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Philosophical Perspectives, an annual, aims to publish original essays by formost thinkers in their fields, with each volume confined to a main area of philosophical research.
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Philosophical Perspectives, an annual, aims to publish original essays by formost thinkers in their fields, with each volume confined to a main area of philosophical research.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Philosophical Perspectives Annual Volume Vol.21
- Verlag: Wiley & Sons
- 1. Auflage
- Seitenzahl: 622
- Erscheinungstermin: 18. März 2008
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 33mm
- Gewicht: 840g
- ISBN-13: 9781405184564
- ISBN-10: 1405184566
- Artikelnr.: 25649740
- Philosophical Perspectives Annual Volume Vol.21
- Verlag: Wiley & Sons
- 1. Auflage
- Seitenzahl: 622
- Erscheinungstermin: 18. März 2008
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 33mm
- Gewicht: 840g
- ISBN-13: 9781405184564
- ISBN-10: 1405184566
- Artikelnr.: 25649740
John Hawthorne is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. He has published numerous articles on metaphysics, philosophy of language, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and early modern philosophy. His books include Knowledge and Lotteries, Substance and Individuation in Leibniz (with Jan Cover, 1999), and The Grammar of Meaning (with Mark Lance, 1997).
I. TIM BAYNE Conscious States and Conscious Creatures: Explanation in the
Scientific Study of Consciousness 1. II. GEORGE BEALER Mental Causation 23.
III. JOSE LUIS BERMUDEZ What Is at Stake in the Debate on Nonconceptual
Content? 55. IV. NED BLOCK Wittgenstein and Qualia 73. V. WYLIE
BRECKENRIDGE Against One Reason for Thinking that Visual Experiences Have
Representational Content 117. VI. ALEX BYRNE Possibility and Imagination
125. VII. ELISABETH CAMP Thinking With Maps 145. VIII JOHN M. DORIS, JOSHUA
KNOBE, & ROBERT L. WOOLFOLK Variantism about Responsibility 183. IX. FRED
DRETSKE What Change Blindness Teachesabout Consciousness 215. X. TAMAR
SZAB¿O GENDLER Self-Deception as Pretense 231. XI. BENJ HELLIE Factive
Phenomenal Characters 259. XII. URIAH KRIEGEL Intentional Inexistence and
Phenomenal Intentionality 307. XIII. GEOFFREY LEE Consciousness in a
Space-Time World 341. XIV. SARAH-JANE LESLIE Generics and the Structure of
the Mind 375. XV. SHAUN NICHOLS After Incompatibilism: A Naturalistic
Defense of the Reactive Attitudes 405. XVI. MARTINE NIDA-RUMELIN
Transparency of Experience and the Perceptual Model of Phenomenal Awareness
429. XVII. ALVA NOE Magic Realism and the Limits of Intelligibility: What
Makes Us Conscious 457. XVIII. DAVID PAPINEAU Kripke's Proof Is Ad Hominem
Not Two-Dimensional 475. XIX. ADAM PAUTZ Intentionalism and Perceptual
Presence 495. XX. MATTHEW SOTERIOU Content and the Stream of Consciousness
543. XXI. SCOTT STURGEON Normative Judgment 569. XXII. MICHAEL TYE
Intentionalism and the Argument from No Common Content 589
Scientific Study of Consciousness 1. II. GEORGE BEALER Mental Causation 23.
III. JOSE LUIS BERMUDEZ What Is at Stake in the Debate on Nonconceptual
Content? 55. IV. NED BLOCK Wittgenstein and Qualia 73. V. WYLIE
BRECKENRIDGE Against One Reason for Thinking that Visual Experiences Have
Representational Content 117. VI. ALEX BYRNE Possibility and Imagination
125. VII. ELISABETH CAMP Thinking With Maps 145. VIII JOHN M. DORIS, JOSHUA
KNOBE, & ROBERT L. WOOLFOLK Variantism about Responsibility 183. IX. FRED
DRETSKE What Change Blindness Teachesabout Consciousness 215. X. TAMAR
SZAB¿O GENDLER Self-Deception as Pretense 231. XI. BENJ HELLIE Factive
Phenomenal Characters 259. XII. URIAH KRIEGEL Intentional Inexistence and
Phenomenal Intentionality 307. XIII. GEOFFREY LEE Consciousness in a
Space-Time World 341. XIV. SARAH-JANE LESLIE Generics and the Structure of
the Mind 375. XV. SHAUN NICHOLS After Incompatibilism: A Naturalistic
Defense of the Reactive Attitudes 405. XVI. MARTINE NIDA-RUMELIN
Transparency of Experience and the Perceptual Model of Phenomenal Awareness
429. XVII. ALVA NOE Magic Realism and the Limits of Intelligibility: What
Makes Us Conscious 457. XVIII. DAVID PAPINEAU Kripke's Proof Is Ad Hominem
Not Two-Dimensional 475. XIX. ADAM PAUTZ Intentionalism and Perceptual
Presence 495. XX. MATTHEW SOTERIOU Content and the Stream of Consciousness
543. XXI. SCOTT STURGEON Normative Judgment 569. XXII. MICHAEL TYE
Intentionalism and the Argument from No Common Content 589
I. TIM BAYNE Conscious States and Conscious Creatures: Explanation in the
Scientific Study of Consciousness 1. II. GEORGE BEALER Mental Causation 23.
