Rational Choice Politics

Herausgegeben:Dowding, Keith; Dewan, Torun; Shepsle, Kenneth A

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

The formal modeling techniques of rational choice theory have become central to the discipline of political science, for example with regard to the understanding of the working of legislatures, coalition governments, executive-bureaucracy relations or electoral systems. The collection includes the very best work in this field, as well as an editors' introduction to each volume that describes the importance of the articles and their place in political science.

Volume I: Social Choice and Equilibrium

Volume II: Voting, Elections and Electoral Systems

Volume III: Legislatures and Pressure Politics

Volume IV: Bureaucracy, Constitutional Arrangements and the State

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Produktdetails

• SAGE Library of Political Science
• Verlag: SAGE Publications Ltd / Sage Publications
• Four-Volume Set edition
• Seitenzahl: 1688
• Erscheinungstermin: 12. März 2009
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 234mm x 156mm
• Gewicht: 3260g
• ISBN-13: 9781412945028
• ISBN-10: 141294502X
• Artikelnr.: 25051276

Autorenporträt

Torun Dewan is Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the LSE and has taught rational choice for many years. He has published in American Journal of Political Science and American Political Science Review. Keith Dowding is Professor of Political Science at London School of Economics and is about to take up a position of Professor of Political Science at the Australian National University, Canberra, ACT. He has published widely in rational choice, public administration, urban studies, British and comparative politics as well as political philosophy. He has been co-editor of the Journal of Theoretical Politics for almost a decade. Kenneth A. Shepsle is Professor of Government at Harvard University. He has long been recognized as one of the leading scholars in rational choice theory. His groundbreaking work on the organization of legislatures has been immensely influential as has his more recent work on coalition formation and overlapping generations. He has published widely on US government and is the author of a leading textbook on rational choice.

Inhaltsangabe

VOLUME 1: SOCIAL CHOICE AND EQUILIBRIUM
Part 1: Social Choice
On the Rationale of Group Decision-making - Duncan Black
A Direct Proof of Arrow' s Theorem - Julian H. Blau
A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions - Amaryta Sen
Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result - Allan Gibbard
Part 2: Equilibrium
A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility under Majority Rule - Charles R. Plott
Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control - Richard D. McKelvey
Generic Instability of Majority Rule - Norman Schofield
Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions - William H. Riker
On 64%-Majority Rule - Andrew Caplin and Barry Nalebuff
Covering, Dominance, and Institution Free Properties of Social Choice - Richard D McKelvey
The Uncovered Set and the Core - Gary C. Cox
Bargaining in Legislatures - David P. Baron and John Ferejohn
A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice - Jeffrey S. Banks and John Duggan
Part 3: Electoral Systems
Electoral Equilibrium under Alternative Voting Institutions - Gary Cox
A Voting Model Implying Duverger's Law and Positive Turnout - Timothy J. Fedderson
Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems - Massimo Morelli
VOLUME 2: VOTING, ELECTIONS AND PRESSURE POLITICS
Part 4: Voting and Elections
A Theory of the Calculus of Voting - William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook
Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty - Thomas R. Palfrey and Howard Rosenthal
The Swing Voter's Curse - Timothy J. Fedderson and Wolfgang Pesendorfer
Voting as Communicating - Thomas Pickety
The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model - Robert J. Barro
Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control - John Ferejohn
Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate motivations, uncertainty and convergence - Randall L. Calvert
Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two Party System with Rational Voters - Alberto Alesina
An Economic Model of Representative Democracy - Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate
A Dynamical Model of Political Equilibrium - Gerald H. Kramer
Elections, Coalitions, and Outcomes - David Austin-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks
Elections, Governments and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems Pressure Politics - David P. Baron and Daniel Diermeier
Part 5: Pressure Politics
The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft - Gordon Tullock
The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society - Anne O. Krueger
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence - Gary Becker
On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests - Stephen Coates and Stephen Morris
Legislators and Interest Groups: How unorganized interests get represented - Arthur T. Denzau and Michael C. Munger
Protection for Sale - Gene Grossman and Elhanen Helpman
The Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective - William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner
VOLUME 3: LEGISLATURES
Part 6: Bureaucracy
Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting over endogenous agendas - David Austen-Smith
Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An analysis of sincere and sophisticated behavior - Arthur T. Denzau and Robert J. Mackay
Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure - Daniel Diermeier and Timothy J. Fedderson
Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures - Daniel Diermeier and Roger B. Myerson
Sophisticated Voting and Agenda Independence in the Distributive Politics Setting - John Ferejohn, Fiorina P. Morris and Richard D. McKelvey
Collective Decision Making and Standing Committee: An informational rationale for restrictive amendment procedures - Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel
Buying Supermajorities - Timothy Groseclose and James Snyder
Where's the Party? - Keith Krehbiel
On Division of the Question - John B. Kadane
Coalitions and Cabinet Government - Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle
Committee Design with Endogenous Information - Nicola Persico
Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo - Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal
Modelling the Interaction of Parties, Activists and Voters: Why is the political center empty? - Norman Schofield and Itai Sened
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multi-dimensional Voting Models - Kenneth A. Shepsle
The Industrial Organization of Congress - Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall
VOLUME 4: BUREAUCRACY, CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE STATE
Part 7: Bureaucracy
Agency Budgets, Cost Information, and Auditing - Jeffrey S. Banks
Bureaucratic Expertise versus Legislative Authority: A model of deception and monitoring in budgeting - Jonathan Bendor, Serge Taylor and Roland Van Gaalen
Delegation and the Structure of Policy-Making: A transactions cost politics approach - David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloren
Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy - John Ferejohn and Charles Shipan
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control - Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police patrols versus fire alarms - Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz
Part 8: Constitutional Arrangements
The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-preserving federalism and economic development - Barry R. Weingast
A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures - Charles M. Tiebout
An Economic Theory of Clubs - James M. Buchanan
The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in government - Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole
Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto players and presidentialism, parliamentarism, multi-cameralism, and multipartism - George Tsebelis
Part 9: The State
Dictatorship, Democracy and Development - Mancur Olson
Constitutions and Commitment: The evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth century england - Douglas C. North and Barry R. Weingast
Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The case of the merchant guild - Anver Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry R. Weingast
A Rational Theory of the Size of Government - Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard
Comparative Politics and Public Finance - Torsten Persson, Gérard Roland and Guido Tabellini
A Theory of Political Transitions - Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson