Jack Lyons addresses two central questions in epistemology: which beliefs are epistemologically basic (i.e. noninferentially justified) and where does perception end and inferential cognition begin.
Jack Lyons addresses two central questions in epistemology: which beliefs are epistemologically basic (i.e. noninferentially justified) and where does perception end and inferential cognition begin.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Associate Professor Philosophy, University of Arkansas
Inhaltsangabe
Abbreviations Chapter 1: External Object Foundationalism 1.1The Problem of the External World 1.2 Metaphysical and Epistemological Direct Realisms 1.3 Basic Beliefs Chapter 2: Doxastic and Nondoxastic Theories 2.1 Evidential and Nonevidential Justifiers 2.2 The Supervenience Argument 2.3 Doxasticism and Nondoxasticism 2.4 Doxastic Theories Chapter 3: Experientialist Theories: 3.1 Sensation and Perception 3.2 Sensations as Grounds 3.2.1 Sensationless Perception 3.2.2 The Sensation/perception Gap and Collateral Information 3.2.3 Problems Concerning Basing 3.2.4 SE and the Content of Sensations 3.3 Percepts as Grounds 3.3.1 In Search of the Percept 3.3.2 Percepts and Beliefs 3.3.3 The Zombies Return 3.4 The Belief Principle 3.5 Experiential States as Nonevidential Justifiers 3.6 Intuitive Resistance 3.7 Recapitulation Chapter 4: Perceptual Systems and Perceptual Beliefs 4.1 Perceptual Systems 4.1.1 Cognitive Systems/Modules 4.1.2 Perceptual Modules 4.2 The Plausibility of the Perceptual System Theory 4.2.1 The "Grain Size" of Perceptual Beliefs 4.2.2 Perception and Ungrounded Justified Belief 4.2.3 Perceptual Learning and Nonexperiential 'Looks' 4.2.4 Percept Experientialism Revisited 4.3 Perceptual Beliefs and Basic Beliefs Chapter 5: Perception, Clairvoyance, and Reliability 5.1 Simple Reliabilism and the Norman/Truetemp Objections 5.2 Clairvoyance and Basicality 5.2.1 Underspecification and the "Clairvoyance Challenge" 5.2.2 Perception and Other Cognitive Abilities 5.2.3 "Meta-Incoherence" 5.3 Reliability and Basicality 5.3.1Clairvoyance and Defeat 5.3.2 Experientialist Reliabilism 5.3.3 Early Reliabilism 5.3.4 Teleological Reliabilism Chapter 6: Basic Beliefs 6.1 The Delineation Problem 6.1.1 The Desiderata 6.1.2 A Systems Theory of Basicality 6.1.3 Counterexamples and Replies 6.2 Intuitions and Beyond 6.2.1 Descriptive and Normative Epistemology 6.2.2 Cognitive Science and Basicality 6.2.3 Illustration: Why My Philosophy is More God-Friendly than Plantinga's 6.2.4 Reflective Equilibrium and Etiological Constraints Chapter 7: Basic and Nonbasic Beliefs in a Reliabilist Epistemology 7.1Toward a Theory of Justification 7.1.1 Evidential Justification 7.1.2 Defeat 7.1.3 Outline of a Theory 7.2 Internalism and Externalism 7.3 The Problem(s) of the External World References Index
Abbreviations Chapter 1: External Object Foundationalism 1.1The Problem of the External World 1.2 Metaphysical and Epistemological Direct Realisms 1.3 Basic Beliefs Chapter 2: Doxastic and Nondoxastic Theories 2.1 Evidential and Nonevidential Justifiers 2.2 The Supervenience Argument 2.3 Doxasticism and Nondoxasticism 2.4 Doxastic Theories Chapter 3: Experientialist Theories: 3.1 Sensation and Perception 3.2 Sensations as Grounds 3.2.1 Sensationless Perception 3.2.2 The Sensation/perception Gap and Collateral Information 3.2.3 Problems Concerning Basing 3.2.4 SE and the Content of Sensations 3.3 Percepts as Grounds 3.3.1 In Search of the Percept 3.3.2 Percepts and Beliefs 3.3.3 The Zombies Return 3.4 The Belief Principle 3.5 Experiential States as Nonevidential Justifiers 3.6 Intuitive Resistance 3.7 Recapitulation Chapter 4: Perceptual Systems and Perceptual Beliefs 4.1 Perceptual Systems 4.1.1 Cognitive Systems/Modules 4.1.2 Perceptual Modules 4.2 The Plausibility of the Perceptual System Theory 4.2.1 The "Grain Size" of Perceptual Beliefs 4.2.2 Perception and Ungrounded Justified Belief 4.2.3 Perceptual Learning and Nonexperiential 'Looks' 4.2.4 Percept Experientialism Revisited 4.3 Perceptual Beliefs and Basic Beliefs Chapter 5: Perception, Clairvoyance, and Reliability 5.1 Simple Reliabilism and the Norman/Truetemp Objections 5.2 Clairvoyance and Basicality 5.2.1 Underspecification and the "Clairvoyance Challenge" 5.2.2 Perception and Other Cognitive Abilities 5.2.3 "Meta-Incoherence" 5.3 Reliability and Basicality 5.3.1Clairvoyance and Defeat 5.3.2 Experientialist Reliabilism 5.3.3 Early Reliabilism 5.3.4 Teleological Reliabilism Chapter 6: Basic Beliefs 6.1 The Delineation Problem 6.1.1 The Desiderata 6.1.2 A Systems Theory of Basicality 6.1.3 Counterexamples and Replies 6.2 Intuitions and Beyond 6.2.1 Descriptive and Normative Epistemology 6.2.2 Cognitive Science and Basicality 6.2.3 Illustration: Why My Philosophy is More God-Friendly than Plantinga's 6.2.4 Reflective Equilibrium and Etiological Constraints Chapter 7: Basic and Nonbasic Beliefs in a Reliabilist Epistemology 7.1Toward a Theory of Justification 7.1.1 Evidential Justification 7.1.2 Defeat 7.1.3 Outline of a Theory 7.2 Internalism and Externalism 7.3 The Problem(s) of the External World References Index
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