This volume challenges some of our most basic understandings of terrorism - in terms of its consequences, its causes, and the most effective government response - and shows how these three areas are closely interrelated.
This volume challenges some of our most basic understandings of terrorism - in terms of its consequences, its causes, and the most effective government response - and shows how these three areas are closely interrelated.
Dr. Max Abrahms is among the worlds leading experts on the subject of terrorism. Currently, he is a professor of political science and public policy at Northeastern University. He has held various affiliations with the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, the Empirical Studies of Conflict project at Princeton University and Stanford University, the Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Military Academy, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Center for Cyber and Homeland Security at George Washington University, the Center for the Study of Terrorism in Rome, the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University, the economics department at Bar Ilan University, the political science department at Johns Hopkins University, and the Belfer Center at Harvard University.
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction: The Stupid Terrorist Rule #1 1. Learning to Win 1: My West Bank Discovery 2: Testing the Strategic Model of Terrorism 3: Terrorism Success Stories Revisited 4: Correspondence of Means and Ends Bias 5: How Terrorism Expedites Organizational Demise 6: What Smart Leaders Know Rule #2 2. Restraining to Win 7: Principal-Agent Problems in Militant Groups 8: Cultivating Task Cohesion 9: The Structure of Success 10: The Benefits of Centralizing 11: When Elephants Rampage Rule #3 3. Branding to Win 12: Denial of Organizational Involvement 13: Denial of Principal Intent Conclusion: The Future of Terrorism
Introduction: The Stupid Terrorist Rule #1 1. Learning to Win 1: My West Bank Discovery 2: Testing the Strategic Model of Terrorism 3: Terrorism Success Stories Revisited 4: Correspondence of Means and Ends Bias 5: How Terrorism Expedites Organizational Demise 6: What Smart Leaders Know Rule #2 2. Restraining to Win 7: Principal-Agent Problems in Militant Groups 8: Cultivating Task Cohesion 9: The Structure of Success 10: The Benefits of Centralizing 11: When Elephants Rampage Rule #3 3. Branding to Win 12: Denial of Organizational Involvement 13: Denial of Principal Intent Conclusion: The Future of Terrorism
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