Nuclear power plant fires, often from electrical malfunctions, can pose serious hazards to operational and public safety. While there has never been core damage at a commercial nuclear power plant from fire worldwide over the entire operating history, several "close calls" since the first, the 1975 Browns Ferry fire in the U.S., have prompted the continued development of phenomenological and probabilistic/statistical models for nuclear power plant fires. Probabilistic risk/safety analysis combines both of these approaches to quantify the potential for core damage from a nuclear plant fire. Drawing from the over 15,000 years of commercial operating experience and experimental results, the author develops several models in the second category and demonstrates their applicability to nuclear power plant fire probabilistic risk/safety analysis. This book presents four previously published conference and journal articles. Included is the author's proposal for an alternative regulatory strategy - "risk-informed determinism" - to the current popular "risk-informed regulation" being championed worldwide. Potential benefits from such a paradigm shift in this regulatory focus are exemplified.