Chemical Weapons595Iraq###8217;s Biological Warfare
Capabilities599Iraq###8217;s Nuclear Warfare Capabilities603Iraq###8217;s
War Fighting Capabilities607Proliferation and the Greater Middle East609The
War Fighting Implications of Weapons of Mass Destruction609Arab and Iranian
Forces and Capabilities610Israeli Forces and Capabilities611The Evolving
War Fighting and Arms Control Implications of Weapons of Mass
Destruction613The Arms Control Implications of Weapons of Mass
Destruction617xivContents16Deterrence, Arms Control, and Regional
Stability625Self-Stabilizing Deterrence626The Nations Inside the Peace
Process626The Nations Outside the Peace Process628The Stabilizing Role of
the US630US Intervention in an Arab-Israel Conflict631The Impact of US
Military Assistance632Beyond Conventional Deterrence633The Impact of the
Peace Process, Low-Intensity Combat, and the Palestinian Problem633The
Impact of Jordan634The Impact of Syria, the Golan, and Lebanon634The Impact
of Weapons of Mass Destruction635Implications for Arms Control63617Sources
and Methods639Sources639Methods641Notes643Bibliography697
Balance3Counting Total Forces5Deciding What to Count5The Strengths and
Weaknesses of Manpower Numbers7The Strengths and Weaknesses of Equipment
Numbers8Dealing with Force Quantity and Force Quality82Arab-Israeli
Military Efforts and Arms Transfers11Differences in the Size of National
Economies and in the Level of Military Effort12Problems in Dollar
Comparisons of Military Expenditures and Arms Sales16What Can Be Learned
from Comparisons of Military Expenditures19Syrian Military
Expenditures20Jordanian Military Expenditures21Egyptian Military
Expenditures22Lebanese Military Expenditures24Israeli Military
Expenditures25###8220;Haves###8221; versus ###8220;Have
Nots###8221;29Relative Efficiency in Using Military
Expenditures29Comparisons of Arms Sales and Imports32The Impact of US
Military Assistance443Comparing Arab-Israeli Forces by Service and
Country55Understanding the Details Behind Quantitative Comparisons of Total
Forces59Total Force Strength and Differences in National Force
Structure59Israeli Command Structure and Land Forces Major Combat Unit
Strength59Syrian Command Structure and Land Forces Major Combat Unit
Strength61Jordanian Command Structure and Land Forces Major Combat Unit
Strength62Lebanese Command Structure and Land Forces Major Combat Unit
Strength64Egyptian Command Structure and Land Forces Major Combat Unit
Strength65The Importance of Reserve Forces and Strategic
Warning67viiiContentsHigh-Quality Weapons versus Total Weapons71Main Battle
Tanks73Other Armored Fighting Vehicles81Anti-Tank Weapons87Artillery
Forces90Multiple Rocket Launchers98Mortars99Advanced Artillery Warfare
Capability100Combat Aircraft101Qualitative Factors Shaping the
Effectiveness of the IAF107Qualitative Factors Shaping the Effectiveness of
the Syrian Air Force117Qualitative Factors Shaping the Effectiveness of the
Jordanian Air Force120Qualitative Factors Shaping the Effectiveness of the
Egyptian Air Force121Attack and Armed Helicopters123Israeli Combat
Helicopter Forces124Arab Combat Helicopter Forces126Major Surface-to-Air
Missile Defenses127Israeli Land-Based Air Defenses128Syrian Land-Based Air
Defenses129Jordanian Land-Based Air Defenses130Egyptian Land-Based Air
Defenses131Short-Range Air Defenses132Israeli Short-Range Air
Defenses132Syrian Short-Range Air Defenses133Jordanian Short-Range Air
Defenses133Egyptian Short-Range Air Defenses133The Size and Role of Naval
Forces134Israeli Naval Forces136Syrian Naval Forces139Jordanian Naval
Forces140Lebanese Naval Forces140Egyptian Naval Forces141The Inevitable
Limits of Quantitative Comparisons1444###8220;Intangibles###8221;:
Arab-Israeli Force Quality147The Israeli ###8220;Edge###8221;147Arab
Organizational, Resource, Political, and ###8220;Cultural###8221;
Problems150The Qualitative Weaknesses in Most Middle Eastern Military
Forces153The Qualitative Advantages of Israeli Forces157The Limits of
Israel###8217;s Qualitative ###8220;Edge###8221;1635Comparing Arab-Israeli
War Fighting Capability1676The Israeli ###8220;Edge###8221;: Strengths and
Weaknesses173ContentsixKeeping the ###8220;Edge###8221;?177Israeli Military
Technology, Equipment Buys, and Arms Transfers178Israeli Force
Trends179Israeli Military Manpower182The Problem of Peace and
Bureaucratization184The Problem of Conscription185The Uncertain Role of
Women186The Changing Role of Reserves187Morale, Motivation, and
Money188Willingness to Serve and Willingness to Take Casualties188Numbers
versus Quality versus Money189Israeli Land Forces190Israeli Air
Forces191Israeli Naval Forces195Israeli Long-Range Missiles and Weapons of
Mass Destruction195Israeli Criticisms of the IDF and Fears That Israel Is
Losing Its ###8220;Edge###8221;197The Wald Report198The Barak
