Stephen Ingram defends a robustly realistic metaethical theory, based on the concept of normative arbitrariness, of which he provides the first in-depth analysis. He argues that a correct understanding of dialogue about moral matters leads to an understanding of moral epistemology and normative language that supports this view.
Stephen Ingram defends a robustly realistic metaethical theory, based on the concept of normative arbitrariness, of which he provides the first in-depth analysis. He argues that a correct understanding of dialogue about moral matters leads to an understanding of moral epistemology and normative language that supports this view.
Stephen Ingram is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Manchester. He completed a PhD in Philosophy at the University of Sheffield in 2016 having previously studies philosophy at the University of Durham. His research focuses on ethics and metaethics.
Inhaltsangabe
0: Introduction Part 1. Moral Reality 1: Arbitrariness Charges 2: Modest Stance-Dependence 3: Ambitious Stance-Dependence 4: Stance-Independence 5: Robust Ontology Part 2. Moral Dialogue 6: Dualistic Intuitionism 7: Actual Dialogue 8: Sceptical Challenges 9: Moral Reference 10: Conclusion