Philosophy of Probability
Contemporary Readings
Herausgeber: Eagle, Antony
Philosophy of Probability
Contemporary Readings
Herausgeber: Eagle, Antony
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Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings is the first anthology of essential readings in this important area of philosophy. Each section includes a helpful introduction by the editor, ensuring that this broad-ranging exploration of the subject is also highly accessible, making it ideal for any student of logic, philosophy of mathematics, or philosophy of science.
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Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings is the first anthology of essential readings in this important area of philosophy. Each section includes a helpful introduction by the editor, ensuring that this broad-ranging exploration of the subject is also highly accessible, making it ideal for any student of logic, philosophy of mathematics, or philosophy of science.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Taylor & Francis
- Seitenzahl: 560
- Erscheinungstermin: 1. August 2009
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 234mm x 156mm x 30mm
- Gewicht: 953g
- ISBN-13: 9780415483865
- ISBN-10: 0415483867
- Artikelnr.: 27284537
- Verlag: Taylor & Francis
- Seitenzahl: 560
- Erscheinungstermin: 1. August 2009
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 234mm x 156mm x 30mm
- Gewicht: 953g
- ISBN-13: 9780415483865
- ISBN-10: 0415483867
- Artikelnr.: 27284537
Antony Eagle is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Oxford, and William Kneale Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at Exeter College, Oxford.
Probability Primer Part 1: Degrees of Belief 1. Introduction 2.Truth and Probability
F. P. Ramsey 3. Subjective Probability: Criticisms
Reflections and Problems
Henry E. Kyburg
Jr. 4. A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism
James Joyce Part 2: Updating Degrees of Belief: Conditionalization and Reflection 5. Introduction 6. Why Conditionalize?
David Lewis 7. Probability Kinematics
Richard C. Jeffrey 8. Belief and the Will
Bas C. van Fraassen 9. Diachronic Rationality
Patrick Maher 10. Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem
Adam Elga 11. Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection
Frank Arntzenius 12. When Betting Odds and Credences Come Apart: more worries for Dutch book arguments
Darren Bradley & Hannes Leitgeb Part 3: Evidence and Probability: Bayesian Confirmation Theory 13. Introduction 14. Bayesian Versus non-Bayesian Approaches to Confirmation
Colin Howson & Peter Urbach 15. Why I am not a Bayesian
Clark Glymour 16. Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support
Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson Part 4: Evidence and Probability: Evidential Probability and Principles of Indifference 17. Introduction 18. Indifference: the Symmetries of Probability
Bas C. van Fraassen 19. Statistical and Inductive Probability
Rudolf Carnap 20. Is The Theory of Logical Probability Groundless?
D. C. Stove Part 5: Physical Probability: The Frequency Theory 21. Introduction 22. The Definition of Probability
Richard von Mises 23. Mises Redux
Richard C. Jeffrey 24. Mises Redux -Redux: Fifteen Arguments Against Finite Frequentism
Alan Hájek 25. Fifteen Arguments Against Hypothetical Frequentism
Alan Hájek Part 6: Physical Probability: Objective Chance and Propensities 26. Introduction 27. A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance
David Lewis 28. A Propensity Interpretation of Probability
Karl Popper 29. Objective Single-Case Probabilities and the Foundations of Statistics
Ronald N. Giere 30. Why Propensities Cannot be Probabilities
Paul W. Humphreys 31. David Lewis's Humean Theory of Objective Chance
Barry Loewer 32. Resiliency
Propensities
and Causal Necessity
Brian Skyrms Bibliography Index
F. P. Ramsey 3. Subjective Probability: Criticisms
Reflections and Problems
Henry E. Kyburg
Jr. 4. A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism
James Joyce Part 2: Updating Degrees of Belief: Conditionalization and Reflection 5. Introduction 6. Why Conditionalize?
David Lewis 7. Probability Kinematics
Richard C. Jeffrey 8. Belief and the Will
Bas C. van Fraassen 9. Diachronic Rationality
Patrick Maher 10. Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem
Adam Elga 11. Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection
Frank Arntzenius 12. When Betting Odds and Credences Come Apart: more worries for Dutch book arguments
Darren Bradley & Hannes Leitgeb Part 3: Evidence and Probability: Bayesian Confirmation Theory 13. Introduction 14. Bayesian Versus non-Bayesian Approaches to Confirmation
Colin Howson & Peter Urbach 15. Why I am not a Bayesian
Clark Glymour 16. Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support
Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson Part 4: Evidence and Probability: Evidential Probability and Principles of Indifference 17. Introduction 18. Indifference: the Symmetries of Probability
Bas C. van Fraassen 19. Statistical and Inductive Probability
Rudolf Carnap 20. Is The Theory of Logical Probability Groundless?