Reforms199Reforms Since Barak200Israel###8217;s Continuing Strategic
Debate201The Creation of a National Security Council, ###8220;Zahal
2000,###8221; ###8220;Idan 2003,###8221; and ###8220;Idan
2010###8221;207The Barak Government and Idan 20102117Israeli-Palestinian
Conflicts215Peace with Violence versus a Second Intifada: The Nature of
Asymmetric Warfare226The ###8220;Military Balance###8221;: The Actors That
Would Challenge the IDF in a Second Intifada234Palestinian Paramilitary
Groups235The Role of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad239Hamas243Islamic
Jihad251Outside Actors: Palestinians in Lebanon, the Hizbollah, and
Iran254Palestinian Hard-Line Movements in Syria and Jordan257Israeli
Hard-Line Movements and Extremists260The History and Effectiveness of the
Palestinian Authority Security Forces260The Palestinian Authority versus
Hamas and the PIJ261The Effectiveness of the Palestinian Authority Security
Forces262The Organization of the Palestinian Security Forces in Gaza and
the West Bank264Conflict in Gaza270Fighting in an Economic and Demographic
Time Bomb271The Forms the Fighting Might Take in the
Gaza275xContentsConflict on the West Bank280The West Bank Version of the
Economic and Demographic Time Bomb283Major Security Issues on the West
Bank285The Problem of Palestinian Sovereignty and the Final Settlement
Issues287The Problem of Demographics and the Right of Return288The Problem
of Economics290The Problem of Jerusalem290The Problem of West Bank
Security293The Problem of Water295The Impact of the Security Arrangements
on the West Bank296The Israeli-Palestinian Accords296Possible Wars on the
West Bank300Israeli Tactics in a West Bank Conflict300The Palestinian
Response302The Costs of Fighting and Possible Aftermaths306Cyber-Conflict
on the Web307If Peace Should Fail for Years: ###8220;Violence without
Peace###8221;308A Possible Drift Towards Military and Political
Extremism308Possible Israeli Tactics in a Prolonged Conflict310Prolonged
Conflict, ###8220;Separation,###8221; and Evacuation313The Role of Egypt,
Syria, Jordan, Iran, and Hizbollah in a Longer Conflict in Gaza or the West
Bank314If Peace Does Ever Come: The Cost of Living with ###8220;Peace with
Violence###8221;315Palestinian Authority Security Operations and
###8220;Mission Impossible###8221;316Israeli Criticisms and the Art of the
Possible318###8220;Peace With Abuses###8221; versus ###8220;Peace With
Violence###8221;319The Palestinian Authority Response319The Israeli
Security Response324The Cost-Effectiveness of Security Measures328A Cold
Peace and the Possible Role of Neutral Observers3308Israeli-Syrian
Conflicts333Syrian Capabilities in War Fighting339Syrian Modernization,
Military Spending, and Arms Imports340Syrian Land Forces349Syrian Air and
Air Defense Forces350The Strategic and Tactical Impact of the Golan351The
Golan and Israel###8217;s Overall Supply of Water354The Impact of Giving up
the Golan357War Fighting on the Golan358Mobilization, Surprise, and
Mass359Expanding the Depth of the Golan Battlefield360Israeli ###8220;Soft
Strike###8221; Capabilities in Strategic Bombing362A New Type of
War?363ContentsxiSyrian Risk Taking363An Attack Through the Golan After a
Syrian-Israeli Peace Settlement364The Value of the Golan to Syria in an
Attack on Israel364Can the Golan Stay Partially Divided?366Creating a
Secure Peace on the Golan369The Military Aspects of the Israeli and Syrian
Positions370Force Limitation Measures and Confidence-Building
Measures371Observation Points, Sensors, and Transparency372The Role of a
Peacekeeping or Observer Force and the Role of the US373US Presence in a
Peacekeeping Force374A US-Israeli Strategic Alliance375US ###8220;Extended
Deterrence###8221;378Including Arab States3789Wars Involving Lebanon381A
History of Civil War381The Lebanese Military Forces385The Lebanese
Army386The Lebanese Air Force and Navy392The Syrian Military Presence in
Lebanon393Syrian Forces in Lebanon and Possible Creation of a Second Front
against Israel395The Hizbollah and the Proxy War in Lebanon397The Evolution
of the Hizbollah398Foreign Support for the Hizbollah400The Size and
Armament of Hizbollah404The Role of the Hizbollah in Military and Terrorist
Actions405Amal in Military and Terrorist Actions407The South Lebanon
Army407Israel###8217;s Defeat in Lebanon: An Israeli Vietnam?410The Basic
Military Situation411The Fighting Through 1995412The Disaster of Operation
Grapes of Wrath413Trying to Fight Guerrillas on Their Own
Terms414Blundering Towards Withdrawal417Sensors and Electronic Fences420Air
Raids, ###8220;Massive Retaliation,###8221; and Collapse421Syria, Israel,
and Lebanon With or Without the Peace Process423Israeli Defense
Options423Peace as a Defense426The UNIFIL Option427The Future Threat to
Israel Proper###8212;With and Without a Peace43210Jordanian-Israeli
Conflicts437Jordan###8217;s Military Forces438xiiContentsJordanian Support
of Palestinian Forces in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Israel444Jordanian
###8220;Rescue###8221; of Palestinians in the West Bank: Jordanian
Re-Occupation of the West Bank451Arms Control and Security
Implications45211A Jordanian-Syrian Alliance, Turkey, and Wars on the
Eastern Front455If Jordan Should Join Syria455A Jordanian Role in a Broader
Alliance Against Israel459The Israeli (Jordanian) Alliance with
Turkey46012Egyptian-Israeli Conflicts463Egyptian War Fighting
Capabilities470Egyptian Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers475Egyptian
Land Forces475Egyptian Air Forces478Egyptian Naval Forces479An
Egyptian-Israeli Conflict in the Sinai480Egyptian Defensive
Capabilities481Egyptian Offensive Capabilities481Arms Control in the
Sinai484Egypt###8217;s Impact on Peace Negotiations and Arms
Control48613###8220;Worst Case###8221; Conventional Wars: Israel Fights
Egypt, Jordan, and Syria with Support from Other Arab States48714Wars
Involving Libyan, Iranian, Iraqi, and Other Arab Conventional
Forces497Libyan Capabilities502Iranian Capabilities503Iraqi
Capabilities505The Impact of Libyan, Iranian, Iraqi, and Other Arab
Conventional Capabilities50615Wars Using Weapons of Mass
Destruction509Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction509Israeli Nuclear
Weapons512Israeli Nuclear Delivery Systems519Israeli Chemical and
Biological Weapons526Israeli Deterrent and Strategic Doctrine and
Planning527Israeli Missile Defenses529Israeli National Programs530The
Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) or Nautilus530ContentsxiiiThe Patriot and
PAC-3531The Arrow532The Integrated Boost-Phase Intercept System and
Moab534Warning and Command and Control535The Interoperable Defense Effort:
Israeli and US Cooperation536The Complex Structure of the Full Israeli
Missile Defense Program537Israeli Civil Defense538Syrian Weapons of Mass
Destruction539Syrian Missile Programs539Syrian and Other Regional Use of
Commercial Satellite Imagery542Syrian Missile Conversions and Cruise
Missiles543Syrian Aircraft Delivery Systems544Syrian Chemical
Weapons544Syrian Biological Weapons546Syrian Strategy, Doctrine, and
Plans548Egyptian Weapons of Mass Destruction549Egyptian Missile
Programs549Egyptian Chemical Weapons551Egyptian Biological and Nuclear
Weapons552Algerian, Libyan, Iranian, and Iraqi Weapons of Mass
Destruction553Algeria553Libya555Libyan Delivery Systems555Libyan Chemical
Warfare Programs556Libyan Biological Programs558Libyan Nuclear
Programs558Libyan War Fighting Capability559Iran560Iranian Delivery
Systems560Iranian Chemical Warfare Capabilities572Iranian Biological
Warfare Capabilities578Iranian Nuclear Warfare Capabilities579Iranian War
Fighting Options588Iraq588Iraq###8217;s Current Delivery
Capabilities589Iraqi Chemical Weapons595Iraq###8217;s Biological Warfare
Capabilities599Iraq###8217;s Nuclear Warfare Capabilities603Iraq###8217;s
War Fighting Capabilities607Proliferation and the Greater Middle East609The
War Fighting Implications of Weapons of Mass Destruction609Arab and Iranian
Forces and Capabilities610Israeli Forces and Capabilities611The Evolving
War Fighting and Arms Control Implications of Weapons of Mass
Destruction613The Arms Control Implications of Weapons of Mass
Destruction617xivContents16Deterrence, Arms Control, and Regional
Stability625Self-Stabilizing Deterrence626The Nations Inside the Peace
Process626The Nations Outside the Peace Process628The Stabilizing Role of
the US630US Intervention in an Arab-Israel Conflict631The Impact of US
Military Assistance632Beyond Conventional Deterrence633The Impact of the
Peace Process, Low-Intensity Combat, and the Palestinian Problem633The
Impact of Jordan634The Impact of Syria, the Golan, and Lebanon634The Impact
of Weapons of Mass Destruction635Implications for Arms Control63617Sources
and Methods639Sources639Methods641Notes643Bibliography697
Contents1Assessing the Conventional Balance1The Conventional
Balance3Counting Total Forces5Deciding What to Count5The Strengths and
Weaknesses of Manpower Numbers7The Strengths and Weaknesses of Equipment
Numbers8Dealing with Force Quantity and Force Quality82Arab-Israeli
Military Efforts and Arms Transfers11Differences in the Size of National
Economies and in the Level of Military Effort12Problems in Dollar
Comparisons of Military Expenditures and Arms Sales16What Can Be Learned
from Comparisons of Military Expenditures19Syrian Military
Expenditures20Jordanian Military Expenditures21Egyptian Military
Expenditures22Lebanese Military Expenditures24Israeli Military
Expenditures25###8220;Haves###8221; versus ###8220;Have
Nots###8221;29Relative Efficiency in Using Military
Expenditures29Comparisons of Arms Sales and Imports32The Impact of US
Military Assistance443Comparing Arab-Israeli Forces by Service and
