Christopher S. Hill offers an original philosophical account of perceptual experience: its intrinsic nature, its engagement with the world, its relations to mental states of other kinds, and its role in epistemic norms. He argues that it constitutively involves representations of worldly items, which can be explained in broadly biological terms.
Christopher S. Hill offers an original philosophical account of perceptual experience: its intrinsic nature, its engagement with the world, its relations to mental states of other kinds, and its role in epistemic norms. He argues that it constitutively involves representations of worldly items, which can be explained in broadly biological terms.
Christopher S. Hill is Faunce Professor of Philosophy at Brown University. He previously held teaching positions at Case Western Reserve University and the University of Arkansas. He has had visiting appointments at the University of Pittsburgh, the University of Michigan, and MIT. He is the author of several books, including Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge (OUP, 2014) and a number of articles.
Inhaltsangabe
1: Representationalism 2: Appearance and Reality I 3: Appearance and Reality II 4: Perceptual Awareness of Particulars 5: Perceptual Phenomenology 6: A Quasi-Perceptualist Account of Pain 7: Perceptual Consciousness 8: Percepts and Concepts 9: The Epistemic Role of Perception
1: Representationalism 2: Appearance and Reality I 3: Appearance and Reality II 4: Perceptual Awareness of Particulars 5: Perceptual Phenomenology 6: A Quasi-Perceptualist Account of Pain 7: Perceptual Consciousness 8: Percepts and Concepts 9: The Epistemic Role of Perception
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