Saul Kripke
Herausgeber: Berger, Alan
Saul Kripke
Herausgeber: Berger, Alan
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The most comprehensive analysis of Saul Kripke's philosophy and writings available.
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The most comprehensive analysis of Saul Kripke's philosophy and writings available.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 382
- Erscheinungstermin: 6. Juni 2011
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 229mm x 150mm x 25mm
- Gewicht: 658g
- ISBN-13: 9780521858267
- ISBN-10: 0521858267
- Artikelnr.: 31080696
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 382
- Erscheinungstermin: 6. Juni 2011
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 229mm x 150mm x 25mm
- Gewicht: 658g
- ISBN-13: 9780521858267
- ISBN-10: 0521858267
- Artikelnr.: 31080696
Introduction Alan Berger; Part I. Naming, Necessity, Identity, and A
Priority: 1. Kripke on proper and general names Bernard Linsky; 2. Kripke
on vacuous names and names in fiction Nathan Salmon; 3. Kripke on epistemic
and modal possibility: two routes to the necessary a posteriori Scott
Soames; 4. Possible world semantics and its philosophic foundations Robert
Stalnaker; Part II. Formal Semantics, Truth, Philosophy of Math, and
Philosophy of Logic: 5. Kripke models for modal logic and intuitionism John
Burgess; 6. Kripke's theory of truth John Burgess; 7. Kripke on logicism,
Wittgenstein, and de re beliefs about numbers Mark Steiner; 8. Kripke on
the incoherency of adopting a logic Alan Berger; Part III. Language and
Mind: 9. Kripke's new puzzle about belief and our principles of belief
attribution Mark Richard; 10. A note on Kripke's puzzle about belief Nathan
Salmon; 11. Kripke's version of Wittgenstein: some conceptions and
misconceptions George Wilson; 12. Kripke on color words and the primary,
secondary quality distinction Mario Gomez-Torrente; Part IV. Philosophy of
Mind and Philosophical Psychology: 13. Kripke's views on Cartesianism and
naturalism Sydney Shoemaker; 14. Kripke's critique of functionalism Jeff
Buechner.
Priority: 1. Kripke on proper and general names Bernard Linsky; 2. Kripke
on vacuous names and names in fiction Nathan Salmon; 3. Kripke on epistemic
and modal possibility: two routes to the necessary a posteriori Scott
Soames; 4. Possible world semantics and its philosophic foundations Robert
Stalnaker; Part II. Formal Semantics, Truth, Philosophy of Math, and
Philosophy of Logic: 5. Kripke models for modal logic and intuitionism John
Burgess; 6. Kripke's theory of truth John Burgess; 7. Kripke on logicism,
Wittgenstein, and de re beliefs about numbers Mark Steiner; 8. Kripke on
the incoherency of adopting a logic Alan Berger; Part III. Language and
Mind: 9. Kripke's new puzzle about belief and our principles of belief
attribution Mark Richard; 10. A note on Kripke's puzzle about belief Nathan
Salmon; 11. Kripke's version of Wittgenstein: some conceptions and
misconceptions George Wilson; 12. Kripke on color words and the primary,
secondary quality distinction Mario Gomez-Torrente; Part IV. Philosophy of
Mind and Philosophical Psychology: 13. Kripke's views on Cartesianism and
naturalism Sydney Shoemaker; 14. Kripke's critique of functionalism Jeff
Buechner.
Introduction Alan Berger; Part I. Naming, Necessity, Identity, and A
Priority: 1. Kripke on proper and general names Bernard Linsky; 2. Kripke
on vacuous names and names in fiction Nathan Salmon; 3. Kripke on epistemic
and modal possibility: two routes to the necessary a posteriori Scott
Soames; 4. Possible world semantics and its philosophic foundations Robert
Stalnaker; Part II. Formal Semantics, Truth, Philosophy of Math, and
Philosophy of Logic: 5. Kripke models for modal logic and intuitionism John
Burgess; 6. Kripke's theory of truth John Burgess; 7. Kripke on logicism,
Wittgenstein, and de re beliefs about numbers Mark Steiner; 8. Kripke on
the incoherency of adopting a logic Alan Berger; Part III. Language and
Mind: 9. Kripke's new puzzle about belief and our principles of belief
attribution Mark Richard; 10. A note on Kripke's puzzle about belief Nathan
Salmon; 11. Kripke's version of Wittgenstein: some conceptions and
misconceptions George Wilson; 12. Kripke on color words and the primary,
secondary quality distinction Mario Gomez-Torrente; Part IV. Philosophy of
Mind and Philosophical Psychology: 13. Kripke's views on Cartesianism and
naturalism Sydney Shoemaker; 14. Kripke's critique of functionalism Jeff
Buechner.
Priority: 1. Kripke on proper and general names Bernard Linsky; 2. Kripke
on vacuous names and names in fiction Nathan Salmon; 3. Kripke on epistemic
and modal possibility: two routes to the necessary a posteriori Scott
Soames; 4. Possible world semantics and its philosophic foundations Robert
Stalnaker; Part II. Formal Semantics, Truth, Philosophy of Math, and
Philosophy of Logic: 5. Kripke models for modal logic and intuitionism John
Burgess; 6. Kripke's theory of truth John Burgess; 7. Kripke on logicism,
Wittgenstein, and de re beliefs about numbers Mark Steiner; 8. Kripke on
the incoherency of adopting a logic Alan Berger; Part III. Language and
Mind: 9. Kripke's new puzzle about belief and our principles of belief
attribution Mark Richard; 10. A note on Kripke's puzzle about belief Nathan
Salmon; 11. Kripke's version of Wittgenstein: some conceptions and
misconceptions George Wilson; 12. Kripke on color words and the primary,
secondary quality distinction Mario Gomez-Torrente; Part IV. Philosophy of
Mind and Philosophical Psychology: 13. Kripke's views on Cartesianism and
naturalism Sydney Shoemaker; 14. Kripke's critique of functionalism Jeff
Buechner.