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Why do some governments borrow from China, while others borrow from the United States or the International Monetary Fund (IMF)? This book systematically explains how governments choose among competing loan offers. As the strings attached to loans vary across creditors, domestic interest groups prefer one type of creditor to the other. However, interest groups disagree about which creditor is preferable. Governments cater to whichever domestic interest group coalition is dominant by borrowing from the coalition's preferred creditor. The book offers evidence from Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia as…mehr

Produktbeschreibung
Why do some governments borrow from China, while others borrow from the United States or the International Monetary Fund (IMF)? This book systematically explains how governments choose among competing loan offers. As the strings attached to loans vary across creditors, domestic interest groups prefer one type of creditor to the other. However, interest groups disagree about which creditor is preferable. Governments cater to whichever domestic interest group coalition is dominant by borrowing from the coalition's preferred creditor. The book offers evidence from Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia as well as an extensive statistical analysis. The results show that borrowing portfolios around the world reflect the relative strength of societal interest groups.
Autorenporträt
Jonas B. Bunte is Assistant Professor of Political Economy at the University of Texas at Dallas. He studies the politics of finance and development. His work has appeared in the British Journal of Political Science, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Peace Research, World Development, Review of International Political Economy, and elsewhere. He received his PhD in Political Science from the University of Minnesota.