III. JOSE LUIS BERMUDEZ What Is at Stake in the Debate on Nonconceptual
Content? 55. IV. NED BLOCK Wittgenstein and Qualia 73. V. WYLIE
BRECKENRIDGE Against One Reason for Thinking that Visual Experiences Have
Representational Content 117. VI. ALEX BYRNE Possibility and Imagination
125. VII. ELISABETH CAMP Thinking With Maps 145. VIII JOHN M. DORIS, JOSHUA
KNOBE, & ROBERT L. WOOLFOLK Variantism about Responsibility 183. IX. FRED
DRETSKE What Change Blindness Teachesabout Consciousness 215. X. TAMAR
SZAB¿O GENDLER Self-Deception as Pretense 231. XI. BENJ HELLIE Factive
Phenomenal Characters 259. XII. URIAH KRIEGEL Intentional Inexistence and
Phenomenal Intentionality 307. XIII. GEOFFREY LEE Consciousness in a
Space-Time World 341. XIV. SARAH-JANE LESLIE Generics and the Structure of
the Mind 375. XV. SHAUN NICHOLS After Incompatibilism: A Naturalistic
Defense of the Reactive Attitudes 405. XVI. MARTINE NIDA-RUMELIN
Transparency of Experience and the Perceptual Model of Phenomenal Awareness
429. XVII. ALVA NOE Magic Realism and the Limits of Intelligibility: What
Makes Us Conscious 457. XVIII. DAVID PAPINEAU Kripke's Proof Is Ad Hominem
Not Two-Dimensional 475. XIX. ADAM PAUTZ Intentionalism and Perceptual
Presence 495. XX. MATTHEW SOTERIOU Content and the Stream of Consciousness
543. XXI. SCOTT STURGEON Normative Judgment 569. XXII. MICHAEL TYE
Intentionalism and the Argument from No Common Content 589
Scientific Study of Consciousness 1. II. GEORGE BEALER Mental Causation 23.
III. JOSE LUIS BERMUDEZ What Is at Stake in the Debate on Nonconceptual
Content? 55. IV. NED BLOCK Wittgenstein and Qualia 73. V. WYLIE
BRECKENRIDGE Against One Reason for Thinking that Visual Experiences Have
Representational Content 117. VI. ALEX BYRNE Possibility and Imagination
125. VII. ELISABETH CAMP Thinking With Maps 145. VIII JOHN M. DORIS, JOSHUA
KNOBE, & ROBERT L. WOOLFOLK Variantism about Responsibility 183. IX. FRED
DRETSKE What Change Blindness Teachesabout Consciousness 215. X. TAMAR
SZAB¿O GENDLER Self-Deception as Pretense 231. XI. BENJ HELLIE Factive
Phenomenal Characters 259. XII. URIAH KRIEGEL Intentional Inexistence and
Phenomenal Intentionality 307. XIII. GEOFFREY LEE Consciousness in a
Space-Time World 341. XIV. SARAH-JANE LESLIE Generics and the Structure of
the Mind 375. XV. SHAUN NICHOLS After Incompatibilism: A Naturalistic
Defense of the Reactive Attitudes 405. XVI. MARTINE NIDA-RUMELIN
Transparency of Experience and the Perceptual Model of Phenomenal Awareness
429. XVII. ALVA NOE Magic Realism and the Limits of Intelligibility: What
Makes Us Conscious 457. XVIII. DAVID PAPINEAU Kripke's Proof Is Ad Hominem
Not Two-Dimensional 475. XIX. ADAM PAUTZ Intentionalism and Perceptual
Presence 495. XX. MATTHEW SOTERIOU Content and the Stream of Consciousness
543. XXI. SCOTT STURGEON Normative Judgment 569. XXII. MICHAEL TYE
Intentionalism and the Argument from No Common Content 589