Pla Influence on China's National Security Policymaking

Herausgeber: Saunders, Phillip C; Scobell, Andrew

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Phillip C. Saunders is Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at the National Defense University. Andrew Scobell is a Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Stanford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 360
• Erscheinungstermin: 9. September 2015
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 226mm x 152mm x 23mm
• Gewicht: 522g
• ISBN-13: 9780804796255
• ISBN-10: 0804796254
• Artikelnr.: 42803540

Autorenporträt

Phillip C. Saunders is Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at the National Defense University. Andrew Scobell is a Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation.

Inhaltsangabe

Contents and Abstracts
Introduction: PLA Influence on Chinese National Security Policymaking
chapter abstract
The Introduction examines four trends that have reshaped civil-military
relations in China and affected the role of the People's Liberation Army
(PLA) in policymaking. It presents two analytic approaches-one focused on
the nature of the issue under consideration, where decisions on that issue
are made within the Chinese system, and what role the PLA plays in those
decisions, and one focused on the PLA's ability to exert influence at
different stages in the policymaking process. After brief chapter
summaries, the Introduction presents ten findings, concluding that civilian
Communist Party leaders remain in control of the military, but that over
the last two decades the PLA appears to have more influence on purely
military issues, much less influence on political issues, and to be more
actively engaged in policy debates on mixed civil-military issues where
military equities are at stake.
1Reconsidering the PLA as an Interest Group
chapter abstract
In this chapter Isaac Kardon and Phillip Saunders examine whether the PLA
can be thought of as an interest group, finding that factors which
previously limited the PLA's ability to act as a coherent policy actor have
diminished. Today's PLA demonstrates numerous characteristics of an
interest group, including professionalization, growing coherence of its
corporate interests, an expanding monopoly on national security expertise
and information, and enhanced capacity to articulate and defend
institutional goals and equities in order to shape public debate and
influence policy.
2The PLA in the Party Leadership Decisionmaking System
chapter abstract
In this chapter Alice Miller explains the political logic behind the
transformation of the Chinese leadership's decisionmaking system,
emphasizing a deliberate effort by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s to establish
an effective collective leadership system with checks and balances to
prevent attempts by any individual member-and especially by the party
general secretary-to dominate the others. She argues that these reforms
have transformed civil-military relations from "subjective civilian
control" to "objective civilian control" as the PLA's influence on
political decisions has narrowed into institutional mechanisms focused on
security issues. These structural changes limit the ability of PLA leaders
to exert influence on political issues or to exploit potential splits among
top civilian leaders.
3The Riddle in the Middle: China's Central Military Commission in the
Twenty-first Century
chapter abstract
In this chapter Tai Ming Cheung uses new sources to describe the inner
workings of the secretive Central Military Commission (CMC). He identifies
key political and organizational principles guiding the CMC's development;
describes its current structure, workings, and responsibilities; highlights
the critical role played by the CMC vice-chairmen; evaluates Hu Jintao's
role as CMC chairman and problems in civil-military relations during his
tenure; and conducts an initial assessment of Xi Jinping's early tenure as
CMC chairman. Cheung stresses Xi's emphasis on the role of military power
in a "strong China dream," efforts to impose stricter political and fiscal
discipline, and decision to restructure the military command system to
improve its ability to conduct joint operations.
4Top Leaders and the PLA: The Different Styles of Jiang, Hu, and Xi
chapter abstract
Nan Li's chapter assesses how Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao exerted influence
over the PLA, and analyzes why their methods differed. He distinguishes
between two approaches: "currying favor" by catering to PLA interests and
"imposing will" by forcing the PLA to do things it would not otherwise want
to do. He argues that Jiang curried favor early in his leadership and then
imposed his will, while Hu curried favor throughout his tenure. Nan Li
suggests Xi Jinping is likely to curry favor initially to consolidate
power, but then to impose his will by downsizing and reorganizing the
military.
5The PLA Role in China's Foreign Policy and Crisis Behavior
chapter abstract
Michael Swaine assesses the limited information about the PLA's role in
China's foreign policy and political-military crisis behavior. He begins by
examining the changing relationship of the PLA to the overall PRC political
power structure and then reviews the PLA's role in foreign policy, looking
at both senior-level and operational-level interactions. He examines five
aspects of the PLA's role in crisis decisionmaking and implementation:
upper-level participants and processes, lower-level actors, intelligence
and information flows and preexisting plans, research institutes, and
unplanned or uncontrolled behavior. Swaine challenges the view of a PLA
that wields a decisive influence, noting that the PLA's strongest avenue
for influence is through the Central Military Commission (CMC). Lack of an
