This book explores the dispositional and categorical debates on the metaphysics of properties. It defends the view that all fundamental properties and relations are contingently categorical, while also examining alternative accounts of the nature of properties. Drawing upon both established research and the author's own investigation into the broader discipline of the metaphysics of science, this book provides a comprehensive study of the many views and opinions regarding a most debatable topic in contemporary metaphysics. Science in Metaphysics will be of interest to metaphysicians of…mehr
This book explores the dispositional and categorical debates on the metaphysics of properties. It defends the view that all fundamental properties and relations are contingently categorical, while also examining alternative accounts of the nature of properties. Drawing upon both established research and the author's own investigation into the broader discipline of the metaphysics of science, this book provides a comprehensive study of the many views and opinions regarding a most debatable topic in contemporary metaphysics. Science in Metaphysics will be of interest to metaphysicians of science, analytic metaphysicians and philosophers of science and physics alike.
Vassilis Livanios is a lecturer at the University of Cyprus, with interests including metaphysics and the philosophy of physical science. His work has appeared in several academic journals including Philosophical Studies, Metaphysica, Acta Analytica and Journal for General Philosophy of Science.
Inhaltsangabe
1. Introduction.- 2. Against Dispositional Monism.- 3. Against Identity Theory and Neutral Monism.- 4. In Defense of Categorical Monism.- 5. Categorical Monism and Qudditism.- 6. Further objections to Categorical Monsim.- 7. The Contingent Character of Categoricality and Disposionality.- 8. Do Nomic Relations Exist?.- 9. Metaphysical Features of Nomic Relations and Laws.- 10. Concluding Remarks.- References.- Index.
1. Introduction.- 2. Against Dispositional Monism.- 3. Against Identity Theory and Neutral Monism.- 4. In Defense of Categorical Monism.- 5. Categorical Monism and Qudditism.- 6. Further objections to Categorical Monsim.- 7. The Contingent Character of Categoricality and Disposionality.- 8. Do Nomic Relations Exist?.- 9. Metaphysical Features of Nomic Relations and Laws.- 10. Concluding Remarks.- References.- Index.
1. Introduction.- 2. Against Dispositional Monism.- 3. Against Identity Theory and Neutral Monism.- 4. In Defense of Categorical Monism.- 5. Categorical Monism and Qudditism.- 6. Further objections to Categorical Monsim.- 7. The Contingent Character of Categoricality and Disposionality.- 8. Do Nomic Relations Exist?.- 9. Metaphysical Features of Nomic Relations and Laws.- 10. Concluding Remarks.- References.- Index.
1. Introduction.- 2. Against Dispositional Monism.- 3. Against Identity Theory and Neutral Monism.- 4. In Defense of Categorical Monism.- 5. Categorical Monism and Qudditism.- 6. Further objections to Categorical Monsim.- 7. The Contingent Character of Categoricality and Disposionality.- 8. Do Nomic Relations Exist?.- 9. Metaphysical Features of Nomic Relations and Laws.- 10. Concluding Remarks.- References.- Index.
Es gelten unsere Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen: www.buecher.de/agb
Impressum
www.buecher.de ist ein Internetauftritt der buecher.de internetstores GmbH
Geschäftsführung: Monica Sawhney | Roland Kölbl | Günter Hilger
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Batheyer Straße 115 - 117, 58099 Hagen
Postanschrift: Bürgermeister-Wegele-Str. 12, 86167 Augsburg
Amtsgericht Hagen HRB 13257
Steuernummer: 321/neu