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He establishes the concept of a 'blaming relation' as the basis for a critique of both, and to challenge the standard analytical account of criminal justice thinking. Moving from the legal theory of Ashworth, Duff, Fletcher, Moore, Smith and Williams to the jurisprudence of the courts, Norrie analyses the seemingly irresolvable problems of punishment, responsibility and justice in the criminal law from a relational point of view. Against the postmodern approach, he argues for the need to retain what remains of moral value in Kantianism by seeking 'a non-Kantian answer to the Kantian question' of individual justice. The result is a relational critique of punishment, responsibility and justice, which recognises the ambiguity and ambivalence that accompany judgment of wrongdoing, and which asserts both the real moral value and the fundamental limits of Kantian justice thinking.
This book addresses the retributive and "orthodox subjectivist" theories that dominate criminal justice theory alongside recent "revisionist" and "postmodern" approaches. Norrie argues that all these approaches, together with their faults and contradictions, stem from their orientation to themes in Kantian moral philosophy. He explores an alternative relational or dialectical approach; examines the work of Ashworth, Duff, Fletcher, Moore, Smith, and Williams; and considers key doctrinal issues.
This book addresses the retributive and "orthodox subjectivist" theories that dominate criminal justice theory alongside recent "revisionist" and "postmodern" approaches. Norrie argues that all these approaches, together with their faults and contradictions, stem from their orientation to themes in Kantian moral philosophy. He explores an alternative relational or dialectical approach; examines the work of Ashworth, Duff, Fletcher, Moore, Smith, and Williams; and considers key doctrinal issues.