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In this book, Lebovic identifies a common pattern that explains how the US failed to accomplish its goals in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Planning to Fail presents a detailed analysis of American decision-making in chapters devoted to each of these conflicts. It shows the same basic bias, at each of four stages of intervention. Such bias left US leaders working less than they should have when conditions permitted good choices, and then working fruitlessly when conditions left them with only bad choices.

Produktbeschreibung
In this book, Lebovic identifies a common pattern that explains how the US failed to accomplish its goals in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Planning to Fail presents a detailed analysis of American decision-making in chapters devoted to each of these conflicts. It shows the same basic bias, at each of four stages of intervention. Such bias left US leaders working less than they should have when conditions permitted good choices, and then working fruitlessly when conditions left them with only bad choices.
Autorenporträt
James H. Lebovic is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at The George Washington University. From spring 2015-2017, he served as chair of the International Security Studies Section of the International Studies Association. He is the author of five previous books, including Flawed Logics: Strategic Nuclear Arms Control from Truman to Obama, The Limits of US Military Capability: Lessons from Vietnam and Iraq , and Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: US National Security Policy after 9/11.