It is currently quite easy for students or designers/engineers to find very general books on the various aspects of safety, reliability and dependability of computer system architectures, and partial treatments of the elements that comprise an effective system architecture. It is not so easy to find a single source reference for all these aspects of system design. However, the purpose of this book is to present, in a single volume, a full description of all the constraints (including legal contexts around performance, reliability norms, etc.) and examples of architectures from various fields…mehr
It is currently quite easy for students or designers/engineers to find very general books on the various aspects of safety, reliability and dependability of computer system architectures, and partial treatments of the elements that comprise an effective system architecture. It is not so easy to find a single source reference for all these aspects of system design. However, the purpose of this book is to present, in a single volume, a full description of all the constraints (including legal contexts around performance, reliability norms, etc.) and examples of architectures from various fields of application, including: railways, aeronautics, space, automobile and industrial automation.
The content of the book is drawn from the experience of numerous people who are deeply immersed in the design and delivery (from conception to test and validation), safety (analysis of safety: FMEA, HA, etc.) and evaluation of critical systems. The involvement of real world industrial applications is handled in such as a way as to avoid problems of confidentiality, and thus allows for the inclusion of new, useful information (photos, architecture plans/schematics, real examples).Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Jean-Louis Boulanger is an Independent Safety Assessor (ISA) for software in the railway industry. After 15 years working at the RATP (the authority that manages the subway in Paris) and 6 years as a researcher and teacher at the University of Technology of Compiegne in France, he is currently working as an expert for the French notified body CERTIFER in the field of certification of safety critical railway applications based on software (ERTMS, SCADA, automatic subway, etc.). His research interests include requirements, software verification and validation, traceability and RAMS with a special focus on safety.
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction xiii Chapter 1. Principles 1 Jean-Louis BOULANGER 1.1. Introduction 1 1.2. Presentation of the basic concepts: faults, errors and failures 1 1.3. Safe and/or available architecture 7 1.4. Resetting a processing unit 7 1.5. Overview of safety techniques 8 1.6. Conclusion 45 1.7. Bibliography 45 Chapter 2. Railway Safety Architecture 47 Jean-Louis BOULANGER 2.1. Introduction 47 2.2. Coded secure processor 47 2.3. Other applications 53 2.4. Regulatory and normative context 60 2.5. Conclusion 66 2.6. Bibliography 66 Chapter 3. From the Coded Uniprocessor to 2oo3 69 Gilles LEGOFF and Christophe GIRARD 3.1. Introduction 69 3.2. From the uniprocessor to the dual processor with voter 71 3.3. CSD: available safety computer 80 3.4. DIVA evolutions 93 3.5. New needs and possible solutions 99 3.6. Conclusion 101 3.7. Assessment of installations 102 3.8. Bibliography 103 Chapter 4. Designing a Computerized Interlocking Module: a Key Component of Computer-Based Signal Boxes Designed by the SNCF 105 Marc ANTONI 4.1. Introduction 105 4.2. Issues 107 4.3. Railway safety: fundamental notions 116 4.4. Development of the computerized interlocking module 124 