Robert Audi

Seeing, Knowing, and Doing

A Perceptualist Account

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

This book provides an overall theory of perception and much of a theory of knowledge. It explains how we can have justified beliefs and knowledge concerning the physical world, the abstract realm, and the normative domain of right and wrong.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Oxford University Press, USA
• Seitenzahl: 248
• Erscheinungstermin: 12. März 2020
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 234mm x 156mm x 14mm
• Gewicht: 517g
• ISBN-13: 9780197503508
• ISBN-10: 0197503500
• Artikelnr.: 58409767

Autorenporträt

Robert Audi is internationally known for writing and speaking in epistemology, philosophy of mind and action, ethics (including political philosophy), and philosophy of religion. In epistemology, perception, the a priori, memory, testimony, and, the relation of all these to rationality, justification, and knowledge are among his central interests. In philosophy of mind and action, he has written on intention, reasons, practical reasoning, and rational action. In ethics, his research has focused on moral epistemology, moral psychology, value theory, and, in applied ethics, business, medical, and journalistic ethics. His work in philosophy of religion has centered on faith and reason, the problem of evil, and religion and politics. He is the author of Rational Belief (OUP 2015), Moral Perception (Princeton 2013), and Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, 3rd ed. (Routledge 2010).

Inhaltsangabe

* Preface and acknowledgments
* Introduction
* Part One: Perception
* Chapter 1 Perception and Perceptual Belief:
* Seeing and Knowing the Physical World
* I. Perception Broadly Conceived
* II. Four Structurally Distinct Cases of Perception
* III. The Representational Character of Perception
* Chapter 2 Dimensions of Perceptual Content
* I. Three Categories of Perceptual Content
* II. Singular Reference and the Possible Role of Russellian
Propositions
* III. Perception and Belief: Cognitive and Conceptual Aspects
* Chapter 3 Perceptual Levels and their Action-Theoretic Counterparts
* I. Perception and Action: the Structural Analogy
* II. Constitutive Elements in the Visual Perception of Physical
Objects
* III. Awareness of Events and Abstract Entities
* IV. The Epistemological Significance of Perceptual Levels
* V. Is Perception Theory-laden?
* VI. The Importance of "Background Beliefs" and Perceptual Levels
* VII. Aspectual Perception, Inference, and Recognition
* Chapter 4 Perception as a Source of Knowledge and Justification
* I. Perceptual Knowledge
* II. The Hierarchical Character of Perception
* III. Perceptual Justification: External and Internal Dimensions
* IV. The Perceptibility of Normative Properties
* Chapter 5 Reasons, Perceptual Grounds, and Normative Explanation
* I. The Diversity of Reasons for Belief
* II. Reasons as Distinguished from Grounds
* III. Reasons and Grounds for Belief: The Practical Analogy
* IV. Reasons as Explanations
* V. Normative Reasons and their Grounds
* Chapter 6 The Autonomy of Justification
* I. Epistemological Internalism
* II. Does Knowledge Entail Justification?
* III. The Practice-Relativity of Justification
* IV. An Integrated View of Knowledge and Justification
* V. The Disjunctivist Challenge
* VI. The Elusive Notion of the Content of Perceptual Belief
* VII. Perception and Singular Reference
* Part Two: Perception and the A Priori
* Chapter 7 Perception, Intuition, and Apprehension
* I. Perception and Intuition
* II. Structural Parallels between Intuitional and Perceptional
Discourse
* III. Intuitions as Evidential Cognitions: Two Intuitionist Traditions
* IV. Intuitions as Apprehensions
* Chapter 8 Toward a Theory of the A Priori
* I. The Concept of Self-Evidence
* II. Understanding as Central for Knowledge of the Self-evident
* III. Understanding and Imagination
* IV. Major Elements in the Understanding of Propositions
* V. Degrees of Understanding and Propositional Justification
* VI. Comprehensional Adequacy
* VII. Obstacles to Comprehension
* Chapter 9 Apriority, Disputability, and Necessity
* I. Self-Evidence and Provability
* II. Can Rational Disagreement Extend to the Self-Evident?
* III. The Self-Evident, the Obvious, and the Credible
* IV. Apprehension of Abstract Entities
* V. Apriority and Necessity
* Part Three: Practical Knowledge
* Chapter 10 Knowledge, Belief, and Action
* I. Belief and Action
* II. Two Orders of Cognitive Disposition
* III. Belief and Knowledge, Intention and Action
* Chapter 11 Knowing, Reasoning, and Doing
* I. Intellectualism as a Perspective on Action
* II. Practical Knowledge and Knowledge of the Practical
* III. Virtual Knowledge: A Neglected Category
* IV. The Place of Knowledge in Practical Reasoning
* Chapter 12 Inference and Its Role in Rational Action
* I. Inference and Inferential Belief
* II. Inference, Reasoning, and Premise-Based Belief-Formation
* III. Reasoning and Rational Action
* IV. The Scope of Rational Action
* V. Intentionality, Knowledge, and Agency
* Conclusion