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This five-part volume surveys the main ideas and contributions to the field of public choice.
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This five-part volume surveys the main ideas and contributions to the field of public choice.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 692
- Erscheinungstermin: 31. Dezember 2009
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 235mm x 157mm x 45mm
- Gewicht: 1259g
- ISBN-13: 9780521553773
- ISBN-10: 0521553776
- Artikelnr.: 28525591
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 692
- Erscheinungstermin: 31. Dezember 2009
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 235mm x 157mm x 45mm
- Gewicht: 1259g
- ISBN-13: 9780521553773
- ISBN-10: 0521553776
- Artikelnr.: 28525591
1. Public choice in perspective Dennis C. Mueller; Part I. The Need for and
Forms of Cooperation: 2. Economic theories of the state Russell Hardin; 3.
Neither markets nor states: linking transformation processes in
collective-action arenas Elinor Ostrom and James Walker; 4. The political
economy of Federalism Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld; 5. The
public choice of international organizations Bruno S. Frey; 6.
Constitutional public choice Dennis C. Mueller; Part II. Voting Rules and
Preference Aggregation: 7. Cycling and majority rule James M. Enelow; 8.
Majority rule Douglas W. Rae and Eric Schickler; 9. Group choice and
individual judgments H. Peyton Young; 10. Some paradoxes of preference
aggregation Prasanta K. Pattanaik; 11. Voting and the revelation of
preferences for public activities T. Nicolaus Tideman; Part III. Electoral
Politics: 12. The spatial analysis of elections and committees: four
decades of research Peter C. Ordeshook; 13. Multiparty electoral politics
Norman Schofield; 14. Interest groups: money, information and influence
David Austen Smith; 15. Logrolling Thomas Stratmann; 16. Political business
cycles Martin Paldam; Part IV. Individual Behavior and Collective Action:
17. When is it rational to vote? John H. Aldrich; 18. Voting behavior
Morris P. Fiorina; 19. Public Choice Experiments Elizabeth Hoffman; Part V.
Public Choice in Action: 20. Modern bureaucratic theory Ronald Wintrobe;
21. The positive theory of public bureaucracy Terry Moe; 22. The political
economy of taxation Walter Hettich and Stanley L. Winer; 23. Rent seeking
Robert D. Tollison; 24. Endogenous protection: a survey Stephen P. Magee;
25. Why does government's share of national income grow? An assessment of
the recent literature on the US experience Cheryl M. Holsey and Thomas
Borchering.
Forms of Cooperation: 2. Economic theories of the state Russell Hardin; 3.
Neither markets nor states: linking transformation processes in
collective-action arenas Elinor Ostrom and James Walker; 4. The political
economy of Federalism Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld; 5. The
public choice of international organizations Bruno S. Frey; 6.
Constitutional public choice Dennis C. Mueller; Part II. Voting Rules and
Preference Aggregation: 7. Cycling and majority rule James M. Enelow; 8.
Majority rule Douglas W. Rae and Eric Schickler; 9. Group choice and
individual judgments H. Peyton Young; 10. Some paradoxes of preference
aggregation Prasanta K. Pattanaik; 11. Voting and the revelation of
preferences for public activities T. Nicolaus Tideman; Part III. Electoral
Politics: 12. The spatial analysis of elections and committees: four
decades of research Peter C. Ordeshook; 13. Multiparty electoral politics
Norman Schofield; 14. Interest groups: money, information and influence
David Austen Smith; 15. Logrolling Thomas Stratmann; 16. Political business
cycles Martin Paldam; Part IV. Individual Behavior and Collective Action:
17. When is it rational to vote? John H. Aldrich; 18. Voting behavior
Morris P. Fiorina; 19. Public Choice Experiments Elizabeth Hoffman; Part V.
