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This is a case study of the JSF program's ability to deliver on its original promise of an affordable, next generation strike-fighter for three separate U.S. services as well as a number of foreign militaries. Although fiscal realities may have driven the services to jump on board the JSF bandwagon, the program has not been run in a manner yielding the highest cost benefit ratio possible. This is primarily due to the services' short memory when authoring key performance parameters coupled with the seemingly proven fact that joint acquisition simply is not an effective way to provide TACAIR assets to our services. The JSF has been a hot debate amongst policy makers, service leaders, and operators. Service leaders are in the hot seat as they must try and walk the fine line of what they need and what they can sell to Congress. Although some may argue that we made small concessions in the name of commonality, others claim otherwise. Some decisions will affect operators for decades to come. The decision to build the JSF around a single engine will never cease to haunt carrier aviators and those on transoceanic ferrying missions.