4.5. Conclusion 145 4.6. Bibliography 147 Chapter 5. Command Control of Railway Signaling Safety: Safety at Lower Cost 149 Daniel DRAGO 5.1. Introduction 149 5.2. A safety coffee machine 149 5.3. History of the PIPC 150 5.4. The concept basis 155 5.5. Postulates for safety requirements 157 5.6. Description of the PIPC architecture7 159 5.7. Description of availability principles 173 5.8. Software architecture 176 5.9. Protection against causes of common failure 186 5.10. Probabilistic modeling 188 5.11. Summary of safety concepts 194 5.12. Conclusion 197 5.13. Bibliography 198 Chapter 6. Dependable Avionics Architectures: Example of a Fly-by-Wire system 199 Pascal TRAVERSE, Christine BEZARD, Jean-Michel CAMUS, Isabelle LACAZE, Hervé LEBERRE, Patrick RINGEARD and Jean SOUYRIS 6.1. Introduction 199 6.2. System breakdowns due to physical failures 205 6.3. Manufacturing and design errors 215 6.4. Specific risks 223 6.5. Human factors in the development of flight controls 225 6.6. Conclusion 229 6.7. Bibliography 229 Chapter 7. Space Applications 233 Jean-Paul BLANQUART and Philippe MIRAMONT 7.1. Introduction 233 7.2. Space system 233 7.3. Context and statutory obligation 237 7.4. Specific needs 243 7.5. Launchers: the Ariane 5 example 252 7.6. Satellite architecture 281 7.7. Orbital transport: ATV example 292 7.8. Summary and conclusions 302 7.9. Bibliography 304 Chapter 8. Methods and Calculations Relative to "Safety Instrumented Systems" at TOTAL 307 Yassine CHAABI and Jean-Pierre SIGNORET 8.1. Introduction 307 8.2. Specific problems to be taken into account 308 8.3. Example 1: system in 2/3 modeled by fault trees 322 8.4. Example 2: 2/3 system modeled by the stochastic Petri net 328 8.5. Other considerations regarding HIPS 333 8.6. Conclusion 342 8.7. Bibliography 343 Chapter 9. Securing Automobile Architectures 345 David LIAIGRE 9.1. Context 345 9.2. More environmentally-friendly vehicles involving more embedded electronics 347 9.3. Mastering the complexity of electronic systems 348 9.4. Security concepts in the automotive field 350 9.5. Which security concepts for which security levels of the ISO 26262 standard? 364 9.6. Conclusion 376 9.7. Bibliography 377 Chapter 10. SIS in Industry 379 Grégory BUCHHEIT and Olaf MALASSE 10.1. Introduction 379 10.2. Safety loop structure 384 10.3. Constraints and requirements of the application 407 10.4. Analysis of a safety loop 413 10.5. Conclusion 423 10.6. Bibliography 424 Chapter 11. A High-Availability Safety Computer 425 Sylvain BARO 11.1. Introduction 425 11.2. Safety computer 426 11.3. Applicative redundancy 433 11.4. Integrated redundancy 433 11.5. Conclusion 443 11.6. Bibliography 446 Chapter 12. Safety System for the Protection of Personnel in the CERN Large Hadron Collider 447 Pierre NININ, Silvia GRAU, Tomasz LADZINSKI and Francesco VALENTINI 12.1. Introduction 447 12.2. LACS 450 12.3. LASS 452 12.4. Functional safety methodology 459 12.5. Test strategy 466 12.6. Feedback 472 12.7. Conclusions 473 12.8. Bibliography 474 Glossary 477 List of Authors 485 Index 487
Introduction xiii Chapter 1. Principles 1 Jean-Louis BOULANGER 1.1. Introduction 1 1.2. Presentation of the basic concepts: faults, errors and failures 1 1.3. Safe and/or available architecture 7 1.4. Resetting a processing unit 7 1.5. Overview of safety techniques 8 1.6. Conclusion 45 1.7. Bibliography 45 Chapter 2. Railway Safety Architecture 47 Jean-Louis BOULANGER 2.1. Introduction 47 2.2. Coded secure processor 47 2.3. Other applications 53 2.4. Regulatory and normative context 60 2.5. Conclusion 66 2.6. Bibliography 66 Chapter 3. From the Coded Uniprocessor to 2oo3 69 Gilles LEGOFF and Christophe GIRARD 3.1. Introduction 69 3.2. From the uniprocessor to the dual processor with voter 71 3.3. CSD: available safety computer 80 3.4. DIVA evolutions 93 3.5. New needs and possible solutions 99 3.6. Conclusion 101 3.7. Assessment of installations 102 3.8. Bibliography 103 Chapter 4. Designing a Computerized Interlocking Module: a Key Component of Computer-Based Signal Boxes Designed by the SNCF 105 Marc ANTONI 4.1. Introduction 105 4.2. Issues 107 4.3. Railway safety: fundamental notions 116 4.4. Development of the computerized interlocking module 124 4.5. Conclusion 145 4.6. Bibliography 147 Chapter 5. Command Control of Railway Signaling Safety: Safety at Lower Cost 149 Daniel DRAGO 5.1. Introduction 149 5.2. A safety coffee machine 149 5.3. History of the PIPC 150 5.4. The concept basis 155 5.5. Postulates for safety requirements 157 5.6. Description of the PIPC architecture7 159 5.7. Description of availability principles 173 5.8. Software architecture 176 5.9. Protection against causes of common failure 186 5.10. Probabilistic modeling 188 5.11. Summary of safety concepts 194 5.12. Conclusion 197 5.13. Bibliography 198 Chapter 6. Dependable Avionics Architectures: Example of a Fly-by-Wire system 199 Pascal TRAVERSE, Christine BEZARD, Jean-Michel CAMUS, Isabelle LACAZE, Hervé LEBERRE, Patrick RINGEARD and Jean SOUYRIS 6.1. Introduction 199 6.2. System breakdowns due to physical failures 205 6.3. Manufacturing and design errors 215 6.4. Specific risks 223 6.5. Human factors in the development of flight controls 225 6.6. Conclusion 229 6.7. Bibliography 229 Chapter 7. Space Applications 233 Jean-Paul BLANQUART and Philippe MIRAMONT 7.1. Introduction 233 7.2. Space system 233 7.3. Context and statutory obligation 237 7.4. Specific needs 243 7.5. Launchers: the Ariane 5 example 252 7.6. Satellite architecture 281 7.7. Orbital transport: ATV example 292 7.8. Summary and conclusions 302 7.9. Bibliography 304 Chapter 8. Methods and Calculations Relative to "Safety Instrumented Systems" at TOTAL 307 Yassine CHAABI and Jean-Pierre SIGNORET 8.1. Introduction 307 8.2. Specific problems to be taken into account 308 8.3. Example 1: system in 2/3 modeled by fault trees 322 8.4. Example 2: 2/3 system modeled by the stochastic Petri net 328 8.5. Other considerations regarding HIPS 333 8.6. Conclusion 342 8.7. Bibliography 343 Chapter 9. Securing Automobile Architectures 345 David LIAIGRE 9.1. Context 345 9.2. More environmentally-friendly vehicles involving more embedded electronics 347 9.3. Mastering the complexity of electronic systems 348 9.4. Security concepts in the automotive field 350 9.5. Which security concepts for which security levels of the ISO 26262 standard? 364 9.6. Conclusion 376 9.7. Bibliography 377 Chapter 10. SIS in Industry 379 Grégory BUCHHEIT and Olaf MALASSE 10.1. Introduction 379 10.2. Safety loop structure 384 10.3. Constraints and requirements of the application 407 10.4. Analysis of a safety loop 413 10.5. Conclusion 423 10.6. Bibliography 424 Chapter 11. A High-Availability Safety Computer 425 Sylvain BARO 11.1. Introduction 425 11.2. Safety computer 426 11.3. Applicative redundancy 433 11.4. Integrated redundancy 433 11.5. Conclusion 443 11.6. Bibliography 446 Chapter 12. Safety System for the Protection of Personnel in the CERN Large Hadron Collider 447 Pierre NININ, Silvia GRAU, Tomasz LADZINSKI and Francesco VALENTINI 12.1. Introduction 447 12.2. LACS 450 12.3. LASS 452 12.4. Functional safety methodology 459 12.5. Test strategy 466 12.6. Feedback 472 12.7. Conclusions 473 12.8. Bibliography 474 Glossary 477 List of Authors 485 Index 487
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