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The United States being a super power has global interests. This puts a huge responsibility on the DoD and US military. US Air Force has reached to a point where it can have presence anywhere around the globe in matter of hours. Gulf War I, Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq proved the supremacy of the USAF. But after the kinetic victory the job never finished in the same way on ground. Insurgencies started in both the countries. The US has spent billions of dollars in these two wars but there is frustratingly awful situation. Public opinion in Sept 2001 was different than what it is today. Approval ratings of the US military operations have gone down drastically outside the US. Domestic public opinion is also divided. The wars are going on half way across the globe in a different environment. Cultural context is also an important aspect in winning the public opinion there. Media advancement, as compared to what was there in 1991 during Gulf War I, has played a key role in shaping public opinion. Satellite TV news, internet and revolution in the usage of cell phones have brought unprecedented changes. The historic western advantage of having superiority in news/information dissemination to common people is not there anymore. People all around the world are at par with the west in getting the international news. Ironically the media and the governmental agencies in the US seem to be unaware of the fact that how advanced are the information technology in some of the third world countries. Unless there is a realization here of this fact a plan of tackling public opinion in the affected areas may not be made. News of all levels from tactical to operational to strategic is available to most of the common people everywhere. This makes the life of PA personnel more difficult. They have to be in sync with the top leadership's stance on a subject; otherwise their message will lose credibility.