Country55Understanding the Details Behind Quantitative Comparisons of Total
Forces59Total Force Strength and Differences in National Force
Structure59Israeli Command Structure and Land Forces Major Combat Unit
Strength59Syrian Command Structure and Land Forces Major Combat Unit
Strength61Jordanian Command Structure and Land Forces Major Combat Unit
Strength62Lebanese Command Structure and Land Forces Major Combat Unit
Strength64Egyptian Command Structure and Land Forces Major Combat Unit
Strength65The Importance of Reserve Forces and Strategic
Warning67viiiContentsHigh-Quality Weapons versus Total Weapons71Main Battle
Tanks73Other Armored Fighting Vehicles81Anti-Tank Weapons87Artillery
Forces90Multiple Rocket Launchers98Mortars99Advanced Artillery Warfare
Capability100Combat Aircraft101Qualitative Factors Shaping the
Effectiveness of the IAF107Qualitative Factors Shaping the Effectiveness of
the Syrian Air Force117Qualitative Factors Shaping the Effectiveness of the
Jordanian Air Force120Qualitative Factors Shaping the Effectiveness of the
Egyptian Air Force121Attack and Armed Helicopters123Israeli Combat
Helicopter Forces124Arab Combat Helicopter Forces126Major Surface-to-Air
Missile Defenses127Israeli Land-Based Air Defenses128Syrian Land-Based Air
Defenses129Jordanian Land-Based Air Defenses130Egyptian Land-Based Air
Defenses131Short-Range Air Defenses132Israeli Short-Range Air
Defenses132Syrian Short-Range Air Defenses133Jordanian Short-Range Air
Defenses133Egyptian Short-Range Air Defenses133The Size and Role of Naval
Forces134Israeli Naval Forces136Syrian Naval Forces139Jordanian Naval
Forces140Lebanese Naval Forces140Egyptian Naval Forces141The Inevitable
Limits of Quantitative Comparisons1444###8220;Intangibles###8221;:
Arab-Israeli Force Quality147The Israeli ###8220;Edge###8221;147Arab
Organizational, Resource, Political, and ###8220;Cultural###8221;
Problems150The Qualitative Weaknesses in Most Middle Eastern Military
Forces153The Qualitative Advantages of Israeli Forces157The Limits of
Israel###8217;s Qualitative ###8220;Edge###8221;1635Comparing Arab-Israeli
War Fighting Capability1676The Israeli ###8220;Edge###8221;: Strengths and
Weaknesses173ContentsixKeeping the ###8220;Edge###8221;?177Israeli Military
Technology, Equipment Buys, and Arms Transfers178Israeli Force
Trends179Israeli Military Manpower182The Problem of Peace and
Bureaucratization184The Problem of Conscription185The Uncertain Role of
Women186The Changing Role of Reserves187Morale, Motivation, and
Money188Willingness to Serve and Willingness to Take Casualties188Numbers
versus Quality versus Money189Israeli Land Forces190Israeli Air
Forces191Israeli Naval Forces195Israeli Long-Range Missiles and Weapons of
Mass Destruction195Israeli Criticisms of the IDF and Fears That Israel Is
Losing Its ###8220;Edge###8221;197The Wald Report198The Barak
Reforms199Reforms Since Barak200Israel###8217;s Continuing Strategic
Debate201The Creation of a National Security Council, ###8220;Zahal
2000,###8221; ###8220;Idan 2003,###8221; and ###8220;Idan
2010###8221;207The Barak Government and Idan 20102117Israeli-Palestinian
Conflicts215Peace with Violence versus a Second Intifada: The Nature of
Asymmetric Warfare226The ###8220;Military Balance###8221;: The Actors That
Would Challenge the IDF in a Second Intifada234Palestinian Paramilitary
Groups235The Role of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad239Hamas243Islamic
Jihad251Outside Actors: Palestinians in Lebanon, the Hizbollah, and
Iran254Palestinian Hard-Line Movements in Syria and Jordan257Israeli
Hard-Line Movements and Extremists260The History and Effectiveness of the
Palestinian Authority Security Forces260The Palestinian Authority versus
Hamas and the PIJ261The Effectiveness of the Palestinian Authority Security
Forces262The Organization of the Palestinian Security Forces in Gaza and
the West Bank264Conflict in Gaza270Fighting in an Economic and Demographic
Time Bomb271The Forms the Fighting Might Take in the
Gaza275xContentsConflict on the West Bank280The West Bank Version of the
Economic and Demographic Time Bomb283Major Security Issues on the West
Bank285The Problem of Palestinian Sovereignty and the Final Settlement
Issues287The Problem of Demographics and the Right of Return288The Problem
of Economics290The Problem of Jerusalem290The Problem of West Bank
Security293The Problem of Water295The Impact of the Security Arrangements
on the West Bank296The Israeli-Palestinian Accords296Possible Wars on the
West Bank300Israeli Tactics in a West Bank Conflict300The Palestinian
Response302The Costs of Fighting and Possible Aftermaths306Cyber-Conflict
on the Web307If Peace Should Fail for Years: ###8220;Violence without
Peace###8221;308A Possible Drift Towards Military and Political
Extremism308Possible Israeli Tactics in a Prolonged Conflict310Prolonged