Public Choice in Action: 20. Modern bureaucratic theory Ronald Wintrobe;
21. The positive theory of public bureaucracy Terry Moe; 22. The political
economy of taxation Walter Hettich and Stanley L. Winer; 23. Rent seeking
Robert D. Tollison; 24. Endogenous protection: a survey Stephen P. Magee;
25. Why does government's share of national income grow? An assessment of
the recent literature on the US experience Cheryl M. Holsey and Thomas
Borchering.
1. Public choice in perspective Dennis C. Mueller; Part I. The Need for and
Forms of Cooperation: 2. Economic theories of the state Russell Hardin; 3.
Neither markets nor states: linking transformation processes in
collective-action arenas Elinor Ostrom and James Walker; 4. The political
economy of Federalism Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld; 5. The
public choice of international organizations Bruno S. Frey; 6.
Constitutional public choice Dennis C. Mueller; Part II. Voting Rules and
Preference Aggregation: 7. Cycling and majority rule James M. Enelow; 8.
Majority rule Douglas W. Rae and Eric Schickler; 9. Group choice and
individual judgments H. Peyton Young; 10. Some paradoxes of preference
aggregation Prasanta K. Pattanaik; 11. Voting and the revelation of
preferences for public activities T. Nicolaus Tideman; Part III. Electoral
Politics: 12. The spatial analysis of elections and committees: four
decades of research Peter C. Ordeshook; 13. Multiparty electoral politics
Norman Schofield; 14. Interest groups: money, information and influence
David Austen Smith; 15. Logrolling Thomas Stratmann; 16. Political business
cycles Martin Paldam; Part IV. Individual Behavior and Collective Action:
17. When is it rational to vote? John H. Aldrich; 18. Voting behavior
Morris P. Fiorina; 19. Public Choice Experiments Elizabeth Hoffman; Part V.
Public Choice in Action: 20. Modern bureaucratic theory Ronald Wintrobe;
21. The positive theory of public bureaucracy Terry Moe; 22. The political
economy of taxation Walter Hettich and Stanley L. Winer; 23. Rent seeking
Robert D. Tollison; 24. Endogenous protection: a survey Stephen P. Magee;
25. Why does government's share of national income grow? An assessment of
the recent literature on the US experience Cheryl M. Holsey and Thomas
Borchering.
Forms of Cooperation: 2. Economic theories of the state Russell Hardin; 3.
Neither markets nor states: linking transformation processes in
collective-action arenas Elinor Ostrom and James Walker; 4. The political
economy of Federalism Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld; 5. The
public choice of international organizations Bruno S. Frey; 6.
Constitutional public choice Dennis C. Mueller; Part II. Voting Rules and
Preference Aggregation: 7. Cycling and majority rule James M. Enelow; 8.
Majority rule Douglas W. Rae and Eric Schickler; 9. Group choice and
individual judgments H. Peyton Young; 10. Some paradoxes of preference
aggregation Prasanta K. Pattanaik; 11. Voting and the revelation of
preferences for public activities T. Nicolaus Tideman; Part III. Electoral
Politics: 12. The spatial analysis of elections and committees: four
decades of research Peter C. Ordeshook; 13. Multiparty electoral politics
Norman Schofield; 14. Interest groups: money, information and influence
David Austen Smith; 15. Logrolling Thomas Stratmann; 16. Political business
cycles Martin Paldam; Part IV. Individual Behavior and Collective Action:
17. When is it rational to vote? John H. Aldrich; 18. Voting behavior
Morris P. Fiorina; 19. Public Choice Experiments Elizabeth Hoffman; Part V.
Public Choice in Action: 20. Modern bureaucratic theory Ronald Wintrobe;
21. The positive theory of public bureaucracy Terry Moe; 22. The political
economy of taxation Walter Hettich and Stanley L. Winer; 23. Rent seeking
Robert D. Tollison; 24. Endogenous protection: a survey Stephen P. Magee;
25. Why does government's share of national income grow? An assessment of
the recent literature on the US experience Cheryl M. Holsey and Thomas
Borchering.