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This volume is about the notion of 'defeat' in philosophy. The idea is that someone who has some knowledge, or a justified belief, can lose this knowledge or justified belief if they acquire a 'defeater' - evidence that undermines it. The contributors examine the role of defeat not just in epistemology but in practical reasoning and ethics.

Produktbeschreibung
This volume is about the notion of 'defeat' in philosophy. The idea is that someone who has some knowledge, or a justified belief, can lose this knowledge or justified belief if they acquire a 'defeater' - evidence that undermines it. The contributors examine the role of defeat not just in epistemology but in practical reasoning and ethics.
Autorenporträt
Jessica Brown is Professor of Philosophy in the Arché Research Centre at the University of St Andrews. She has worked on a wide range of topics within philosophy of mind, epistemology, moral responsibility, and the methodology of philosophy, and has published two monographs : Anti-Individualism and Knowledge (MIT Press, 2004) and and Fallibilism (OUP, 2018). In addition, she is the co-editor of the OUP volumes Knowledge Ascriptions (with Mikkel Gerken, 2012) and Assertion (with Herman Cappelen, 2011). She is also Editor of the Philosophical Quarterly, Associate Editor of the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. Mona Simion is a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, where she is Deputy Director of the COGITO Epistemology Research Centre. Her research is in the fields of epistemology, philosophy of language, ethics, and feminist philosophy. Her work has been published in major philosophy journals including Nous, Journal of Philosophy, and Philosophical Studies, and she has been awarded several prestigious grants including a Mind Fellowship and a Leverhulme Research Grant.