Robert Audi

Seeing, Knowing, and Doing

A Perceptualist Account

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

This book provides an overall theory of perception and much of a theory of knowledge. It explains how we can have justified beliefs and knowledge concerning the physical world, the abstract realm, and the normative domain of right and wrong.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Oxford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 248
• Erscheinungstermin: 18. April 2025
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9780197802342
• ISBN-10: 0197802346
• Artikelnr.: 73664444

Autorenporträt

Robert Audi is internationally known for his books, articles, and lectures in ethics (including political philosophy), the theory of knowledge, the philosophy of mind and action, and the philosophy of religion. His books since 2000 include Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (Cambridge 2000), a theory of the relation between church and state and, for individuals, between religion and politics; The Architecture of Reason (Oxford 2001), a theory of rationality that provides a partial foundation for ethics; The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value (Princeton 2004), a presentation of some main elements in Audi's view in ethics; Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision (Routledge 2006), an account of the nature and varieties of practical reasoning and its relation to moral standards; Moral Value and Human Diversity (Oxford 2007), a non-technical presentation of major approaches in ethics and value theory; Rationality and Religious Commitment (Oxford 2011), a comprehensive monograph in philosophy of religion (derived from the Wilde Lectures given much earlier at Oxford); Moral Perception (Princeton 2013), a theory of perceptual moral knowledge and its relation to emotion, intuition, and objectivity in ethics; Seeing, Knowing, and Doing (Oxford 2020), an account of perception of the physical, apprehension of the abstract, and how both underlie our actions; Of Moral Conduct: A Theory of Obligation, Reasons, and Value (Cambridge 2023); and (as Editor) The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge, 3rd ed. 2015). Audi is a past president of the American Philosophical Association, a former director of National Endowment for the Humanities Seminars and Institutes, a recipient of prizes and honors for lifetime contributions to philosophy, a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and presently John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame. His B. A. is from Colgate University, his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan.

Inhaltsangabe

* Preface
* Acknowledgments
* Introduction
* Part One: Perception
* Chapter 1 Perception and Perceptual Belief: Seeing and Knowing the
Physical World
* I. Perception Broadly Conceived
* II. Four Structurally Distinct Cases of Perception
* III. The Representational Character of Perception
* Chapter 2 Dimensions of Perceptual Content
* I. Three Categories of Perceptual Content
* II. Singular Reference and the Possible Role of Russellian
Propositions
* III. Perception and Belief: Cognitive and Conceptual Aspects
* Chapter 3 Perceptual Levels and their Action-Theoretic Counterparts
* I. Perception and Action: The Structural Analogy
* II. Constitutive Elements in the Visual Perception of Physical
Objects
* III. Awareness of Events and Abstract Entities
* IV. The Epistemological Significance of Perceptual Levels
* V. Is Perception Theory-Laden?
* VI. The Importance of "Background Beliefs" and Perceptual Levels
* VII. Aspectual Perception, Inference, and Recognition
* Chapter 4 Perception as a Source of Knowledge and Justification
* I. Perceptual Knowledge
* II. The Hierarchical Character of Perception
* III. Perceptual Justification: External and Internal Dimensions
* IV. The Perceptibility of Normative Properties
* Chapter 5 Reasons, Perceptual Grounds, and Normative Explanation
* I. The Diversity of Reasons for Belief
* II. Reasons as Distinguished from Grounds
* III. Reasons and Grounds for Belief: The Practical Analogy
* IV. Reasons as Explanations
* V. Normative Reasons and their Grounds
* Chapter 6 The Autonomy of Justification
* I. Epistemological Internalism
* II. Does Knowledge Entail Justification?
* III. The Practice-Relativity of Justification
* IV. An Integrated View of Knowledge and Justification
* V. The Disjunctivist Challenge
* VI. The Elusive Notion of the Content of Perceptual Belief
* VII. Perception and Singular Reference
* Part Two: Perception and the A Priori
* Chapter 7 Perception, Intuition, and Apprehension
* I. Perception and Intuition
* II. Structural Parallels between Intuitional and Perceptional
Discourse
* III. Intuitions as Evidential Cognitions: Two Intuitionist Traditions
* IV. Intuitions as Apprehensions
* Chapter 8 Toward a Theory of the A Priori
* I. The Concept of Self-Evidence
* II. Understanding as Central for Knowledge of the Self-evident
* III. Understanding and Imagination
* IV. Major Elements in the Understanding of Propositions
* V. Degrees of Understanding and Propositional Justification
* VI. Comprehensional Adequacy
* VII. Obstacles to Comprehension
* Chapter 9 Apriority, Disputability, and Necessity
* I. Self-Evidence and Provability
* II. Can Rational Disagreement Extend to the Self-Evident?
* III. The Self-Evident, the Obvious, and the Credible
* IV. Apprehension of Abstract Entities
* V. Apriority and Necessity
* Part Three: Practical Knowledge
* Chapter 10 Knowledge, Belief, and Action
* I. Belief and Action
* II. Two Orders of Cognitive Disposition
* III. Belief and Knowledge, Intention and Action
* Chapter 11 Knowing, Reasoning, and Doing
* I. Intellectualism as a Perspective on Action
* II. Practical Knowledge and Knowledge of the Practical
* III. Virtual Knowledge: A Neglected Category
* IV. The Place of Knowledge in Practical Reasoning
* Chapter 12 Inference and Its Role in Rational Action
* I. Inference and Inferential Belief
* II. Inference, Reasoning, and Premise-Based Belief-Formation
* III. Reasoning and Rational Action
* IV. The Scope of Rational Action
* V. Intentionality, Knowledge, and Agency
* Conclusion: Perception, Apprehension, and Action
* References
* Index