effective NSC-like structure raises doubts about adequate coordination and
oversight of PLA operational activities such as weapons testing and
military actions outside China's borders.
6The PLA Role in China's Taiwan Policymaking
chapter abstract
Bonnie Glaser assesses the extent of the PLA's influence on the PRC's
cross-Strait policy and the avenues the PLA uses to influence that policy.
Acknowledging the difficulty in judging whether the PLA's attempts to exert
influence are successful, Glaser identifies ten methods the PLA uses to
shape Taiwan policy. These include using its institutional representation
in the CMC and other policy bodies, intelligence and research, military
procurement, military exercises, official statements, defense white papers
and other official documents, media exposure, informal mechanisms, cultural
and social exchanges, and military-to-military channels with third-party
countries. Glaser suggests that the CMC is the most important avenue by
which the PLA attempts to influence China's Taiwan policy, with
intelligence and research and defense white papers being the next most
effective avenues.
7The PLA Role in China's DPRK Policy
chapter abstract
Andrew Scobell addresses the PLA's decisionmaking role on Korea issues by
analyzing the 2002-2003 "second nuclear crisis" and the 2010 ROK Navy
Cheonan crisis. Scobell argues that Chinese leaders place a high priority
on stability, view the DPRK as volatile, and believe policy changes might
destabilize the relationship and the region. China is therefore likely to
maintain its current DPRK policy unless a crisis arises. Scobell notes that
China and the PLA struggle to influence the DPRK. Because the military
largely agrees with the party's overall Korea policy and with keeping the
DPRK as a buffer state, it is difficult to assess whether the PLA has much
independent influence on China's DPRK policy. The chapter concludes that
China is unlikely to change its North Korean policy and that "maintaining
stability both inside China and on its periphery is the highest priority"
of China's leaders today.
8The Rise of PLA Diplomacy
chapter abstract
Eric Hagt assesses the PLA's role in China's increasingly active military
diplomacy by surveying its international activities and examining the
relevant institutions and individuals. The three key elements are the
General Staff Department (GSD) Foreign Affairs Office, the senior PLA
officers who supervise military diplomacy and military-to-military (M2M)
activities, and the PLA officers involved in military diplomacy. Hagt
argues that the PLA focuses on Chinese strategic objectives rather than on
building stable bilateral relations. Chinese military diplomacy sometimes
complicates overall Chinese diplomacy and can produce outcomes incongruent
with the objectives sought by the foreign affairs system.
9The PLA and National Security Decisionmaking: Insights from China's
Territorial and Maritime Disputes
chapter abstract
M. Taylor Fravel examines the PLA's influence on China's territorial and
maritime disputes, arguing that the PLA is limited to bureaucratic
influence within existing policymaking structures and processes. PLA
actions in contested waters reflect the consensus of top CCP leaders, not
independent military decisions or actions. Fravel traces the PLA's
relatively limited role in previous territorial disputes, including border
consolidation following the Chinese civil war and Beijing's initial claim
over the Senkakus. In current territorial debates in the East and South
China Seas, there is little evidence that the preferences of civilian
leaders and the PLA differ; there are examples of Beijing utilizing
diplomatic and political tools rather than military instruments to assert
its territorial claims.
10The PLA Navy Lobby and Its Influence over China's Maritime Sovereignty
Policies
chapter abstract
Christopher Yung argues that the PLA Navy lobby sought to influence the
1988 decision to use force against Vietnam in the Spratly Islands; the
decision to acquire an aircraft carrier; and the 2013 decision on
centralizing the functions, command and control, and management of China's
"maritime sovereignty" activities. In the first case, the PLA got what it
wanted by presenting a unified PLA opinion to CCP leaders without
alternative options. The PLA's initial advocacy of acquiring an aircraft
carrier was rebuffed, but the PLA sought and eventually received "friendly
guidance" from leadership to achieve its goal. In the third case, the
results were mixed as CCP leaders did not agree to centralize enforcement
activities under PLA Navy control, but did pay more attention to maritime
sovereignty issues and seek to improve coordination.
11The PLA and Maritime Security Actors
chapter abstract
Linda Jakobson examines how the PLA works with civilian maritime security
agencies. In addition to the military, a wide variety of government bodies
associated with maritime law enforcement, maritime security, and maritime
economic development attempt to influence maritime policy. Her research
reveals a noteworthy increase in interactions between the PLA and maritime
law enforcement agencies since the March 2013 restructuring that
established the China Coast Guard, including joint training, research, and
drills. The PLA Navy is attempting to influence decisionmakers directly and
to shape public opinion on maritime security issues by engaging with
civilian law enforcement, government ministries and agencies, state-owned
enterprises, and universities. Jakobson concludes that uncertainty remains
over how the restructuring of the maritime law enforcement agencies will
affect interactions with the PLA due to the opacity of the PLA command
structure and the difficulty of achieving "jointness" between military and
civilian agencies.