G. F. Schueler

Reasons and Purposes

Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Fred Schueler seeks to replace such causal views, arguing that they leave out two essential elements of these explanations. Reasons explanations are inherently teleological in the sense that the agent's reasons always explain the purpose for which he acted. They are also inherently normative since it is always possible that an agent's reasons for doing something are not good reasons. Schueler argues that causal accounts of reasons explanations make no sense of either of these features; he argues instead for an account based on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept.

---

People act for reasons. That is how we understand ourselves. But what is it to act for a reason? This is what Fred Schueler investigates. He rejects the dominant view that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do, and argues instead for a view centred on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. Schueler's account of 'reasons explanations' emphasizes the relation between reasons and purposes, and the fact that the reasons for an action are not always good reasons.

---

Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: OUP Oxford
• Seitenzahl: 190
• Erscheinungstermin: 17. März 2005
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 216mm x 140mm x 10mm
• Gewicht: 247g
• ISBN-13: 9780199278459
• ISBN-10: 0199278458
• Artikelnr.: 22216120

Autorenporträt

(Department of Philosophy, University of New Mexico, USA)

Inhaltsangabe

Preface
1. Purposes, Causes, and Reasons Explanations
1: Purposes
2: Reasons and Causes
3: Causes and Causal Explanations
2. Non Telelogical Explanations of Actions
4: The Argument for 'The Humean Theory of Motivation'
5: Are 'Causal' Explanations Unavoidable?
3. Teleological Explanations of Actions
6: The Need for Teleological Explanaations
7: Character Traits
4. Explaining in Terms of the Agent's Reasoning
8: Problems with the Practical Syllogism
9: Practical Reasoning and the Explanation of Actions
10: Practical Reasoning and Evaluations
11: The Principle of Charity
5. The Inherently Normative Nature of Action Explanations
12: Normative Explanations I: The Deliberative Model
13: Normative Explanations II: The Agent's Perspective
Bibliography