Regional Missile Defense from a Global Perspective

Herausgeber: Kelleher, Catherine Mcardle; Dombrowski, Peter

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Catherine McArdle Kelleher is College Park Professor in the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland.Peter Dombrowski is Professor of Strategy in the Strategic Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Stanford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 328
• Erscheinungstermin: 23. September 2015
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 233mm x 159mm x 25mm
• Gewicht: 574g
• ISBN-13: 9780804790642
• ISBN-10: 0804790647
• Artikelnr.: 42790950

Autorenporträt

Catherine McArdle Kelleher is College Park Professor in the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland. Peter Dombrowski is Professor of Strategy in the Strategic Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College.

Inhaltsangabe

Contents and Abstracts
Introduction
chapter abstract
Missile defense, and particularly regional missile defense, has returned to
the spotlight after nearly a decade of relative obscurity. It has returned
to the global policy agenda both because President Obama made regional
missile defense a centerpiece of his national security strategy and because
Russia's aggressive foreign policy toward Ukraine and elsewhere has soured
its relations with Europe and the United States. The new hallmark of
Obama's regional missile defense system, the European Phased Adaptive
Approach (EPAA) scheduled to be operational in 2020, has become a pawn in
the larger game of resetting the West's relations with Russia. Current
uncertainties about missile defense in the European context have global
implications, however, because regional missile defense has been a
centerpiece of U.S. strategic diplomacy since the middle of the George W.
Bush administration.
1Addressing the Missile Threat: 1980-2008
chapter abstract
This chapter discusses U.S. ballistic missile defense policies and programs
through four administrations, from President Reagan through the second
President Bush. That history has been one of major change-in basic
strategy, military aims, threat definition, technological focus, funding,
and U.S. and international political salience. National missile defense
(NMD) efforts, aimed at countering strategic ballistic missiles, were
particularly subject to dramatic fluctuations over the period. Programs
grew or contracted, and were emphasized or terminated, depending on several
different factors. Changes in the political environment surrounding NMD
were undoubtedly due in large part to the scaled-down ambitions of U.S. NMD
efforts.
2U.S. National Missile Defense Policy
chapter abstract
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, every U.S. administration has
articulated similar missile defense objectives: (1) The United States will
defend its homeland from limited ballistic missile attacks, and (2) it will
defend U.S. deployed forces from regional missile threats while also
protecting our allies and partners. This continuity may seem unremarkable.
But it stands in stark contrast to the Cold War, which saw the United
States adopt almost every conceivable policy on ballistic missile defense
(BMD), ranging from no policy to outright opposition to complete support to
the qualified endorsement of limited defenses. It represents an equilibrium
between three forces: external threats, domestic politics, and
technological and financial realities. The first two forces have tended to
put "upward pressure" on BMD programs. The scale of U.S. ambitions has,
however, been kept in check by the cost and technical complexity of
developing and deploying defenses.
3Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Concepts
chapter abstract
The Obama administration has adopted the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to
guide its deployment of defenses against theater-range ballistic missiles.
Under this approach, the United States will deploy missile defense
architectures tailored to the needs of specific regions and support the
integration of U.S assets with allied resources. It will deploy these
capabilities over time, taking advantage of improvements in its sensor and
interceptor technologies. The phased approach will also allow the missile
defense architectures to adapt vis-à-vis changes in an adversary's
capabilities. With the PAA concept, regional ballistic missile defense
(BMD) capabilities will combine with other U.S. military systems in
extended deterrence architectures goals. As the United States and its
allies deploy more capable systems, and as these systems blend and overlap
into a global missile defense architecture, they will affect assessments,
among both adversaries and allies, of regional and global stability.
4Technical Controversy: Can Missile Defense Work?
chapter abstract
Perhaps the most important and contentious question regarding ballistic
missile defenses is whether can they work. However, the answer to this
question is not simple and will depend on many factors, such as the type of
defense, the nature of the attacking missiles, the circumstances of the
attacks, and the standards by which the success or failure of the defense
is judged. Broadly speaking, many supporters of ballistic missile defenses
argue that not only can they work but that they have already demonstrated
that they will work. On the other hand, critics argue that not only is the
effectiveness of defenses unproven but that there are fundamental reasons
to believe that they will never be able to function effectively.
5Congress and Missile Defense
chapter abstract
Congress has been more involved in missile defense than it usually is on
national security, but its motivations and impact are often misunderstood.
One common misconception is that missile defense was intensely
controversial during the twentieth century but now represents a rare area
of stable consensus across party lines and between the Executive Branch and
Congress. Another is that Congress has been unusually active on missile
defense because the public strongly supports it and would punish
politicians who did not. A deeper look shows that there is not, and never
has been, a consensus about the feasibility and desirability of
comprehensive missile defense, nor on related questions such as how nuclear
deterrence works and what, if any, role arms control should play in
security policy.
6Europe and Missile Defense
chapter abstract
This chapter assesses American missile defense initiatives in Europe over
the last ten years. Specifically, it reviews missile defense priorities
under the George W. Bush administration for a "third site" in Europe and
the follow-on initiative for a European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)
unveiled by the Obama administration. The chapter examines some of the
principal policy debates in Europe concerning missile defense and how these
currently shape the evolution toward an integrated NATO ballistic missile
