Do we have control of how we act, and does it matter to morality whether we do? Thomas Pink examines this free will problem by arguing that what matters to morality is not in fact the freedom to do otherwise, but something more primitive, a basic capacity or power to determine for ourselves what we do.
Do we have control of how we act, and does it matter to morality whether we do? Thomas Pink examines this free will problem by arguing that what matters to morality is not in fact the freedom to do otherwise, but something more primitive, a basic capacity or power to determine for ourselves what we do.
Thomas Pink, Department of Philosophy, King's College London
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction and summary 1: Action and its place in ethics 2: Freedom and purposiveness 3: Motivation and voluntariness 4: The non-voluntariness of the will 5: The voluntariness-based model of action 6: Freedom and scepticism: incompatibilism 7: Freedom and scepticism: alternatives 8: Moral responsibility and reduction 9: The practical reason-based model and its past 10: Intention and practical reason 11: The action-constitutive exercise of reason 12: Action and its motivation 13: Voluntariness and freedom of the will 14: Freedom and causation 15: Freedom as a power
Introduction and summary 1: Action and its place in ethics 2: Freedom and purposiveness 3: Motivation and voluntariness 4: The non-voluntariness of the will 5: The voluntariness-based model of action 6: Freedom and scepticism: incompatibilism 7: Freedom and scepticism: alternatives 8: Moral responsibility and reduction 9: The practical reason-based model and its past 10: Intention and practical reason 11: The action-constitutive exercise of reason 12: Action and its motivation 13: Voluntariness and freedom of the will 14: Freedom and causation 15: Freedom as a power
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