Political Foundations of Judicial Independence in Dictatorship and Democracy - Epperly, Brad
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Why do political actors tolerate courts able to check their power? This book argues that judicial independence as electorally-induced 'insurance' is about the risks of losing power, risks that are higher in autocratic regimes. Using a mixed-methods approach, it develops a theory of both de facto and de jure independence across regime type.

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Produktbeschreibung
Why do political actors tolerate courts able to check their power? This book argues that judicial independence as electorally-induced 'insurance' is about the risks of losing power, risks that are higher in autocratic regimes. Using a mixed-methods approach, it develops a theory of both de facto and de jure independence across regime type.
Autorenporträt
Brad Epperly is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina, where he has received the university's highest award for undergraduate teaching. His research on the rule of law appears in numerous journals, including Comparative Political Studies, Perspectives on Politics , and the Journal of Law and Courts.