Power Plays argues that international institutions prevent extortion in some areas, but cause states to shift coercive behavior into less effective policy domains.
Power Plays argues that international institutions prevent extortion in some areas, but cause states to shift coercive behavior into less effective policy domains.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Allison Carnegie is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Columbia University. She received a joint PhD in Political Science and Economics from Yale University and was a postdoctoral research fellow at Princeton University from 2013 to 2014. Her work has been published in the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, Political Analysis, and the Election Law Journal. Carnegie has been awarded the Provost's Grant from Columbia University, along with fellowships from the Bradley, Falk, Ethel Boies Morgan, and Kaufman Foundations. Her essay on foreign aid delivery won the Global Development Network's Next Horizons Essay Contest, which was cosponsored by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.
Inhaltsangabe
1. Introduction 2. Theoretical framework 3. Bilateral agreements and state similarity 4. WTO membership as a commitment strategy 5. Coercive diplomacy in comparative perspective 6. Agreements and the displacement of coercion 7. Reduced effectiveness of coercion: evidence from the United States 8. Conclusion.
1. Introduction 2. Theoretical framework 3. Bilateral agreements and state similarity 4. WTO membership as a commitment strategy 5. Coercive diplomacy in comparative perspective 6. Agreements and the displacement of coercion 7. Reduced effectiveness of coercion: evidence from the United States 8. Conclusion.
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