Property Relations, Incentives and Welfare
124,99 €
inkl. MwSt.
Versandkostenfrei*
Versandfertig in über 4 Wochen
payback
62 °P sammeln
  • Gebundenes Buch

The dramatic implosions of the centrally administered, non-democratic political systems in central and eastern Europe in the late 1980s have generated a body of research concerning the transition from public ownership, and the role of the market and other institutions in engendering good incentives for economic actors. The essays collected in this volume study property relations, their associated incentives and the consequent effects on welfare: the ubiquitous theme is that efficiency cannot be divorced from the distribution of productive assets.

Andere Kunden interessierten sich auch für
Produktbeschreibung
The dramatic implosions of the centrally administered, non-democratic political systems in central and eastern Europe in the late 1980s have generated a body of research concerning the transition from public ownership, and the role of the market and other institutions in engendering good incentives for economic actors. The essays collected in this volume study property relations, their associated incentives and the consequent effects on welfare: the ubiquitous theme is that efficiency cannot be divorced from the distribution of productive assets.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Autorenporträt
JOHN E. ROEMER is Professor of Economics at the University of California, Davis, where he is also Director of the Program on Economy, Justice and Society. He is the author of over 90 academic articles and eight books including Egalitarian Perspectives: Essays in Philosphical Economics and A Future for Socialism. Roemer is on the board of several academic journals, and is associate editor of the Journal of Economic Perspectives, the Journal of Economic Literature and Economic Design. He has been a Fellow of the Econometric Society since 1986.