José L. Zalabardo defends a reliabilist theory of knowledge that belongs firmly in the truth-tracking tradition. His account refutes standard lines of sceptical reasoning--including the regress argument, sceptical hypotheses, and the problem of the criterion--but Zalabardo goes on to explore one argument against which the theory offers no defence.
José L. Zalabardo defends a reliabilist theory of knowledge that belongs firmly in the truth-tracking tradition. His account refutes standard lines of sceptical reasoning--including the regress argument, sceptical hypotheses, and the problem of the criterion--but Zalabardo goes on to explore one argument against which the theory offers no defence.
José L. Zalabardo is a reader at the University College London Philosophy Department. He studied for his PhD at the University of Michigan, was a lecturer at the University of Birmingham from 1994 to 2000, and then joined UCL. He has published numerous articles in academic journals and collective volumes, and is the author of Introduction to the Theory of Logic (Westview Press, 2000), and editor of Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy (OUP, 2012).
Inhaltsangabe
Preface 1: The problem of scepticism 2: Reliabilism and the evidential constraint 3: Knowledge and truth tracking 4: Evidence 5: Inferential knowledge 6: Knowledge without evidence 7: Sceptical arguments 8: Scepticism and realism Appendix References Index
Preface 1: The problem of scepticism 2: Reliabilism and the evidential constraint 3: Knowledge and truth tracking 4: Evidence 5: Inferential knowledge 6: Knowledge without evidence 7: Sceptical arguments 8: Scepticism and realism Appendix References Index
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