Conflict, ###8220;Separation,###8221; and Evacuation313The Role of Egypt,
Syria, Jordan, Iran, and Hizbollah in a Longer Conflict in Gaza or the West
Bank314If Peace Does Ever Come: The Cost of Living with ###8220;Peace with
Violence###8221;315Palestinian Authority Security Operations and
###8220;Mission Impossible###8221;316Israeli Criticisms and the Art of the
Possible318###8220;Peace With Abuses###8221; versus ###8220;Peace With
Violence###8221;319The Palestinian Authority Response319The Israeli
Security Response324The Cost-Effectiveness of Security Measures328A Cold
Peace and the Possible Role of Neutral Observers3308Israeli-Syrian
Conflicts333Syrian Capabilities in War Fighting339Syrian Modernization,
Military Spending, and Arms Imports340Syrian Land Forces349Syrian Air and
Air Defense Forces350The Strategic and Tactical Impact of the Golan351The
Golan and Israel###8217;s Overall Supply of Water354The Impact of Giving up
the Golan357War Fighting on the Golan358Mobilization, Surprise, and
Mass359Expanding the Depth of the Golan Battlefield360Israeli ###8220;Soft
Strike###8221; Capabilities in Strategic Bombing362A New Type of
War?363ContentsxiSyrian Risk Taking363An Attack Through the Golan After a
Syrian-Israeli Peace Settlement364The Value of the Golan to Syria in an
Attack on Israel364Can the Golan Stay Partially Divided?366Creating a
Secure Peace on the Golan369The Military Aspects of the Israeli and Syrian
Positions370Force Limitation Measures and Confidence-Building
Measures371Observation Points, Sensors, and Transparency372The Role of a
Peacekeeping or Observer Force and the Role of the US373US Presence in a
Peacekeeping Force374A US-Israeli Strategic Alliance375US ###8220;Extended
Deterrence###8221;378Including Arab States3789Wars Involving Lebanon381A
History of Civil War381The Lebanese Military Forces385The Lebanese
Army386The Lebanese Air Force and Navy392The Syrian Military Presence in
Lebanon393Syrian Forces in Lebanon and Possible Creation of a Second Front
against Israel395The Hizbollah and the Proxy War in Lebanon397The Evolution
of the Hizbollah398Foreign Support for the Hizbollah400The Size and
Armament of Hizbollah404The Role of the Hizbollah in Military and Terrorist
Actions405Amal in Military and Terrorist Actions407The South Lebanon
Army407Israel###8217;s Defeat in Lebanon: An Israeli Vietnam?410The Basic
Military Situation411The Fighting Through 1995412The Disaster of Operation
Grapes of Wrath413Trying to Fight Guerrillas on Their Own
Terms414Blundering Towards Withdrawal417Sensors and Electronic Fences420Air
Raids, ###8220;Massive Retaliation,###8221; and Collapse421Syria, Israel,
and Lebanon With or Without the Peace Process423Israeli Defense
Options423Peace as a Defense426The UNIFIL Option427The Future Threat to
Israel Proper###8212;With and Without a Peace43210Jordanian-Israeli
Conflicts437Jordan###8217;s Military Forces438xiiContentsJordanian Support
of Palestinian Forces in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Israel444Jordanian
###8220;Rescue###8221; of Palestinians in the West Bank: Jordanian
Re-Occupation of the West Bank451Arms Control and Security
Implications45211A Jordanian-Syrian Alliance, Turkey, and Wars on the
Eastern Front455If Jordan Should Join Syria455A Jordanian Role in a Broader
Alliance Against Israel459The Israeli (Jordanian) Alliance with
Turkey46012Egyptian-Israeli Conflicts463Egyptian War Fighting
Capabilities470Egyptian Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers475Egyptian
Land Forces475Egyptian Air Forces478Egyptian Naval Forces479An
Egyptian-Israeli Conflict in the Sinai480Egyptian Defensive
Capabilities481Egyptian Offensive Capabilities481Arms Control in the
Sinai484Egypt###8217;s Impact on Peace Negotiations and Arms
Control48613###8220;Worst Case###8221; Conventional Wars: Israel Fights
Egypt, Jordan, and Syria with Support from Other Arab States48714Wars
Involving Libyan, Iranian, Iraqi, and Other Arab Conventional
Forces497Libyan Capabilities502Iranian Capabilities503Iraqi
Capabilities505The Impact of Libyan, Iranian, Iraqi, and Other Arab
Conventional Capabilities50615Wars Using Weapons of Mass
Destruction509Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction509Israeli Nuclear
Weapons512Israeli Nuclear Delivery Systems519Israeli Chemical and
Biological Weapons526Israeli Deterrent and Strategic Doctrine and
Planning527Israeli Missile Defenses529Israeli National Programs530The
Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) or Nautilus530ContentsxiiiThe Patriot and
PAC-3531The Arrow532The Integrated Boost-Phase Intercept System and
Moab534Warning and Command and Control535The Interoperable Defense Effort:
Israeli and US Cooperation536The Complex Structure of the Full Israeli
Missile Defense Program537Israeli Civil Defense538Syrian Weapons of Mass
