"Very large balance sheet policies by central banks followed the Great Financial Crisis which along with the associated expanded mandate, eroded the independence of central banks. This book argues for a return to the consensus role for independent central banks"--
"Very large balance sheet policies by central banks followed the Great Financial Crisis which along with the associated expanded mandate, eroded the independence of central banks. This book argues for a return to the consensus role for independent central banks"--Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Stan du Plessis is Professor of Macroeconomics at Stellenbosch University where he is Chief Operating Officer and formerly a Dean. This Past President of the Economic Society of South Africa studied at the Universities of Cambridge, Stellenbosch and the Wharton Business School and is a member of the Academy of Science of South Africa.
Inhaltsangabe
Part I. The Theoretical Foundations: 1. History of Central Banking 2. Focus on Inflation: The Rationale for Central Bank Independence since Ancient Days 3. The Political Economy of CBI Part II. Balance Sheet Operations in Different Times and CBI: 4. Central Banks and the Great Moderation 5. Monetary Policy Response to the Financial Crisis 6. Balance sheet policies and CBI Part III. The Political Economy of CBI in the Real Economy: 7. Fiscal Needs and Low Interest Rates Policy in an Olsonian Setting 8. Are Central Banks Too Independent? CBI and Democracy after the Crises 9. The Future of Central Bank Independence.
Part I. The Theoretical Foundations: 1. History of Central Banking 2. Focus on Inflation: The Rationale for Central Bank Independence since Ancient Days 3. The Political Economy of CBI Part II. Balance Sheet Operations in Different Times and CBI: 4. Central Banks and the Great Moderation 5. Monetary Policy Response to the Financial Crisis 6. Balance sheet policies and CBI Part III. The Political Economy of CBI in the Real Economy: 7. Fiscal Needs and Low Interest Rates Policy in an Olsonian Setting 8. Are Central Banks Too Independent? CBI and Democracy after the Crises 9. The Future of Central Bank Independence.
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