defense (BMD) capability. The chapter ends with an overview of issues for
future consideration, including how developments in other regions might
impact the future evolution of missile defense in Europe. It concludes that
missile defense programs in Europe are still in their infancy but strong
and that the regional capabilities increasingly serve as political
expressions of NATO's pursuit of collective defense.
7Postcrisis Perspectives: The Prospects for Cooperation among the United
States, NATO, and Russia on Ballistic Missile Defense
chapter abstract
8From Dream to Reality: Israel and Missile Defense
chapter abstract
This chapter reviews the evolution of the missile threat against Israel and
the emergence of the indigenous Israeli and collaborative U.S.-Israeli
missile defense response. It highlights the remarkable success achieved by
the Israeli missile defense program, not only in tests and simulations but
in combat. It also goes on to briefly analyze some of the vexing dilemmas
in its second phase, such as who and what should get a higher level of
protection, that have grown precisely as a result of these remarkable
technological advances in missile defense. It concludes with a brief
discussion of key implications of the Israeli introduction and operation of
a multilayered missile defense system. Although some of these dilemmas and
implications are specific to Israel, others may have broader relevance for
other nations seriously considering the implications of missile defense.
9Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation in the Arabian Gulf
chapter abstract
One of the least well known of the regional missile defense efforts
encompasses the Arabian Gulf nations, primarily those allied with or
friendly to the United States, who all face a new strategic landscape in
the twenty-first century. For almost a decade, the United States has been
laboring to construct an integrated and layered missile defense
architecture in the Gulf, one that networks the sensors and interceptor
missiles of all its Gulf allies and partners into a unified command,
control, battle management, and communications system to maximize efficacy
and cooperation with American programs nearby. Washington's efforts have
encountered numerous hurdles.
10Ballistic Missile Defense in South Asia
chapter abstract
This chapter outlines the unique, and still largely nascent, development of
ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities in both India and Pakistan.
The focus is on each country's indigenous efforts, as well as support that
they have sought from foreign suppliers. It then outlines how BMD figures
in each country's national security strategies and nuclear doctrines. The
chapter then discusses the interactive effect between BMD developments on
the one hand and nuclear doctrines, modernization, and potential nuclear
weapons use in peacetime, crisis, and war. How external involvement-both
supply and cooperation and actions that shape threat perceptions-affects
ballistic missile developments is emphasized. In particular, China's role
in the Indo-Pakistan dyad, including Beijing's own actions and reactions to
U.S. ballistic missile defense developments, has a significant impact
11Chinese Attitudes Toward Missile Defense
chapter abstract
China has long viewed U.S. development and deployment of missile defense
systems as an important threat to Chinese national security. Specifically,
Chinese analysts are concerned that U.S. missile defenses could diminish
the credibility of China's growing, but still relatively modest, nuclear
deterrent force by threatening to eliminate missiles that would survive a
hypothetical disarming first strike against China. Yet even as Beijing
continues to object to U.S. missile defense programs on the ground that
they are strategically destabilizing, China is developing its own midcourse
missile defense intercept technology. This chapter explores Chinese views
on missile defense technology and capabilities
12Japan's Ballistic Missile Defense and "Proactive Pacifism"
chapter abstract
In early October 2013, the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee
(SCC), comprising the heads of defense and foreign ministries in both
countries, issued a joint statement. The statement emphasized the
centrality of the two countries' alliance in maintaining international
peace and security and, more specifically, in providing for the security of
Japan through the full range of U.S. military capabilities. The strategic
vision was emphatic on the need to significantly upgrade the capabilities
of the U.S.-Japan alliance.
13Strategic Dead End or Game Changer?
chapter abstract
The purpose of this chapter is to reconstruct the debate about U.S. BMD in
these new circumstances. It begins with a description of the new strategic
problem for which missile defense is relevant. This is the problem posed by
regional actors like North Korea seeking nuclear weapons and the means to
deliver them at all ranges, with the hope of creating a relationship of
mutual vulnerability with the United States. The chapter then defines the
place of BMD in the intended comprehensive approach to this new strategic
problem. It goes on to catalogue the particular and specific values of BMD.
Turning to the stability topic, it addresses the concerns of Russia and
China in the context of technical considerations. The chapter also
considers two main counterarguments to the propositions set out here
14Evaluating the Opportunity and Financial Costs of Missile Defense
chapter abstract
Thirty years, and many billions of dollars later, the policy debates raised
by President Reagan's "Star Wars" speech continue, with many of the same
critiques being applied to a system that is now operational. Nevertheless,
many changes have taken place, both in terms of the international political
context in which the merits of missile defense are debated, as well as in
the very nature of the missile defenses themselves. These changes have not
only affected the policy debate but also the debate over the economics of
missile defense and, in particular, the question of foregone expenditures,
or the opportunity cost, of missile defense budgets. Debates about the
viability of missile defense range from capability issues, to cost
estimates, to ideologically driven views of the optimum manner in which to
pursue strategic stability. It is the last of these three factors that will
continue to dominate the antiballistic missile debate.
Conclusion: The Future of Ballistic Missile Defense
chapter abstract
Even with the Obama administration's successes building on the missile
defense policies of the Clinton and Bush administrations, there remain
questions of comparative strategic impact, cost, and technology like those
that derailed the previous periods of missile defense enthusiasm. It is
unclear how theater and national approaches to missile defense-especially
EPAA, but the other regional arrangements as well-will progress in the face
of three major challenges: strategic implications, cost, and technological
progress.