Role of Intuition in Moral Knowledge - Smyth, Nicholas James
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Historically, philosophers have based much knowledge upon intuition, but this tradition found itself under increasing criticism. Claims of intuitive knowledge have been accused of being asserted dogmatically, and when pressed for justification, proponents of intuitive knowledge often fail to provide satisfactory replies. So it is no surprise that intuition as a base for knowledge has come to strike many modern thinkers as suspect. Proponents of intuition have been accused of treating intuition as a superpower able to peer into a Platonistic realm of facts. Not only is it highly dubious whether…mehr

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Historically, philosophers have based much knowledge upon intuition, but this tradition found itself under increasing criticism. Claims of intuitive knowledge have been accused of being asserted dogmatically, and when pressed for justification, proponents of intuitive knowledge often fail to provide satisfactory replies. So it is no surprise that intuition as a base for knowledge has come to strike many modern thinkers as suspect. Proponents of intuition have been accused of treating intuition as a superpower able to peer into a Platonistic realm of facts. Not only is it highly dubious whether such a mental faculty could exist, but widespread disagreement on intuitive knowledge casts doubt on the ability of intuition to provide knowledge at all, superpowered or not. This has led some to abandon intuition entirely, and argue that philosophy relying upon intuition is misguided or hopeless. If intuition is epistemically suspect, then moral philosophy is in trouble since intuition is widely used and regarded as epistemically valuable.