Scientific and technological advancements have allowed us to create beings that blur the distinctions between human, non-human animal, and non-biological beings, which challenge our assumptions about moral status. This volume explores our responses to these challenges and reflects on ordinary presuppositions and intuitions about moral status.
Scientific and technological advancements have allowed us to create beings that blur the distinctions between human, non-human animal, and non-biological beings, which challenge our assumptions about moral status. This volume explores our responses to these challenges and reflects on ordinary presuppositions and intuitions about moral status.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Steve Clarke is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Charles Sturt University, NSW, Australia. He is also a Senior Research Associate in Ethics and Humanities Wellcome Centre for Ethics and Humanities, the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, and the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Oxford. He has broad research interests in philosophy and bioethics. Hazem Zohny is Research Fellow in Bioethics at the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics at the University of Oxford. His research focuses on the goals of medicine and the ethical implications of human enhancement technologies, as well as the bioprediction of behaviour and the use of neurointerventions for crime prevention. Julian Savulescu has held the Uehiro Chair in Practical Ethics at the University of Oxford since 2002. He directs the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics and co-directs the interdisciplinary Wellcome Centre for Ethics and Humanities. He is Visiting Professorial Fellow in Biomedical Ethics at Murdoch Children's Research Institute, and Distinguished Visiting Professor in Law, Melbourne University, where he directs the Biomedical Ethics Research Group.
Inhaltsangabe
* 1: Steve Clarke and Julian Savulescu: Rethinking our Assumptions about Moral Status * Section I. The Idea of Moral Status * 2: Jeff McMahan: Suffering and Moral Status * 3: David DeGrazia: An Interest-Based Model of Moral Status * 4: Josh Shepherd: The Moral Status of Conscious Subjects * 5: F.M. Kamm: Moral Status, Person-Affectingness, and Parfit's No-Difference View * 6: Elizabeth Harman: The Ever Conscious View and The Contingency of Moral Status * 7: Ingmar Persson: Moral Status and Moral Significance * 8: Udo Schuklenk: Moral Recognition and the Limits of Impartialist Ethics: On Androids, Sentience and Personhood * 9: Thomas Douglas: Is Moral Status Good for You? * Section II. Specific Issues about Moral Status * 10: Ruth Faden, Tom Beauchamp, Alan Regenberg, and Debra Mathews: Toward a Theory of Moral Status Inclusive of Nonhuman Animals: Pig Brains in a Vat, Cows versus Chickens, and Human-Nonhuman Chimeras * 11: Jason Robert and Françoise Baylis: Revisiting Inexorable Moral Confusion About the Moral Status of Human-Nonhuman Chimeras * 12: Sarah Chan: Chimeras, Superchimps and Post-persons: Species Boundaries and Moral Status Enhancements * 13: Ben Sachs: The Weak Connection between Moral Status and Legal Status * 14: Russell Powell, Irina Mikhalevich and Allen Buchanan: How the Moral Community Evolves * 15: Julian Koplin, Olivia Carter, and Julian Savulescu: Moral Status of Brain Organoids * 16: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Vincent Conitzer: How Much Moral Status Could Artificial Intelligence Ever Achieve? * 17: David R. Lawrence and John Harris: Monkeys and Moral Machines * 18: Carl Shulman and Nick Bostrom: Sharing the World with Digital Minds
* 1: Steve Clarke and Julian Savulescu: Rethinking our Assumptions about Moral Status * Section I. The Idea of Moral Status * 2: Jeff McMahan: Suffering and Moral Status * 3: David DeGrazia: An Interest-Based Model of Moral Status * 4: Josh Shepherd: The Moral Status of Conscious Subjects * 5: F.M. Kamm: Moral Status, Person-Affectingness, and Parfit's No-Difference View * 6: Elizabeth Harman: The Ever Conscious View and The Contingency of Moral Status * 7: Ingmar Persson: Moral Status and Moral Significance * 8: Udo Schuklenk: Moral Recognition and the Limits of Impartialist Ethics: On Androids, Sentience and Personhood * 9: Thomas Douglas: Is Moral Status Good for You? * Section II. Specific Issues about Moral Status * 10: Ruth Faden, Tom Beauchamp, Alan Regenberg, and Debra Mathews: Toward a Theory of Moral Status Inclusive of Nonhuman Animals: Pig Brains in a Vat, Cows versus Chickens, and Human-Nonhuman Chimeras * 11: Jason Robert and Françoise Baylis: Revisiting Inexorable Moral Confusion About the Moral Status of Human-Nonhuman Chimeras * 12: Sarah Chan: Chimeras, Superchimps and Post-persons: Species Boundaries and Moral Status Enhancements * 13: Ben Sachs: The Weak Connection between Moral Status and Legal Status * 14: Russell Powell, Irina Mikhalevich and Allen Buchanan: How the Moral Community Evolves * 15: Julian Koplin, Olivia Carter, and Julian Savulescu: Moral Status of Brain Organoids * 16: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Vincent Conitzer: How Much Moral Status Could Artificial Intelligence Ever Achieve? * 17: David R. Lawrence and John Harris: Monkeys and Moral Machines * 18: Carl Shulman and Nick Bostrom: Sharing the World with Digital Minds
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