Francois Recanati presents a ground-breaking study of the context-dependence of our language and thought. He argues that our linguistic and mental representations alike must be assigned two layers of content: the explicit content, which is relative and perspectival, and the complete content, which is absolute and involves contextual factors.
Francois Recanati presents a ground-breaking study of the context-dependence of our language and thought. He argues that our linguistic and mental representations alike must be assigned two layers of content: the explicit content, which is relative and perspectival, and the complete content, which is absolute and involves contextual factors.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
François Recanati is Director of Research, CNRS (Institut Jean-Nicod), and Arché Professorial Fellow, University of St Andrews.
Inhaltsangabe
* PART 1 : MODERATE RELATIVISM * 1. The framework * 1: The distribution of content * 2: Radical vs Moderate Relativism * 3: Two levels of content * 4: Branch points for Moderate Relativism * 2. The debate over temporalism (1) : Do we need temporal propositions? * 5: Modal vs extensional treatments of tense * 6: What is at stake? * 7: Modal and temporal innocence * 8: Temporal operators and temporal propositions in an extensional framework * 3. The debate over temporalism (2) : Can we believe temporal propositions ? * 9: An epistemic argument against temporalism * 10: Rebutting Richard's argument * 11: Relativistic disagreement * 4. Relativization and indexicality * 12: Index, context, and content * 13: The two-stage picture : Lewis vs Kaplan and Stalnaker * 14: Rescuing the two-stage picture * 15: Content, character, and cognitive significance * PART 2 : EXPERIENCE AND SUBJECTIVITY * 5. Content and mode * 16: Duality and the fallacy of misplaced information * 17: The content of perceptual judgments * 18: Episodic memory * 6. Immunity to error through misidentification * 19: Implicit self-reference * 20: Weak and strong immunity * 21: Quasi-perception and quasi-memory * 22: Reflexive states * 7. Relativization and reflexivity * 23: The (alleged) reflexivity of de se thoughts * 24: Reflexivity : internal or external ? * 25: What is wrong with Reflexivism * 8. The first person point of view * 26: De se thoughts and subjectivity * 27: Memory and the imagination * 28: Imagination and the self * 29: Imagination, empathy, and the quasi-de se * PART 3 : EGOCENTRICITY AND BEYOND * 9. Unarticulated constituents in the lekton ? * 30: The context-dependence of the lekton : how far can we go ? * 31: Unarticulatedness and the 'concerning' relation * 32: Three (alleged) arguments for the Externality Principle * 33: Invariance * 10. Self-relative thoughts * 34: The problem of the essential indexical * 35: Perry against relativized propositions * 36: Context-relativity * 37: Basic and nonbasic de se thoughts * 11. Shiftability * 38: The Generalized Reflexive Constraint * 39: Parametric invariance and m-shiftability * 40: Free shiftability * 41: The anaphoric mode : a Bühlerian perspective * References
* PART 1 : MODERATE RELATIVISM * 1. The framework * 1: The distribution of content * 2: Radical vs Moderate Relativism * 3: Two levels of content * 4: Branch points for Moderate Relativism * 2. The debate over temporalism (1) : Do we need temporal propositions? * 5: Modal vs extensional treatments of tense * 6: What is at stake? * 7: Modal and temporal innocence * 8: Temporal operators and temporal propositions in an extensional framework * 3. The debate over temporalism (2) : Can we believe temporal propositions ? * 9: An epistemic argument against temporalism * 10: Rebutting Richard's argument * 11: Relativistic disagreement * 4. Relativization and indexicality * 12: Index, context, and content * 13: The two-stage picture : Lewis vs Kaplan and Stalnaker * 14: Rescuing the two-stage picture * 15: Content, character, and cognitive significance * PART 2 : EXPERIENCE AND SUBJECTIVITY * 5. Content and mode * 16: Duality and the fallacy of misplaced information * 17: The content of perceptual judgments * 18: Episodic memory * 6. Immunity to error through misidentification * 19: Implicit self-reference * 20: Weak and strong immunity * 21: Quasi-perception and quasi-memory * 22: Reflexive states * 7. Relativization and reflexivity * 23: The (alleged) reflexivity of de se thoughts * 24: Reflexivity : internal or external ? * 25: What is wrong with Reflexivism * 8. The first person point of view * 26: De se thoughts and subjectivity * 27: Memory and the imagination * 28: Imagination and the self * 29: Imagination, empathy, and the quasi-de se * PART 3 : EGOCENTRICITY AND BEYOND * 9. Unarticulated constituents in the lekton ? * 30: The context-dependence of the lekton : how far can we go ? * 31: Unarticulatedness and the 'concerning' relation * 32: Three (alleged) arguments for the Externality Principle * 33: Invariance * 10. Self-relative thoughts * 34: The problem of the essential indexical * 35: Perry against relativized propositions * 36: Context-relativity * 37: Basic and nonbasic de se thoughts * 11. Shiftability * 38: The Generalized Reflexive Constraint * 39: Parametric invariance and m-shiftability * 40: Free shiftability * 41: The anaphoric mode : a Bühlerian perspective * References
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