Eli Hirsch

Radical Skepticism and the Shadow of Doubt

A Philosophical Dialogue

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Radical Skepticism and the Shadow of Doubt brings something new to epistemology both in content and style. At the outset we are asked to imagine a person named Vatol who grows up in a world containing numerous people who are brains-in-vats and who hallucinate their entire lives. Would Vatol have reason to doubt whether he himself is in contact with reality? If he does have reason to doubt, would he doubt, or is it impossible for a person to have such doubts? And how do we ourselves compare to Vatol? After reflection, can we plausibly claim that Vatol has reason to doubt, but we don't? These are the questions that provide the novel framework for the debates in this book. Topics that are treated here in significantly new ways include: the view that we ought to doubt only when we philosophize; epistemological "dogmatism"; and connections between radical doubt and "having a self." The book adopts the innovative form of a "dialogue/play." The three characters, who are Talmud students as well as philosophers, hardly limit themselves to pure philosophy, but regale each other with Talmudic allusions, reminiscences, jokes, and insults. For them the possibility of doubt emerges as an existential problem with potentially deep emotional significance. Setting complex arguments about radical skepticism within entertaining dialogue, this book can be recommended for both beginners and specialists.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Bloomsbury Academic
• Seitenzahl: 248
• Erscheinungstermin: 28. Dezember 2017
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 213mm x 140mm x 18mm
• Gewicht: 318g
• ISBN-13: 9781350033856
• ISBN-10: 1350033855
• Artikelnr.: 47365357

Autorenporträt

Eli Hirsch

Inhaltsangabe

Introduction I. Vatol's anxiety Introduction to Lev's question The example
of Vatol Yitzhak's reaction to skepticism, and Williamson's On the nature
of this work The "two-level" view of the impossibility of doubt The meaning
of "reasons" to doubt Relationships between "doubt", "belief", "assertion",
and "certainty" Further connections between "doubt", "anxiety", and
"knowledge" Interlude: Waiting for Godot A connection to Nagel's skepticism
Interlude: philosophy and comedy A challenge to Lev's assumptions about
epistemic anxiety II. Vatol and Us The n-to-n+1 argument A safety condition
on belief Interlude: memories of Berkeley Pryor's epistemic principle
Distinction between one-level and two-level cases Interlude: Talmudic
connections The "non-circularity" condition Daniel 's challenges to
Yitzhak's view Yitzhak's stringent response to "entering a loop" Yitzhak's
Austinian answer to the problem of dreams Interlude: finding an "eitzah"
Daniel's two additional questions Summary Lev's disagreement with Yitzhak
III. The Impossibility of Doubt Lev's past epistemic anxiety Interlude:
Memories from Yeshiva Lev's first argument for the impossibility of doubt
The first premise of Lev's first argument A question about valuing one's
life on the basis of probabilities A comparison of Lev's position with
Kant's and Wittgenstein's Interlude: Yitzhak's tale Lev's second argument
The meaning of "having a self" Interlude: Yitzhak's pride and shame
Relationship between the notions of "self" and "identification" Broughton's
suggestion that Hume did not identity with his belief in an external
reality Lev's epistemic attitude Endnotes References