What is morality? Neil Sinclair argues that it is a purely natural interpersonal co-ordination device, whereby human beings express their attitudes in order to influence others' attitudes and actions. Sinclair shows that even if moral practice is fundamentally expressive, it can still possess the features that make morality appear objective.
What is morality? Neil Sinclair argues that it is a purely natural interpersonal co-ordination device, whereby human beings express their attitudes in order to influence others' attitudes and actions. Sinclair shows that even if moral practice is fundamentally expressive, it can still possess the features that make morality appear objective.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Neil Sinclair studied Philosophy at Cambridge and Oxford, culminating in a PhD from Cambridge in 2006. Subsequently he has taught philosophy at several UK Universities, including Bristol, Oxford, St. Andrews, and Nottingham. He was awarded a University of Nottingham Lord Dearing Award for Teaching in Learning in 2014 and the Marc Sanders Metaethics Prize in 2016. He has published more than 25 papers on metaethics including for journals such as Analysis, Biology and Philosophy, and Philosophical Studies. He is the editor of The Naturalistic Fallacy (Cambridge University Press 2018) and Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics (with Uri D. Leibowitz, Oxford University Press 2016) and an area editor for Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
Inhaltsangabe
Preface 1: The Subject Matter of Metaethics 2: Practical Expressivism, Morality's Function, and Moral Attitudes 3: Practical Expressivism, Expression, and Quasi-Realism 4: Moral Disagreement and Reason-Giving 5: The Frege-Geach Problem 6: Subsentential Metasemantics 7: Truth, Truth-aptness, and Belief 8: Mind-Independent Moral Truths and Categorical Moral Reasons 9: Practical Expressivist Strategies and Presumptive Arguments for Realism 10: Conclusion Appendix A: Comparison with Other Versions of Expressivism Bibliography
Preface 1: The Subject Matter of Metaethics 2: Practical Expressivism, Morality's Function, and Moral Attitudes 3: Practical Expressivism, Expression, and Quasi-Realism 4: Moral Disagreement and Reason-Giving 5: The Frege-Geach Problem 6: Subsentential Metasemantics 7: Truth, Truth-aptness, and Belief 8: Mind-Independent Moral Truths and Categorical Moral Reasons 9: Practical Expressivist Strategies and Presumptive Arguments for Realism 10: Conclusion Appendix A: Comparison with Other Versions of Expressivism Bibliography
Es gelten unsere Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen: www.buecher.de/agb
Impressum
www.buecher.de ist ein Internetauftritt der buecher.de internetstores GmbH
Geschäftsführung: Monica Sawhney | Roland Kölbl | Günter Hilger
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Batheyer Straße 115 - 117, 58099 Hagen
Postanschrift: Bürgermeister-Wegele-Str. 12, 86167 Augsburg
Amtsgericht Hagen HRB 13257
Steuernummer: 321/5800/1497
USt-IdNr: DE450055826