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This monograph examines the rear battle to determine if current self-defense doctrine is consistent with the tenets of AirLand Battle and the principles of war. It investigates the importance successful defense has on both the tactical and operational missions assigned to the total force, analyses current self-defense doctrine, and examines alternatives which might enhance operations in the rear area. The analysis shows that current doctrine is inconsistent with the tenets of AirLand Battle and the principle of war. Changes are needed to optimize self-defense capability. It also reinforces the need to look at rear operations as one of three components of the total battle and recognizes that rear operations are critical to success in the close and deep battles.