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This study analyzes the prospects for a joint center to exercise command and control (C2) over United States (US) Joint Forces. The idea for such a center emanates from the need for joint warfighting efficiency and the emergence of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ). The study assesses the compatibility of a joint center with individual service doctrine as well as net-centric environments (NCE) and net-centric operations (NCO). It concludes that a joint C2 center is incompatible with the preponderance of service doctrine, and is diametrically opposed to the concept of NCO. Instead,…mehr

Produktbeschreibung
This study analyzes the prospects for a joint center to exercise command and control (C2) over United States (US) Joint Forces. The idea for such a center emanates from the need for joint warfighting efficiency and the emergence of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ). The study assesses the compatibility of a joint center with individual service doctrine as well as net-centric environments (NCE) and net-centric operations (NCO). It concludes that a joint C2 center is incompatible with the preponderance of service doctrine, and is diametrically opposed to the concept of NCO. Instead, a Joint Planning and Monitoring Center (JPMC) could plan and monitor the joint fight, accomplishing many of the same goals of efficiency that a C2 center might. In execution, the Joint Force would conduct net-centric warfare (NCW) wherein subordinate empowerment prevails on the battlefield, focused by mission-orders and commander's intent. The paper concludes with recommendations to field the NCE, create the JPMC, and to adapt service doctrine to operate in the NCE and conduct NCW.