Does metacognition--the capacity to self-evaluate one's cognitive performance--derive from a mindreading capacity, or does it rely on informational processes? Joëlle Proust draws on psychology and neuroscience to defend the second claim. She argues that metacognition need not involve metarepresentations, and is essentially related to mental agency.
Does metacognition--the capacity to self-evaluate one's cognitive performance--derive from a mindreading capacity, or does it rely on informational processes? Joëlle Proust draws on psychology and neuroscience to defend the second claim. She argues that metacognition need not involve metarepresentations, and is essentially related to mental agency.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
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Autorenporträt
Joëlle Proust is Director of Research at Fondation Pierre-Gilles de Gennes pour la Recherche, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris. Proust first conducted research at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in the domain of the history and philosophy of logic, and was awarded a CNRS bronze medal for her first book, Questions of Form (Minnesota Press, 1989). She was a founding member of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, and of the European Society for Analytic Philosophy. From 2006 to 2009 Proust was the principal investigator of an European Science Foundation interdisciplinary research program about the evolution of metacognition; in 2010 she was awarded an European Research Council advanced grant.
Inhaltsangabe
1: Introduction 2: An evaluativist proposal: cognitive control and metacognition 3: Metacognition as cognition about cognition: attributive views 4: Metacognition or metarepresentation? A critical discussion of attributivism 5: Primate metacognition 6: A representational format for procedural metacognition 7: Mental acts as natural kinds 8: The norms of acceptance 9: Epistemic agency and metacognition: an externalist view 10: Is there a sense of agency for thought? 11: The sense of self as the same 12: Experience of agency in schizophrenia 13: Conversational metacognition 14: Dual-system metacognition and new challenges Glossay References
1: Introduction 2: An evaluativist proposal: cognitive control and metacognition 3: Metacognition as cognition about cognition: attributive views 4: Metacognition or metarepresentation? A critical discussion of attributivism 5: Primate metacognition 6: A representational format for procedural metacognition 7: Mental acts as natural kinds 8: The norms of acceptance 9: Epistemic agency and metacognition: an externalist view 10: Is there a sense of agency for thought? 11: The sense of self as the same 12: Experience of agency in schizophrenia 13: Conversational metacognition 14: Dual-system metacognition and new challenges Glossay References
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