This anthology focuses on four central issues animating the current philosophy of mind: mind/body, mental content, mental causation, and consciousness. The editor’s introductory essays provide a context for each article and where the article leads; reading questions help focus attention on crucial aspects of the selection, providing landmarks as students navigate the readings.
Table of contents:
PART I. THE NATURE OF MIND 1. Dualism René Descartes, Meditations II, VI / Alvin Plantinga, “Could Socrates Have Been an Alligator?” (excerpt from The Nature of Necessity) / Dale Jacquette, “Dualisms of Mental and Physical Phenomena” (excerpts from The Philosophy of Mind) 2. Behaviorism Gilbert Ryle, “Knowing How and Knowing That” from The Concept of Mind / B. F. Skinner, from About Behaviorism / Daniel C. Dennett, “Skinner Skinned” 3. Type Identity Theory J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes” / Jerome Shaffer, “Mental Events and the Brain” / Saul Kripke, Lecture III from Naming and Necessity 4. Functionalism Hilary Putnam, “The Nature of Mental States” / David Lewis, “Mad Pain and Martian Pain” / Jerry A. Fodor, “The Mind Body Problem” / Ned Block, “Troubles With Functionalism” / Paul M. Churchland and Patricia Smith Churchland, “Functionalism, Qualia, and Intentionality” 5. Eliminative Materialism and Instrumentalism Richard Rorty, “In Defense of Eliminative Materialism” / Paul M. Churchland, “Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes” / Terrence Horgan and James Woodward, “Folk Psychology Is Here to Stay” / Patricia Kitcher, “In Defense of Intentional Psychology” / Daniel C. Dennett, “True Believers: Or the Intentional Strategy and Why It Works” PART II. MENTAL CONTENT 6. A Language of Thought Jerry A. Fodor, “Introduction: The Persistence of the Attitudes” / Daniel C. Dennett, “A Cure for the Common Code?” 7. Externalism Hilary Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” / Tyler Burge, “Other Bodies” / Avrum Stroll, “What Water Is Or Back to Thales” / Robert Stalnaker, “On What’s In the Head” 8. Causal and Covariance Theories Fred Dretske, “Misrepresentation” / Jerry Fodor, “Meaning and the World Order” / Lynne Rudder Baker, “On a Causal Theory of Content” 9. Functional and Conceptual Role Theories Robert Cummins, “Functional Roles” / John Searle, “Can Computers Think?” / Margaret Boden, “Escaping From the Chinese Room” / Daniel C. Dennett, “The Myth of Original Intentionality” 10. Teleological Theories Ruth Garrett Millikan, “Biosemantics” / Kim Sterelny, “Teleology” and “A Modest Proposal” / David Papineau, “The Teleological Theory of Representation” PART III. MENTAL CAUSATION 11. Supervenience and Causation Donald Davidson, “Mental Events” / Ernest Sosa, “Mind-Body Interaction and Supervenient Causation” / Jaegwon Kim, “The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism” / John Haugeland, “Ontological Supervenience” 12. Mind Matters Jerry Fodor, “Making Mind Matter More” / Robert van Gulick, “Who’s in Charge Here? And Who’s Doing All the Work?” / Fred Dretske, “Reasons and Causes” / John Foster, “A Defense of Dualism” PART IV. CONSCIOUSNESS, QUALIA AND SUBJECTIVITY Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” / Colin McGinn, “Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?” / Frank Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia” / Paul M. Churchland, “Reduction, Qualia and the Direct Introspection of Brain States” / Frank Jackson, “What Mary Didn’t Know” / Laurence Nemirow, “Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of Acquaintance” / David Chalmers, “Can Consciousness Be Reductively Explained?” / Owen Flanagan, “Prospects for a Unified Theory of Consciousness, or What Dreams Are Made Of”
Table of contents:
PART I. THE NATURE OF MIND 1. Dualism René Descartes, Meditations II, VI / Alvin Plantinga, “Could Socrates Have Been an Alligator?” (excerpt from The Nature of Necessity) / Dale Jacquette, “Dualisms of Mental and Physical Phenomena” (excerpts from The Philosophy of Mind) 2. Behaviorism Gilbert Ryle, “Knowing How and Knowing That” from The Concept of Mind / B. F. Skinner, from About Behaviorism / Daniel C. Dennett, “Skinner Skinned” 3. Type Identity Theory J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes” / Jerome Shaffer, “Mental Events and the Brain” / Saul Kripke, Lecture III from Naming and Necessity 4. Functionalism Hilary Putnam, “The Nature of Mental States” / David Lewis, “Mad Pain and Martian Pain” / Jerry A. Fodor, “The Mind Body Problem” / Ned Block, “Troubles With Functionalism” / Paul M. Churchland and Patricia Smith Churchland, “Functionalism, Qualia, and Intentionality” 5. Eliminative Materialism and Instrumentalism Richard Rorty, “In Defense of Eliminative Materialism” / Paul M. Churchland, “Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes” / Terrence Horgan and James Woodward, “Folk Psychology Is Here to Stay” / Patricia Kitcher, “In Defense of Intentional Psychology” / Daniel C. Dennett, “True Believers: Or the Intentional Strategy and Why It Works” PART II. MENTAL CONTENT 6. A Language of Thought Jerry A. Fodor, “Introduction: The Persistence of the Attitudes” / Daniel C. Dennett, “A Cure for the Common Code?” 7. Externalism Hilary Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” / Tyler Burge, “Other Bodies” / Avrum Stroll, “What Water Is Or Back to Thales” / Robert Stalnaker, “On What’s In the Head” 8. Causal and Covariance Theories Fred Dretske, “Misrepresentation” / Jerry Fodor, “Meaning and the World Order” / Lynne Rudder Baker, “On a Causal Theory of Content” 9. Functional and Conceptual Role Theories Robert Cummins, “Functional Roles” / John Searle, “Can Computers Think?” / Margaret Boden, “Escaping From the Chinese Room” / Daniel C. Dennett, “The Myth of Original Intentionality” 10. Teleological Theories Ruth Garrett Millikan, “Biosemantics” / Kim Sterelny, “Teleology” and “A Modest Proposal” / David Papineau, “The Teleological Theory of Representation” PART III. MENTAL CAUSATION 11. Supervenience and Causation Donald Davidson, “Mental Events” / Ernest Sosa, “Mind-Body Interaction and Supervenient Causation” / Jaegwon Kim, “The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism” / John Haugeland, “Ontological Supervenience” 12. Mind Matters Jerry Fodor, “Making Mind Matter More” / Robert van Gulick, “Who’s in Charge Here? And Who’s Doing All the Work?” / Fred Dretske, “Reasons and Causes” / John Foster, “A Defense of Dualism” PART IV. CONSCIOUSNESS, QUALIA AND SUBJECTIVITY Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” / Colin McGinn, “Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?” / Frank Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia” / Paul M. Churchland, “Reduction, Qualia and the Direct Introspection of Brain States” / Frank Jackson, “What Mary Didn’t Know” / Laurence Nemirow, “Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of Acquaintance” / David Chalmers, “Can Consciousness Be Reductively Explained?” / Owen Flanagan, “Prospects for a Unified Theory of Consciousness, or What Dreams Are Made Of”