Joseph Levine draws together a series of essays in which he has developed his distinctive approach to philosophy of mind. He defends a materialist view of the mind against various challenges, and offers illuminating studies of consciousness, phenomenal concepts, mental representation, demonstrative thought, and cognitive phenomenology.
Joseph Levine draws together a series of essays in which he has developed his distinctive approach to philosophy of mind. He defends a materialist view of the mind against various challenges, and offers illuminating studies of consciousness, phenomenal concepts, mental representation, demonstrative thought, and cognitive phenomenology.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Joseph Levine is originally from Los Angeles, California, and received his BA in philosophy from UCLA in 1975. He then did his graduate work in philosophy at Harvard University, receiving his Ph.D. in 1981. He has held positions at Boston University, Bates College, North Carolina State University, and The Ohio State University before moving to the University of Massachusetts in 2006. Professor Levine works primarily in philosophy of mind and psychology, but also works on topics in metaphysics and social/political philosophy.
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction Part I: Architectural Issues 1: Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint 2: Demonstrative Thought 3: On the Phenomenology of Thought Part II: On Consciousness as Representation 4: Experience and Representation 5: Knowing What It's Like 6: Conscious Awareness and (Self-)Representation Part III: Modal and Semantic Issues 7: The Modal Status of Materialism (with Kelly Trogdon) 8: The Q Factor: Modal Rationalism vs. Modal Autonomism 9: Modality, Semantics, and Consciousness Part IV: Acquaintance-Appearance 10: Color and Color Experience: Colors as Ways of Appearing 11: Secondary Qualities: Where Consciousness and Intentionality Meet 12: Phenomenal Experience: A Cartesian Theater Revival
Introduction Part I: Architectural Issues 1: Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint 2: Demonstrative Thought 3: On the Phenomenology of Thought Part II: On Consciousness as Representation 4: Experience and Representation 5: Knowing What It's Like 6: Conscious Awareness and (Self-)Representation Part III: Modal and Semantic Issues 7: The Modal Status of Materialism (with Kelly Trogdon) 8: The Q Factor: Modal Rationalism vs. Modal Autonomism 9: Modality, Semantics, and Consciousness Part IV: Acquaintance-Appearance 10: Color and Color Experience: Colors as Ways of Appearing 11: Secondary Qualities: Where Consciousness and Intentionality Meet 12: Phenomenal Experience: A Cartesian Theater Revival
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