D. C. Stove Part 5: Physical Probability: The Frequency Theory 21. Introduction 22. The Definition of Probability
Richard von Mises 23. Mises Redux
Richard C. Jeffrey 24. Mises Redux -Redux: Fifteen Arguments Against Finite Frequentism
Alan Hájek 25. Fifteen Arguments Against Hypothetical Frequentism
Alan Hájek Part 6: Physical Probability: Objective Chance and Propensities 26. Introduction 27. A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance
David Lewis 28. A Propensity Interpretation of Probability
Karl Popper 29. Objective Single-Case Probabilities and the Foundations of Statistics
Ronald N. Giere 30. Why Propensities Cannot be Probabilities
Paul W. Humphreys 31. David Lewis's Humean Theory of Objective Chance
Barry Loewer 32. Resiliency
Propensities
and Causal Necessity
Brian Skyrms Bibliography Index
Probability Primer Part 1: Degrees of Belief 1. Introduction 2.Truth and Probability
F. P. Ramsey 3. Subjective Probability: Criticisms
Reflections and Problems
Henry E. Kyburg
Jr. 4. A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism
James Joyce Part 2: Updating Degrees of Belief: Conditionalization and Reflection 5. Introduction 6. Why Conditionalize?
David Lewis 7. Probability Kinematics
Richard C. Jeffrey 8. Belief and the Will
Bas C. van Fraassen 9. Diachronic Rationality
Patrick Maher 10. Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem
Adam Elga 11. Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection
Frank Arntzenius 12. When Betting Odds and Credences Come Apart: more worries for Dutch book arguments
Darren Bradley & Hannes Leitgeb Part 3: Evidence and Probability: Bayesian Confirmation Theory 13. Introduction 14. Bayesian Versus non-Bayesian Approaches to Confirmation
Colin Howson & Peter Urbach 15. Why I am not a Bayesian
Clark Glymour 16. Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support
Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson Part 4: Evidence and Probability: Evidential Probability and Principles of Indifference 17. Introduction 18. Indifference: the Symmetries of Probability
Bas C. van Fraassen 19. Statistical and Inductive Probability
Rudolf Carnap 20. Is The Theory of Logical Probability Groundless?
D. C. Stove Part 5: Physical Probability: The Frequency Theory 21. Introduction 22. The Definition of Probability
Richard von Mises 23. Mises Redux
Richard C. Jeffrey 24. Mises Redux -Redux: Fifteen Arguments Against Finite Frequentism
Alan Hájek 25. Fifteen Arguments Against Hypothetical Frequentism
Alan Hájek Part 6: Physical Probability: Objective Chance and Propensities 26. Introduction 27. A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance
David Lewis 28. A Propensity Interpretation of Probability
Karl Popper 29. Objective Single-Case Probabilities and the Foundations of Statistics
Ronald N. Giere 30. Why Propensities Cannot be Probabilities
Paul W. Humphreys 31. David Lewis's Humean Theory of Objective Chance
Barry Loewer 32. Resiliency
Propensities
and Causal Necessity
Brian Skyrms Bibliography Index
F. P. Ramsey 3. Subjective Probability: Criticisms
Reflections and Problems
Henry E. Kyburg
Jr. 4. A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism
James Joyce Part 2: Updating Degrees of Belief: Conditionalization and Reflection 5. Introduction 6. Why Conditionalize?
David Lewis 7. Probability Kinematics
Richard C. Jeffrey 8. Belief and the Will
Bas C. van Fraassen 9. Diachronic Rationality
Patrick Maher 10. Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem
Adam Elga 11. Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection
Frank Arntzenius 12. When Betting Odds and Credences Come Apart: more worries for Dutch book arguments
Darren Bradley & Hannes Leitgeb Part 3: Evidence and Probability: Bayesian Confirmation Theory 13. Introduction 14. Bayesian Versus non-Bayesian Approaches to Confirmation
Colin Howson & Peter Urbach 15. Why I am not a Bayesian
Clark Glymour 16. Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support
Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson Part 4: Evidence and Probability: Evidential Probability and Principles of Indifference 17. Introduction 18. Indifference: the Symmetries of Probability
Bas C. van Fraassen 19. Statistical and Inductive Probability
Rudolf Carnap 20. Is The Theory of Logical Probability Groundless?
D. C. Stove Part 5: Physical Probability: The Frequency Theory 21. Introduction 22. The Definition of Probability
Richard von Mises 23. Mises Redux
Richard C. Jeffrey 24. Mises Redux -Redux: Fifteen Arguments Against Finite Frequentism
Alan Hájek 25. Fifteen Arguments Against Hypothetical Frequentism
Alan Hájek Part 6: Physical Probability: Objective Chance and Propensities 26. Introduction 27. A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance
David Lewis 28. A Propensity Interpretation of Probability
Karl Popper 29. Objective Single-Case Probabilities and the Foundations of Statistics
Ronald N. Giere 30. Why Propensities Cannot be Probabilities
Paul W. Humphreys 31. David Lewis's Humean Theory of Objective Chance
Barry Loewer 32. Resiliency
Propensities
and Causal Necessity
Brian Skyrms Bibliography Index