Philosophy of Mind, Volume 26
Herausgeber: Hawthorne, John; Turner, Jason
Philosophy of Mind, Volume 26
Herausgeber: Hawthorne, John; Turner, Jason
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Philosophical Perspectives, an annual, aims to publish original essays by foremost thinkers in their fields, with each volume confined to a main area of philosophical research.
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Philosophical Perspectives, an annual, aims to publish original essays by foremost thinkers in their fields, with each volume confined to a main area of philosophical research.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Wiley
- Seitenzahl: 446
- Erscheinungstermin: 22. Januar 2013
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 226mm x 152mm x 23mm
- Gewicht: 590g
- ISBN-13: 9781118596876
- ISBN-10: 1118596870
- Artikelnr.: 37718139
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
- Verlag: Wiley
- Seitenzahl: 446
- Erscheinungstermin: 22. Januar 2013
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 226mm x 152mm x 23mm
- Gewicht: 590g
- ISBN-13: 9781118596876
- ISBN-10: 1118596870
- Artikelnr.: 37718139
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
John Hawthorne is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. He has published numerous articles on metaphysics, philosophy of language, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and early modern philosophy. His books include Knowledge and Lotteries, Substance and Individuation in Leibniz, and The Grammar of Meaning. Jason Turner is a philosopher who received his PhD from Rutgers University. He has worked at the University of Leeds, St. Louis University, and the University of Arizona.
The Uses and Abuses of the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction
ZOE DRAYSON
Perception Without Propositions
CHRISTOPHER GAUKER
Understanding the Internalism-Externalism Debate: What Is the Boundary of
the Thinker?
BRIE GERTLER
Why and How not to be a Sortalist about Thought
RACHEL GOODMAN
Concepts, Analysis, Generics and the Canberra Plan
MARK JOHNSTON and SARAH-JANE LESLIE
What Should the Naýve Realist Say about Total Hallucinations?
HEATHER LOGUE
Desire Considered as a Propositional Attitude
WILLIAM G. LYCAN
Are There Mental Indexicals and Demonstratives?
RUTH GARRETT MILLIKAN
Perceptual Phenomenology
BENCE NANAY
First Person Illusions: Are They Descartes', or Kant's?
CHRISTOPHER PEACOCKE
Attention to the Passage of Time
IAN PHILLIPS
Indiscriminability and Phenomenal Continua
DIANA RAFFMAN
Don't Panic: Self-Authorship Without Obscure Metaphysics
ADINA L. ROSKIES
The Mental Lives of Zombies
DECLAN SMITHIES
Actions as Processes
HELEN STEWARD
Introspective Knowledge of Negative Facts
DANIEL STOLJAR
Defining and Defending Nonconceptual Contents and States
JAMES VAN CLEVE
Belief, Information and Reasoning
BRUNO WHITTLE
ZOE DRAYSON
Perception Without Propositions
CHRISTOPHER GAUKER
Understanding the Internalism-Externalism Debate: What Is the Boundary of
the Thinker?
BRIE GERTLER
Why and How not to be a Sortalist about Thought
RACHEL GOODMAN
Concepts, Analysis, Generics and the Canberra Plan
MARK JOHNSTON and SARAH-JANE LESLIE
What Should the Naýve Realist Say about Total Hallucinations?
HEATHER LOGUE
Desire Considered as a Propositional Attitude
WILLIAM G. LYCAN
Are There Mental Indexicals and Demonstratives?
RUTH GARRETT MILLIKAN
Perceptual Phenomenology
BENCE NANAY
First Person Illusions: Are They Descartes', or Kant's?
CHRISTOPHER PEACOCKE
Attention to the Passage of Time
IAN PHILLIPS
Indiscriminability and Phenomenal Continua
DIANA RAFFMAN
Don't Panic: Self-Authorship Without Obscure Metaphysics
ADINA L. ROSKIES
The Mental Lives of Zombies
DECLAN SMITHIES
Actions as Processes
HELEN STEWARD
Introspective Knowledge of Negative Facts
DANIEL STOLJAR
Defining and Defending Nonconceptual Contents and States
JAMES VAN CLEVE
Belief, Information and Reasoning
BRUNO WHITTLE
The Uses and Abuses of the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction
ZOE DRAYSON
Perception Without Propositions
CHRISTOPHER GAUKER
Understanding the Internalism-Externalism Debate: What Is the Boundary of
the Thinker?
BRIE GERTLER
Why and How not to be a Sortalist about Thought
RACHEL GOODMAN
Concepts, Analysis, Generics and the Canberra Plan
MARK JOHNSTON and SARAH-JANE LESLIE
What Should the Naýve Realist Say about Total Hallucinations?
HEATHER LOGUE
Desire Considered as a Propositional Attitude
WILLIAM G. LYCAN
Are There Mental Indexicals and Demonstratives?
RUTH GARRETT MILLIKAN
Perceptual Phenomenology
BENCE NANAY
First Person Illusions: Are They Descartes', or Kant's?
CHRISTOPHER PEACOCKE
Attention to the Passage of Time
IAN PHILLIPS
Indiscriminability and Phenomenal Continua
DIANA RAFFMAN
Don't Panic: Self-Authorship Without Obscure Metaphysics
ADINA L. ROSKIES
The Mental Lives of Zombies
DECLAN SMITHIES
Actions as Processes
HELEN STEWARD
Introspective Knowledge of Negative Facts
DANIEL STOLJAR
Defining and Defending Nonconceptual Contents and States
JAMES VAN CLEVE
Belief, Information and Reasoning
BRUNO WHITTLE
ZOE DRAYSON
Perception Without Propositions
CHRISTOPHER GAUKER
Understanding the Internalism-Externalism Debate: What Is the Boundary of
the Thinker?
BRIE GERTLER
Why and How not to be a Sortalist about Thought
RACHEL GOODMAN
Concepts, Analysis, Generics and the Canberra Plan
MARK JOHNSTON and SARAH-JANE LESLIE
What Should the Naýve Realist Say about Total Hallucinations?
HEATHER LOGUE
Desire Considered as a Propositional Attitude
WILLIAM G. LYCAN
Are There Mental Indexicals and Demonstratives?
RUTH GARRETT MILLIKAN
Perceptual Phenomenology
BENCE NANAY
First Person Illusions: Are They Descartes', or Kant's?
CHRISTOPHER PEACOCKE
Attention to the Passage of Time
IAN PHILLIPS
Indiscriminability and Phenomenal Continua
DIANA RAFFMAN
Don't Panic: Self-Authorship Without Obscure Metaphysics
ADINA L. ROSKIES
The Mental Lives of Zombies
DECLAN SMITHIES
Actions as Processes
HELEN STEWARD
Introspective Knowledge of Negative Facts
DANIEL STOLJAR
Defining and Defending Nonconceptual Contents and States
JAMES VAN CLEVE
Belief, Information and Reasoning
BRUNO WHITTLE