Gordon C. Rausser (Berkeley University of California), Johan Swinnen (Belgium Katholieke Universiteit Leuven), Pinhas Zusman

Political Power and Economic Policy

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

This book analyzes the links between political economics, governance structures and the distribution of political power in economic policy making.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Cambridge University Press
• Seitenzahl: 536
• Erscheinungstermin: 2. Februar 2012
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 235mm x 157mm x 36mm
• Gewicht: 842g
• ISBN-13: 9780521190169
• ISBN-10: 0521190169
• Artikelnr.: 33380237

Autorenporträt

Gordon C. Rausser is the Robert Gordon Sproul Distinguished Professor, University of California, Berkeley. He has taught economics and statistics at several eminent universities, served as Dean of the College of Natural Resources at the University of California, Berkeley, and twice served as Chair of the Giannini Foundation. Professor Rausser is the author or editor of 18 books, including co-editor of the four-volume Handbook of Agricultural Economics with Bruce L. Gardner; he has won 16 national awards and honors for teaching and research. He has been an associate editor of the Journal of the American Statistical Association and the Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control and an editor of the American Journal of Agricultural Economics, and he was recently named editor of the Annual Review of Resource Economics. He has also served as Senior Economist on the President's Council of Economic Advisors and Chief Economist at the Agency for International Development in Washington, DC. He co-founded LECG, Inc., and the Washington, DC-based Institute for Policy Reform. He has been elected a Fellow of the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, the American Statistical Association and the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Inhaltsangabe

Part I. Political Power and Economic Analysis: 1. Public policy: the lens of political economy
2. The Nash solution to the bargaining problem
3. The Harsanyi solution to the bargaining problem
4. Political-economic analysis
5. Normative political-economic analysis
6. Dynamic political-economic analysis
Part II. Ideology, Prescription, and Political Power Coefficients: 7. Political power, ideology, and political organizational structures
8. Political power, influence, and lobbying
9. Constitutional prescription and political power coefficients
Part III. Analysis of Specific Structures: 10. The political economy of commodity market intervention
11. The political economy of public research and development
12. Political-economic analysis of redistributive policy and public good investments
13. Interest groups, coalition breaking, and productive policies
14. Policy reform and compensation
15. Political-economic analysis of land reform
16. Political-economic analysis of water resource systems
17. The political-economic lens on quality and public standard regulations
18. Political-economic analysis in transition economies
19. The power of bureaucracies: the European commission and EU policy reforms
Part IV. Empirical Applications of Political Power Estimation: 20. Political econometrics
21. The political econometrics of the Israeli dairy industry
22. Flexible policy instruments given a political power distribution
23. Estimating statistical properties of power weight parameters and their temporal shifts
24. Role of institutions in the joint determination of PERTs and PESTs.