Edward P. Lazear (Stanford University), Michael Gibbs (University of Chicago)

Personnel Economics in Practice

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Personnel Economics in Practice, 3rd Edition by Edward Lazear and Michael Gibbs gives readers a rigorous framework for understanding organizational design and the management of employees. Economics has proven to be a powerful approach in the changing study of organizations and human resources by adding rigor and structure and clarifying many important issues. Not only will readers learn and apply ideas from microeconomics, they will also learn principles that will be valuable in their future careers.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Wiley / Wiley & Sons
• Artikelnr. des Verlages: 1W119427360
• 3. Aufl.
• Seitenzahl: 416
• Erscheinungstermin: 11. April 2017
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 235mm x 193mm x 17mm
• Gewicht: 650g
• ISBN-13: 9781119427360
• ISBN-10: 1119427363
• Artikelnr.: 54944443

Inhaltsangabe

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

PREFACE

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

PART ONE SORTING AND INVESTING IN EMPLOYEES

CHAPTER 1 SETTING HIRING STANDARDS

An Example: Hiring Risky Workers

New Hires as Options

Analysis

A Counterargument

Setting Hiring Standards

Balancing Benefits Against Costs

Foreign Competition

The Method of Production

How Many Workers to Hire?

Other Factors

Making Decisions with Imperfect Information

Make a Decision Independent of Analysis

Estimate the Relevant Information

Experiment

Summary

Study Questions

References

Further Reading

Appendix (available online)

CHAPTER 2 RECRUITMENT

Introduction

Screening Job Applicants

Credentials

Learning a Worker's Productivity

Is Screening Profitable? For Whom?

Probation

Signaling

Who Pays, and Who Benefits?

Examples

Signaling More Formally: Separating and Pooling Equilibria

Which Type of Firm is More Likely to use Signaling?

Summary

Study Questions

References

Further Reading

Appendix (available online)

CHAPTER 3 INVESTMENT IN SKILLS

Introduction

Matching

Investments in Education

Effects of Costs and Benefits

Was Benjamin Franklin Correct?

Investments in On the Job Training

General vs. Firm-Specific Human Capital

Who Should Pay for Training?

Implications of On the Job Training

Rent Sharing and Compensation

Implicit Contracting

Summary

Study Questions

References

Further Reading

Appendix (available online)

CHAPTER 4 MANAGING TURNOVER

Introduction

Is Turnover Good or Bad?

Importance of Sorting

Technical Change

Organizational Change

Hierarchical Structure

Specific Human Capital

Retention Strategies

Reducing Costs of Losing Key Employees

Embracing Turnover

Bidding for Employees

Raiding Other Firms: Benefits and Pitfalls

Offer Matching

Layoffs and Buyouts

Who to Target for Layoffs

Buyouts

Summary

Study Questions

References

Further Reading

Appendix (available online)

PART TWO ORGANIZATIONAL AND JOB DESIGN

CHAPTER 5 DECISION MAKING

Introduction

The Organization of an Economy

Markets as Information Systems

Markets as Incentive Systems

Markets and Innovation

Benefits of Central Planning

The Market as Metaphor for Organizational Design

Benefits of Centralization

Economies of Scale or Public Goods

Better Use of Central Knowledge

Coordination

Benefits of Decentralization

Specific vs. General Knowledge

Other Benefits of Decentralization

Authority and Responsibility

Decision Making as a Multistage Process

Flat vs. Hierarchical Structures

Investing in Better Quality Decision Making

Summary

Study Questions

References

Further Reading

Appendix (available online)

CHAPTER 6 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Introduction

Types of Organizational Structures

Hi