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In its second part, the book examines key issues in crisis management. Suggesting that optimal reforms must set the inefficiencies of crisis against the inefficiencies of debtor moral hazard, the authors consider the relative merits of statutory and contractual solutions to sovereign debt workouts. They go on to discuss the role of the IMF in influencing private lending and debtor moral hazard, theoretically and empirically. They argue that there is no simple relationship between ex post crisis management and ex ante moral hazard, implying that the handling of financial crises is a delicate…mehr

Produktbeschreibung
In its second part, the book examines key issues in crisis management. Suggesting that optimal reforms must set the inefficiencies of crisis against the inefficiencies of debtor moral hazard, the authors consider the relative merits of statutory and contractual solutions to sovereign debt workouts. They go on to discuss the role of the IMF in influencing private lending and debtor moral hazard, theoretically and empirically. They argue that there is no simple relationship between ex post crisis management and ex ante moral hazard, implying that the handling of financial crises is a delicate affair warranting a cautious approach by would-be architects.
This is the first book to integrate analyses of sovereign debt and crises in financial markets. Offering an analytical perspective on the design of the international financial architecture, this book relates insights from recent literature on co-ordination games to earlier work on currency crises and sovereign debt default to set out a coherent framework for the assessment of crisis management policy. Issues examined include the design of sovereign bankruptcy procedures, and the role of the IMF in influencing creditors and debtor countries.
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Autorenporträt
Prasanna Gai is a Fellow of the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at the Australian National University. He has been a Senior Adviser at the Bank of England (1994-2001), Senior Research Associate in the Financial Markets Group at the London School of Economics, and a Consultant to the Bank of England on international financial affairs (2002-2003). He has held visiting appointments as Visiting Fellow at the Hong Kong Institute of Monetary Research (2003) and Visiting Lecturer at the University of Oxford (2001). Michael Chui is Senior Manager at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. He has been an Economist in the Directorate General International & European Relations at the European Central Bank (2001-2003), an Economist in the International Finance Division at the Bank of England (1998-2001), and a Research Officer in the Centre for Economic Forecasting at the London Business School (1993-98).