Destruction539Syrian Missile Programs539Syrian and Other Regional Use of
Commercial Satellite Imagery542Syrian Missile Conversions and Cruise
Missiles543Syrian Aircraft Delivery Systems544Syrian Chemical
Weapons544Syrian Biological Weapons546Syrian Strategy, Doctrine, and
Plans548Egyptian Weapons of Mass Destruction549Egyptian Missile
Programs549Egyptian Chemical Weapons551Egyptian Biological and Nuclear
Weapons552Algerian, Libyan, Iranian, and Iraqi Weapons of Mass
Destruction553Algeria553Libya555Libyan Delivery Systems555Libyan Chemical
Warfare Programs556Libyan Biological Programs558Libyan Nuclear
Programs558Libyan War Fighting Capability559Iran560Iranian Delivery
Systems560Iranian Chemical Warfare Capabilities572Iranian Biological
Warfare Capabilities578Iranian Nuclear Warfare Capabilities579Iranian War
Fighting Options588Iraq588Iraq###8217;s Current Delivery
Capabilities589Iraqi Chemical Weapons595Iraq###8217;s Biological Warfare
Capabilities599Iraq###8217;s Nuclear Warfare Capabilities603Iraq###8217;s
War Fighting Capabilities607Proliferation and the Greater Middle East609The
War Fighting Implications of Weapons of Mass Destruction609Arab and Iranian
Forces and Capabilities610Israeli Forces and Capabilities611The Evolving
War Fighting and Arms Control Implications of Weapons of Mass
Destruction613The Arms Control Implications of Weapons of Mass
Destruction617xivContents16Deterrence, Arms Control, and Regional
Stability625Self-Stabilizing Deterrence626The Nations Inside the Peace
Process626The Nations Outside the Peace Process628The Stabilizing Role of
the US630US Intervention in an Arab-Israel Conflict631The Impact of US
Military Assistance632Beyond Conventional Deterrence633The Impact of the
Peace Process, Low-Intensity Combat, and the Palestinian Problem633The
Impact of Jordan634The Impact of Syria, the Golan, and Lebanon634The Impact
of Weapons of Mass Destruction635Implications for Arms Control63617Sources
and Methods639Sources639Methods641Notes643Bibliography697
Balance3Counting Total Forces5Deciding What to Count5The Strengths and
Weaknesses of Manpower Numbers7The Strengths and Weaknesses of Equipment
Numbers8Dealing with Force Quantity and Force Quality82Arab-Israeli
Military Efforts and Arms Transfers11Differences in the Size of National
Economies and in the Level of Military Effort12Problems in Dollar
Comparisons of Military Expenditures and Arms Sales16What Can Be Learned
from Comparisons of Military Expenditures19Syrian Military
Expenditures20Jordanian Military Expenditures21Egyptian Military
Expenditures22Lebanese Military Expenditures24Israeli Military
Expenditures25###8220;Haves###8221; versus ###8220;Have
Nots###8221;29Relative Efficiency in Using Military
Expenditures29Comparisons of Arms Sales and Imports32The Impact of US
Military Assistance443Comparing Arab-Israeli Forces by Service and
Country55Understanding the Details Behind Quantitative Comparisons of Total
Forces59Total Force Strength and Differences in National Force
Structure59Israeli Command Structure and Land Forces Major Combat Unit
Strength59Syrian Command Structure and Land Forces Major Combat Unit
Strength61Jordanian Command Structure and Land Forces Major Combat Unit
Strength62Lebanese Command Structure and Land Forces Major Combat Unit
Strength64Egyptian Command Structure and Land Forces Major Combat Unit
Strength65The Importance of Reserve Forces and Strategic
Warning67viiiContentsHigh-Quality Weapons versus Total Weapons71Main Battle
Tanks73Other Armored Fighting Vehicles81Anti-Tank Weapons87Artillery
Forces90Multiple Rocket Launchers98Mortars99Advanced Artillery Warfare
Capability100Combat Aircraft101Qualitative Factors Shaping the
Effectiveness of the IAF107Qualitative Factors Shaping the Effectiveness of
the Syrian Air Force117Qualitative Factors Shaping the Effectiveness of the
Jordanian Air Force120Qualitative Factors Shaping the Effectiveness of the
Egyptian Air Force121Attack and Armed Helicopters123Israeli Combat
Helicopter Forces124Arab Combat Helicopter Forces126Major Surface-to-Air
Missile Defenses127Israeli Land-Based Air Defenses128Syrian Land-Based Air
Defenses129Jordanian Land-Based Air Defenses130Egyptian Land-Based Air
Defenses131Short-Range Air Defenses132Israeli Short-Range Air
Defenses132Syrian Short-Range Air Defenses133Jordanian Short-Range Air
Defenses133Egyptian Short-Range Air Defenses133The Size and Role of Naval
Forces134Israeli Naval Forces136Syrian Naval Forces139Jordanian Naval
Forces140Lebanese Naval Forces140Egyptian Naval Forces141The Inevitable
Limits of Quantitative Comparisons1444###8220;Intangibles###8221;:
Arab-Israeli Force Quality147The Israeli ###8220;Edge###8221;147Arab
Organizational, Resource, Political, and ###8220;Cultural###8221;
Problems150The Qualitative Weaknesses in Most Middle Eastern Military
