David J. Samuels and Matthew S. Shugart provide the first systematic analysis of how democratic constitutional design shapes party politics.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
David J. Samuels is the Benjamin E. Lippincott Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota. He is the author of Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil (Cambridge University Press, 2003) and the co-editor of Decentralization and Democracy in Latin America (2004). He has published articles in the American Political Science Review, the Journal of Politics, Comparative Politics, Comparative Political Studies, Legislative Studies Quarterly, and the British Journal of Political Science.
Inhaltsangabe
1. Introduction 2. Political parties in the Neo-Madisonian theoretical framework 3. Insiders and outsiders: Madison's dilemma and leadership selection 4. Constitutional design and intra-party leadership accountability 5. Electoral separation of purpose within political parties 6. The impact of constitutional change on party organization and behavior 7. Parties' 'presidential dilemmas' in Brazil and Mexico 8. Presidents, prime ministers, and mandate representation 9. Conclusion.
1. Introduction 2. Political parties in the Neo-Madisonian theoretical framework 3. Insiders and outsiders: Madison's dilemma and leadership selection 4. Constitutional design and intra-party leadership accountability 5. Electoral separation of purpose within political parties 6. The impact of constitutional change on party organization and behavior 7. Parties' 'presidential dilemmas' in Brazil and Mexico 8. Presidents, prime ministers, and mandate representation 9. Conclusion.
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