Michael Shepanski

Quine's Epistemic Norms in Practice

Undogmatic Empiricism

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

In this illuminating guide to the criteria of rational theorizing, Michael Shepanski identifies, defends and applies W. V. Quine's epistemic norms - the norms that best explain Quine's decisions to accept some theories and not others. Parts I and II set out the doctrines of this epistemology, demonstrating their potential for philosophical application. Part III is a case study in which Shepanski develops a theory of the propositional attitudes by the method of formalizing inferences to behaviour. He presents critiques of popular alternative views, including foundationalism, the centrality of knowledge and Quine's own epistemological naturalism. By reassessing Quine's normative epistemology, Shepanski advances our understanding of Quine's philosophy whilst providing a guide for our own theorizing.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Taylor & Francis Ltd (Sales)
• Seitenzahl: 200
• Erscheinungstermin: 23. Januar 2025
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 234mm x 156mm x 25mm
• Gewicht: 454g
• ISBN-13: 9781350304307
• ISBN-10: 1350304301
• Artikelnr.: 69927924

Autorenporträt

Michael Shepanski is Adjunct Lecturer of Philosophy at Charles Sturt University, Australia.

Inhaltsangabe

Preface Acknowledgements Part I. Undogmatic Empiricism 1. Wanted: A
Normative Epistemology in Working Order 2. Epistemological Dissociative
Disorder 3. Empiricism Without (Even Mentioning) the Dogmas 4. Conservatism
is not a Third Norm 5. Sufficient Logical Explicitness is Norm Zero Part
II. Application to Philosophy 6. Touching Base 7. The Armchair 8. Adapting
to Predicate Logic Part III. Case Study: Propositional Attitude Ascriptions
9. Destination and Horizon 10. Sententialism 11. From Sententialism to
Russellianism 12. Sententialism with Non-Designating Names Part IV. Paths
Not Taken 13. The "Two Dogmas" Argument 14. Naturalized Epistemology 15.
Attitudes to Sets of Possibilia 16. The Mythical Given 17. Epistemology as
the Theory of Knowledge Notes Bibliography Index