Forces153The Qualitative Advantages of Israeli Forces157The Limits of
Israel###8217;s Qualitative ###8220;Edge###8221;1635Comparing Arab-Israeli
War Fighting Capability1676The Israeli ###8220;Edge###8221;: Strengths and
Weaknesses173ContentsixKeeping the ###8220;Edge###8221;?177Israeli Military
Technology, Equipment Buys, and Arms Transfers178Israeli Force
Trends179Israeli Military Manpower182The Problem of Peace and
Bureaucratization184The Problem of Conscription185The Uncertain Role of
Women186The Changing Role of Reserves187Morale, Motivation, and
Money188Willingness to Serve and Willingness to Take Casualties188Numbers
versus Quality versus Money189Israeli Land Forces190Israeli Air
Forces191Israeli Naval Forces195Israeli Long-Range Missiles and Weapons of
Mass Destruction195Israeli Criticisms of the IDF and Fears That Israel Is
Losing Its ###8220;Edge###8221;197The Wald Report198The Barak
Reforms199Reforms Since Barak200Israel###8217;s Continuing Strategic
Debate201The Creation of a National Security Council, ###8220;Zahal
2000,###8221; ###8220;Idan 2003,###8221; and ###8220;Idan
2010###8221;207The Barak Government and Idan 20102117Israeli-Palestinian
Conflicts215Peace with Violence versus a Second Intifada: The Nature of
Asymmetric Warfare226The ###8220;Military Balance###8221;: The Actors That
Would Challenge the IDF in a Second Intifada234Palestinian Paramilitary
Groups235The Role of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad239Hamas243Islamic
Jihad251Outside Actors: Palestinians in Lebanon, the Hizbollah, and
Iran254Palestinian Hard-Line Movements in Syria and Jordan257Israeli
Hard-Line Movements and Extremists260The History and Effectiveness of the
Palestinian Authority Security Forces260The Palestinian Authority versus
Hamas and the PIJ261The Effectiveness of the Palestinian Authority Security
Forces262The Organization of the Palestinian Security Forces in Gaza and
the West Bank264Conflict in Gaza270Fighting in an Economic and Demographic
Time Bomb271The Forms the Fighting Might Take in the
Gaza275xContentsConflict on the West Bank280The West Bank Version of the
Economic and Demographic Time Bomb283Major Security Issues on the West
Bank285The Problem of Palestinian Sovereignty and the Final Settlement
Issues287The Problem of Demographics and the Right of Return288The Problem
of Economics290The Problem of Jerusalem290The Problem of West Bank
Security293The Problem of Water295The Impact of the Security Arrangements
on the West Bank296The Israeli-Palestinian Accords296Possible Wars on the
West Bank300Israeli Tactics in a West Bank Conflict300The Palestinian
Response302The Costs of Fighting and Possible Aftermaths306Cyber-Conflict
on the Web307If Peace Should Fail for Years: ###8220;Violence without
Peace###8221;308A Possible Drift Towards Military and Political
Extremism308Possible Israeli Tactics in a Prolonged Conflict310Prolonged
Conflict, ###8220;Separation,###8221; and Evacuation313The Role of Egypt,
Syria, Jordan, Iran, and Hizbollah in a Longer Conflict in Gaza or the West
Bank314If Peace Does Ever Come: The Cost of Living with ###8220;Peace with
Violence###8221;315Palestinian Authority Security Operations and
###8220;Mission Impossible###8221;316Israeli Criticisms and the Art of the
Possible318###8220;Peace With Abuses###8221; versus ###8220;Peace With
Violence###8221;319The Palestinian Authority Response319The Israeli
Security Response324The Cost-Effectiveness of Security Measures328A Cold
Peace and the Possible Role of Neutral Observers3308Israeli-Syrian
Conflicts333Syrian Capabilities in War Fighting339Syrian Modernization,
Military Spending, and Arms Imports340Syrian Land Forces349Syrian Air and
Air Defense Forces350The Strategic and Tactical Impact of the Golan351The
Golan and Israel###8217;s Overall Supply of Water354The Impact of Giving up
the Golan357War Fighting on the Golan358Mobilization, Surprise, and
Mass359Expanding the Depth of the Golan Battlefield360Israeli ###8220;Soft
Strike###8221; Capabilities in Strategic Bombing362A New Type of
War?363ContentsxiSyrian Risk Taking363An Attack Through the Golan After a
Syrian-Israeli Peace Settlement364The Value of the Golan to Syria in an
Attack on Israel364Can the Golan Stay Partially Divided?366Creating a
Secure Peace on the Golan369The Military Aspects of the Israeli and Syrian
Positions370Force Limitation Measures and Confidence-Building
Measures371Observation Points, Sensors, and Transparency372The Role of a
Peacekeeping or Observer Force and the Role of the US373US Presence in a
Peacekeeping Force374A US-Israeli Strategic Alliance375US ###8220;Extended
Deterrence###8221;378Including Arab States3789Wars Involving Lebanon381A
History of Civil War381The Lebanese Military Forces385The Lebanese
Army386The Lebanese Air Force and Navy392The Syrian Military Presence in
Lebanon393Syrian Forces in Lebanon and Possible Creation of a Second Front
against Israel395The Hizbollah and the Proxy War in Lebanon397The Evolution
of the Hizbollah398Foreign Support for the Hizbollah400The Size and
Armament of Hizbollah404The Role of the Hizbollah in Military and Terrorist
Actions405Amal in Military and Terrorist Actions407The South Lebanon
Army407Israel###8217;s Defeat in Lebanon: An Israeli Vietnam?410The Basic
Military Situation411The Fighting Through 1995412The Disaster of Operation
Grapes of Wrath413Trying to Fight Guerrillas on Their Own
Terms414Blundering Towards Withdrawal417Sensors and Electronic Fences420Air
Raids, ###8220;Massive Retaliation,###8221; and Collapse421Syria, Israel,
and Lebanon With or Without the Peace Process423Israeli Defense
Options423Peace as a Defense426The UNIFIL Option427The Future Threat to
Israel Proper###8212;With and Without a Peace43210Jordanian-Israeli
Conflicts437Jordan###8217;s Military Forces438xiiContentsJordanian Support
of Palestinian Forces in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Israel444Jordanian
###8220;Rescue###8221; of Palestinians in the West Bank: Jordanian
Re-Occupation of the West Bank451Arms Control and Security
Implications45211A Jordanian-Syrian Alliance, Turkey, and Wars on the
Eastern Front455If Jordan Should Join Syria455A Jordanian Role in a Broader
Alliance Against Israel459The Israeli (Jordanian) Alliance with
Turkey46012Egyptian-Israeli Conflicts463Egyptian War Fighting
Capabilities470Egyptian Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers475Egyptian
Land Forces475Egyptian Air Forces478Egyptian Naval Forces479An
Egyptian-Israeli Conflict in the Sinai480Egyptian Defensive
Capabilities481Egyptian Offensive Capabilities481Arms Control in the
Sinai484Egypt###8217;s Impact on Peace Negotiations and Arms
Control48613###8220;Worst Case###8221; Conventional Wars: Israel Fights
Egypt, Jordan, and Syria with Support from Other Arab States48714Wars
Involving Libyan, Iranian, Iraqi, and Other Arab Conventional
Forces497Libyan Capabilities502Iranian Capabilities503Iraqi
Capabilities505The Impact of Libyan, Iranian, Iraqi, and Other Arab
Conventional Capabilities50615Wars Using Weapons of Mass
Destruction509Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction509Israeli Nuclear
Weapons512Israeli Nuclear Delivery Systems519Israeli Chemical and
Biological Weapons526Israeli Deterrent and Strategic Doctrine and
Planning527Israeli Missile Defenses529Israeli National Programs530The
Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) or Nautilus530ContentsxiiiThe Patriot and
PAC-3531The Arrow532The Integrated Boost-Phase Intercept System and
Moab534Warning and Command and Control535The Interoperable Defense Effort:
Israeli and US Cooperation536The Complex Structure of the Full Israeli
Missile Defense Program537Israeli Civil Defense538Syrian Weapons of Mass
Destruction539Syrian Missile Programs539Syrian and Other Regional Use of
Commercial Satellite Imagery542Syrian Missile Conversions and Cruise
Missiles543Syrian Aircraft Delivery Systems544Syrian Chemical
Weapons544Syrian Biological Weapons546Syrian Strategy, Doctrine, and
Plans548Egyptian Weapons of Mass Destruction549Egyptian Missile
Programs549Egyptian Chemical Weapons551Egyptian Biological and Nuclear
Weapons552Algerian, Libyan, Iranian, and Iraqi Weapons of Mass
Destruction553Algeria553Libya555Libyan Delivery Systems555Libyan Chemical
Warfare Programs556Libyan Biological Programs558Libyan Nuclear
Programs558Libyan War Fighting Capability559Iran560Iranian Delivery
Systems560Iranian Chemical Warfare Capabilities572Iranian Biological
Warfare Capabilities578Iranian Nuclear Warfare Capabilities579Iranian War
Fighting Options588Iraq588Iraq###8217;s Current Delivery
Capabilities589Iraqi Chemical Weapons595Iraq###8217;s Biological Warfare
Capabilities599Iraq###8217;s Nuclear Warfare Capabilities603Iraq###8217;s
War Fighting Capabilities607Proliferation and the Greater Middle East609The
War Fighting Implications of Weapons of Mass Destruction609Arab and Iranian
Forces and Capabilities610Israeli Forces and Capabilities611The Evolving
War Fighting and Arms Control Implications of Weapons of Mass
Destruction613The Arms Control Implications of Weapons of Mass
Destruction617xivContents16Deterrence, Arms Control, and Regional
Stability625Self-Stabilizing Deterrence626The Nations Inside the Peace
Process626The Nations Outside the Peace Process628The Stabilizing Role of
the US630US Intervention in an Arab-Israel Conflict631The Impact of US
Military Assistance632Beyond Conventional Deterrence633The Impact of the
Peace Process, Low-Intensity Combat, and the Palestinian Problem633The
Impact of Jordan634The Impact of Syria, the Golan, and Lebanon634The Impact
of Weapons of Mass Destruction635Implications for Arms Control63617Sources
and Methods639Sources639Methods641Notes643Bibliography697